Operation „Mammut“

A Wehrmacht commando operation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1943

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Edited and introduced

by

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Introduction

This is the story of an undertaking that was launched to pull away Iraq and ultimately the whole of Arabia from the British Empire and bring it under German control. The commander, Johann Gottfried Müller, hoped to achieve maximum effect with minimum effort. With only a few agents, the Kurds in northern Iraq were to be incited to rebellion, which would then spread and ultimately bring down British rule. It was a bold plan, but it quickly failed, revealing how little the German protagonists knew about the Iraqi people, especially the Kurds.

Müller and his subordinates, including a Kurdish student, Ramzi al-Nafi, parachuted over northern Iraq in June 1943 and attempted to make contact with Kurdish tribal leaders. The initial goals were limited, but were to be gradually expanded if the operation succeeded. Afterwards, more groups of agents were to be sent and, finally, a large organisation to be established. Müller hoped to ultimately spark a large-scale rebellion.

The plan was as bold as it was unrealistic. Completely misinterpreting the real situation, especially the capabilities of the British in the country, Müller and his first group were arrested after only a few days.

The operation „Mammut“ in historical context

At the beginning of the Second World War, unlike in 1914, the Near and Middle East were not the immediate focus of German expansion and conquest interests.[1] Hitler and the leadership of the OKW[2] and OKH[3] were very much fixated on continental campaigns in Europe and therefore had only a peripheral view of the global perspective.

Although Iraq had formally become independent in 1932, it was still de facto under the influence of its former mandatory power, Great Britain. In May 1941, the pro-German government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani (1892-1965) clashed with the British, who wanted to march troops from India through Iraq.

[1] The information in this section is based primarily on Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien aus der Sicht deutscher Kriegsteilnehmer und Orientreisender 1918 bis 1945, Aufstandsfantasien, Kriegserfahrungen, Zukunftshoffnungen, Enttäuschungen, Distanz, Frankfurt am Main 2012, chap. 4.4 and the essay by Pherset Rosbeiani, Subversion gegen das Empire: Das Unternehmen "Mammut" 1943 (Subversion against the Empire: The "Mammoth" Operation in 1943), in: Militärgeschichte, Zeitschrift für Politische Bildung (Military History, Journal for Political Education), 4/2016, pp. 10–13. See also Rosbeiani, Pherset, Das Unternehmen "Mammut" (The "Mammoth" Operation). A political-military intelligence operation in South Kurdistan in 1942/43 and its background; dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlin, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/rosbeiani-pherset-zuber-mohammed-2011-06-08/PDF/rosbeiani.pdf

[2] = Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Wehrmacht).

[3] = Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Army).

This led to war. The Iraqi army took action against the British forces, not least because the government in Baghdad hoped that the Germans would intervene.

In this context, outspoken advocates of German intervention in the Orient had already become active and revived old hopes from the period before 1918.[4] Particularly noteworthy are Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer (1885-1948), Otto Werner von Hentig (1886-1984, both leaders of a risky, and finally unsuccessful, expedition to Afghanistan in 1915/16), and Franz von Papen (1879-1969, last Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, then briefly Vice-Chancellor under Hitler, later transferred to the post of German Ambassador in Ankara). Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) was sympathetic to such a commitment.

In Berlin, these forces were unable to prevail with their views against the primacy of Hitler's one-sided race and extermination war against the Soviet Union. Hitler did issue Directive No. 30 on 23 May 1941 on warfare in the Middle East and support for the "Arab freedom movement". However, this was more a wish list and a set of options than a call to arms. The dictator then approved the deployment of only a few squadrons of Me 110 and He 111 aircraft in Iraq, primarily as a "heroic gesture" to the Iraqis. The British, for their part, had air force units in Iraq (including Hawker Hurricanes) and quickly struck back. The German units received no replacements for their losses and were therefore quickly wiped out. The Iraqi army was then quickly defeated by British troops. The British subsequently occupied Iraq and Syria.

After the failure of the "Iraq adventure" in 1941, military activities were limited to commando operations by the "Abwehr". One of these projects was Operation „Mammut“. The planning, preparation and execution of such operations was in the responsibility of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr under its long-time commander, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887- 1945). Abwehr Department II (Sabotage and Subversion) under the leadership of Colonel Erwin Edler von Lahousen-Vivremont (1897-1955) was directly in charge.[5] Lahousen-Vivremont had been transferred from the Austrian Armed Forces to the Wehrmacht in March 1938 and later promoted to Major General. From June 1935 to March 1938, he had headed the Evidenz- und Informationsdienst (Evidence and Information Service), i.e. the military intelligence service in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. He led the Abwehr Abteilung II from 1 January 1939 until the end of the war. Lahousen was responsible for a whole series of intelligence operations – mostly unsuccessful. The majority of these operations and sabotage actions failed due to technical and organisational shortcomings, combined with the occurrence of circumstances that were rarely predictable or calculable.

The operational planning, preparation and deployment of special teams to selected targets, including in the Middle East, was carried out by the Eastern Group of Abw. Abt. II („Gruppe Ost“). The group

[4] As the space in this publication is limited no extensive quoting of all further relevant literature, e.g. for the framework etc., is possible. Cf. in general, *i.a*., the publications of David Motadel and Jeffrey Herf. For the famous expedition of Hentig and Niedermayer to Kabul cf., i.a., Jules Stewart, The Kaiser's Mission to Kabul: A Secret Expedition to Afghanistan in World War I, London 2014. For background information and details (including operational aspects) of the German Air Force's mission in Iraq 1941, see Bernd–Philipp Schröder, Irak 1941, Freiburg 1980. From a British perspective, see Robert Lyman, Iraq 1941, The battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad, Oxford 2006. For a somewhat dramatised account of events from a British perspective, see Barrie G. James, Hitler’s Gulf War, The Fight for Iraq 1941, Barnsley 2009.

[5] For Lahousen-Vivremont cf. Harry Carl Schaub, Abwehrgeneral Erwin Lahousen. Der erste Zeuge beim Nürnberger Prozess, Vienna 2015.

leader was Lieutenant Colonel Putz, who was very experienced in military espionage and sabotage work. He was in charge of several desks which, depending on the geographical location of the target locations, dealt with all theatres of war in Europe and overseas.

The purpose of these activities was to cause as much damage as possible to the main enemies, in this case primarily Great Britain, through inciting insurgencies, secret sabotage and a whole range of diversionary tactics. In the Middle East, the long-term goal was to destabilise the British Empire – a highly ambitious goal.

Lieutenant Gottfried Johannes Müller, the head of the planned operation, submitted a memorandum dated 5 December 1942 to Abwehr II for an operation called "Said Schahwar" (later renamed "Mammut") in northern Iraq.

The idea for this memorandum had already been raised on 21 October 1942, when the head of Group East of Abwehr Department II, Lieutenant Colonel Putz, discussed the potential success of sabotage and insurgency operations in Iraqi Kurdistan with his subordinates and other colleagues. Müller, who later became the commander of the operation, was also present at this meeting.

The background to the planning of such a operation was the strategic situation in autumn 1942, when the German armies were about to conquer the Caucasus region. There was at least a theoretical possibility of the Wehrmacht advancing south into Iraq and then throughout the entire Middle East. However, the disaster in Stalingrad consigned such hopes to the realm of wishful thinking and dreams.[6]

Despite the developments on the front lines, the order to launch Operation Mammoth was issued on 14 January 1943. This was done with the approval of department head Lahousen. Müller was considered sufficiently competent to successfully lead this operation due to a trip to the Middle East in 1935/36, which had taken him to the Sulaimaniya area. However, the very thin personnel resources were also a factor in the background. There were hardly any other forces in the Abwehr's portfolio who had similar experience.

There were also substantial lacks in terms of professionalism. Not only Müller, but the entire Abwehr had failed to realise that Operation „Mammut“ was based on Müller's -very limited- knowledge of the situation in South Kurdistan in the mid-1930s, that had to be supplemented by older British publications. The main target of the operation was the Kurdish sheikh Mahmud Barzinji ("Mammut" as a corruption of "Mahmud"), who until 1931 had carried out a series of uprisings against the British Mandate achieving some quite impressive successes that added to much worrying on the British side. According to his own statements, Müller had met him himself during his trip to the Orient.

[6] For further information incl. plans for similar operations, e.g. Unternehmen „Dromedar“ to incite an insurgency in Armenia, cf. Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, p. 30. Cf. The work written by Staritz was never published and lacks exact footnotes and proofs. Nevertheless, it must be consulted, as Staritz was involved in the Abwehr and took part in special mission in World War II. Furthermore, he used a great many of revelant reserach literature on the subject. As most of these, sometimes specialist works, cannot be referred to here, see Staritz as a general reference. Also for more information, espec. on intelligence, transmission, radio etc., incl. the general framework (organisation etc., further command missions e.g. (p. 24f.) in North Africa, Afghanistan, and the establishment of world wide transmission network, espec. in Asia). A permanent eyewitness account (video) by Staritz can be watched at the Deutsche Spionagemuseum, Berlin (general exhibition).

However, by 1943, the hopes this had raised were no longer in line with reality, because Mahmud had withdrawn from the active resistance movement in South Kurdistan after a series of defeats against the British, including the failure of the Gailani coup in mid-1941. He was living under house arrest in Baghdad, monitored by the British. In the meantime, there had been further uprisings, for example by Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and later also by his younger brother, Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), the father of the former president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (2005 – 2017), Masud Barzani. These rebellions had remained unknown in Germany.

In his memorandum, Müller had expressed the hope that, with a few dozen men and massive support from Kurdish tribes, he would not only be able to hold out against British colonial rule in Iraq for a long time, but might even be able to bring it down. One of the most important aspects hereby was the oil in Kurdistan.

Crucial to the success of "Mammut" was the recruitment of the Kurdish informant Ramzi Nafi' Raschid Agha (1917-1948), a young Kurdish idealist from Erbil who, through his cooperation with the Abwehr, was to send a signal for the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan from the Arab central government installed by the British in Baghdad.

„Mammut“ within the structure of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr (OKW)

The planning and execution of Operation Mammoth was the responsibility of Abwehr II. This section was one of three Abwehr departments within the Office Foreign Intelligence and Defence Office, (Amt „Ausland/Abwehr“)[7] of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW). Abwehr Department I, headed by Colonel Hans Piekenbrock since 1936, was in charge for the "Secret Reporting Service" (Geheimer Meldedienst)[8] while Department III, led by Major Rudolf Bamler, had to run "counter-espionage" (Spionageabwehr).[9] Department II, responsible for "Mammut," was the Abwehr department for "sabotage and subversion" (Sabotage und Zersetzung)[10], under the leadership of Lahousen-Vivremont.[11]

[7] Not to be confused with German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt).

[8] = espionage.

[9] Cf. (only most important works in the context of „Mammut“) Richard Bassett, Hitler's Master Spy: The Mystery of Wilhelm Canaris; Cologne/Weimar 2005, p. 105 ff. (furthermore in general, by the same author Hitler's Spy Chief: The Wilhelm Canaris Betrayal. New York 2011) and Norbert Müller, et al. (eds.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, p. 53 ff.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See, among others, Thomas Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr im Spiegel der Aktenüberlieferung im Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br., in: MGZ 67 (2008), no. 1, p. 119 and p. 128. and Müller, Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, p. 55.

When Lahousen took over the leadership of Abwehr Department II, its structure and its tasks only existed for a few months. As part of a reorganisation of the OKW's command structure, which had been personally initiated by the Chief of the High Command, Wilhelm Keitel, on 1 June 1938, the Foreign Intelligence and Defence Office („Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr“) had been created and placed under the command of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.[12] Canaris, who had been head of the German military intelligence service since 1935, reorganised the department under his command. He merged the seven existing Abwehr groups[13] into the Abwehr departments I and III and formed the Abwehr department II (Abwehrabteilung II).[14] In addition to sabotage, the main task of Abwehr II was to incite minorities to revolt in enemy-occupied territories. Accordingly, the initial structure of the department was divided into Group I "Minorities" and Group II "Special Measures," supplemented by Departments Ia (Administration Officer) and Ib (Laboratory Management).[15]

After taking office, Lahousen attempted to meet the increased demands placed on his department during the war by expanding and reorganising Abwehr II. The original two groups were divided into five and six.[16] Apart from the "Chief's Office" and "Technology" groups, each of the groups was dedicated to a specific geographical area. The secret service support for the Soviet Union fell within the remit of Group A, while Group W(est) dealt with the areas west of the German Reich and Group O(st) with all areas to the east (except the Soviet Union).[17] Given the developments in the following years, it is hardly surprising an entire defence group, Group A, dealt with the Soviet Union alone.

Responsibility for Operation „Mammut“, which had been in preparation since early 1943, lay with Group O(st), which at that time was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Putz.[18] His subordinate Captain Dr Eisenberg, and Sonderführer Dr Wagner[19] were both involved in the preparations for the operation. Statements made by Lieutenant Gottfried Müller during his interrogation by British intelligence officers indicate that Captain Dr Eisenberg in particular played a key role in the preparations for "Mammut". This is hardly surprising, given that, according to a telephone directory of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr from 1943, Dr Eisenberg had been entrusted with the management of the

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[12] See, among others, Heinz Höhne, Canaris. Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich 1967, p. 275 f. and Michael Mueller, Canaris. Hitlers Abwehrchef, Berlin 2006, p. 233.

[13] *Group I (Reconnaissance), Group II (Encryption and Radio Interception Service), Group III (Counterintelligence), Group IV (Naval Transport Service), Group V (Navy), Group VI (Air Force), Group VII (Sabotage)*; see, among others, Menzel, T.; Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/ Abwehr; p. 115.

[14] Höhne, Canaris, p. 276.

[15] See ibid., p. 119 f. and Julius Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus. Ein Dokumentarbericht über Aufbau, Struktur und Operationen des OKW-Geheimdienstes Ausland/Abwehr mit einer Chronologie seiner Einsätze von 1933 bis 1944, Berlin 1983, p. 418.

[16] Bassett and Höhne each mention an additional group, "Southeast" and "Overseas" respectively, which are not mentioned by Menzel and Müller. Bassett, Hitler's Master Spy, p. 106f., Höhne, Canaris, Cover Text, as well as Müller, Das Amt Ausland Abwehr, p. 492 f. and Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr, p. 128.

[17] Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr, p. 125.

[18] Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland/Abwehr, p. 128.

[19] Müller, Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr, p. 493: Staffing of the Foreign Office/Abwehr in the OKW according to the telephone directory of the Foreign Office/Abwehr, BA-MA, RHD 46/3.

"SOS" (Sabotage East-South) department[20] since at least March of that year, whose area of responsibility primarily covered the Orient and thus also Iraq.[21] The documents printed here repeatedly refer to the "Abwehr II / Orient" department, a designation that cannot be found in the relevant research literature. It can therefore be assumed that this designation refers to the Abwehr II / Ost or Abwehr II / SOS departments.

If Müller's statements are to be believed, Eisenberg maintained contact with the field offices of the Abwehr department, the so-called KO's or Kriegsorganisationen (war organisations). Since 1936, the Abwehr had begun to become active in neutral or occupied countries and to set up secret service outposts under this designation.[22] A list of the KOs dated 18 September 1941, for example, includes branch offices in Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Iran, China and Turkey.[23] These posts were mostly located in German diplomatic missions in the respective countries and could fulfil a wide variety of tasks and requirements. The range of tasks depended largely on which Abwehr department the active intelligence officer in a KO belonged to.[24]

After the failure of the anti-British revolt in Iraq in 1941, which was supported by the Abwehr department[25], Admiral Canaris came to the conclusion that it was necessary to set up a foreign intelligence branch in the region in order to carry out future intelligence operations in the Middle East. As a result, a KO control centre was set up in the German embassy in Ankara in the same year. At the same time, a branch of the Abwehr was formed in Istanbul, headed by Paul Leverkuehn.[26] According to Leverkuehn's own account, the task of the two bureaus was to set up an intelligence service in the Middle East and thus support the activities of the Abwehr in this area and provide it with information. Another task of the KO'sappears to have been the recruitment of informants and agents for the Abwehr.[27] The secret service office in Istanbul was particularly important for the "Mammut" operation. According to Müller's statement, Eisenberg maintained constant contact with Istanbul. With the help of the Istanbul KO, Ramzi Nafi Raschid was recruited to participate in the operation as a Kurdish informant.

In addition to the „Gruppe Ost“ within Abwehr II, in which the "Mammut" mission group was embedded, the Technology Group (Gruppe Technik) of Abwehr II played a particularly important role in the preparation and planning of the operation. The Technology Group was headed at that time by Colonel Marguerre and was responsible for all areas of material procurement, development and

[20] Business distribution plan Abwehr II (20 January 1941), BArch RH 2/3109, in: Menzel, Organisational History of the Foreign Office/Defence Office, p. 123.

[21] See ibid.

[22] Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, p. 212 f.

[23] Menzel, Organisational History of the Foreign Office/Defence, p. 124.

[24] Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, p. 212.

[25] On al-Gailani's failed uprising, see, among others, Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen "Mammut", as quoted in FN 1, p. 53 ff.

[26] See, among others, Paul Leverkuehn, Der Geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehrmacht, p. 161 and Mueller, Canaris, p. 225.

[27] See Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, p. 212 ff.

maintenance. It was also responsible for running the "Laboratorium," a research and development centre of Abwehr located in Berlin Tegel. The files on Operation „Mammut“ show during the preparations for the operation repeatedly the support of the Technik group and the expertise of the laboratory in Tegel was requested. For example, there is a list of material requirements addressed to Abwehr II/LT[28] and signed by Lieutenant Colonel Putz, that encompasses various items that were needed for the implementation of "Mammut".[29] The technical group of Abwehr II was probably entrusted with the procurement of these items and materials, insofar as they were not part of the general requirements for soldiers. Furthermore, a file note by Müller dated 5 April 1943[30] indicates that First Lieutenant Mühlmann was consulted for exercises for explosives (calculation of blast effect etc.). This First Lieutenant Mühlmann was an engineer and explosives expert at the demolition and testing site of the Abwehr laboratory in Berlin/Tegel.[31]

As the operational arm of Abwehr II, the department was formally subordinate to the Training Regiment or Special Unit (Lehrregiment / Sonderverband) z.b.V. 800 "Brandenburg".[32] This "command unit" of Abwehr II, which was initially established in September 1939 as a construction training company "for special purposes," primarily served as an "offensive intelligence service"[33] , i.e. as an instrument for carrying out operations behind enemy lines planned and prepared by the Abwehr.

It had been deemed necessary that specially trained and skilled men were needed for such undertakings, and the "Brandenburger" had been created for this purpose as a command unit within the Abwehr. The ranks of the "Brandenburgers" included Germans formerly living abroad, for example came from South and South West Africa or the Sudeten German areas, as well as emigrants and refugees, mainly from Eastern European countries, who were often assigned to missions in their respective countries of origin due to their local and language skills.[34]

The Brandenburgers carried out various operations in a wide range of theatres of war. Their missions included Operation „Dora“ in West Africa and Operation „Wildschütz“ in Yugoslavia.[35] In the wake of

[28] Probably refers to "Leiter T(echnik)" (Head of Technology), Colonel Marguerre.

[29] BArch RW 5/ 271, list of materials requested on 20 March 1943, p. 35 ff. (this list is not printed in the following document section).

[30] BArch RW 5/ 271, p. 18, file note on the meeting between liaison officer Lt. Dr. Messow and operations commander Lt. Müller.

[31] See the relevant sources below in the document section.

[32] In November 1942, the training regiment was expanded into a special unit for special purposes (Sonderverband), and later designated as division. See Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland / Abwehr, pp. 121f., p. 126 and pp. 130f., with footnote 120, as well as Müller, Das Amt Ausland/ Abwehr, pp. 56f.

[33] See ibid.

[34] Cf., among others, Lawrence Paterson, Hitler's Brandenburgers, The Third Reich Elite Special Forces, Barnsley 2018, further Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, p. 439 ff. and Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p.16, p. 42. Further Helmuth Spaeter, Die Brandenburger. Eine deutsche Kommandotruppe zbV 800, Munich 1978, p. 10.

[35] See, among others, Werner Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges, pp. 211 ff. and pp. 304 ff. as well as Spaeter, Die Brandenburger, pp. 288 ff.

Canaris's removal from power in February 1944 and the takeover of the Abwehr by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, the Brandenburg Division was placed directly under the OKW and converted into a frontline unit of the Wehrmacht.[36]

One unit of the Brandenburgers, the so-called "Arab Brigade", had apparently joined forces with the Iraqis during the uprising led by Rashid Ali al-Gailani in 1941 to fight against British troops in Iraq.[37] This force was formed from Iraqi, Persian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, Saudi Arabian and Yemeni volunteers. It went into battle against the troops of the Empire under the leadership of German officers, albeit with very limited and only local success.[38] Finally, it withdrew to Iran and to Syria in May / June 1941, from where it continued the fight.[39] Members of these units could possibly have been able to provide information to the "Mammut" operation, but it is not certain whether such personnel were available at the beginning of 1943 and whether their information was still useful.[40]

Müller and the members of his "Mammut" group were not integrated into the command structure of the "Brandenburger," and it does not appear that had any active duty with them. As far as we know, there were no consultations, talks or exchange of experiences between those responsible for the "Mammut" and the "Brandenburger". It remains doubtful that Müller and his men were really under the command of the division.

[36] For the history of the „Brandenburger“ on the whole (cf. in general, and for the following section of this publication, if not other works or sources are quoted) the publications Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Franz Kurowski, Deutsche Kommandotrupps 1939–1945,. "Brandenburger" und Abwehr im weltweiten Einsatz, Stuttgart 2004, and Hans Bentzien, Hans Bentzien, Division Brandenburg, Die Rangers von Admiral Canaris, Berlin, 2nd edition, 2004.

[37] Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges, pp. 400–417 and Franz Kurowski, Deutsche Kommandotrupps 1939–1945pp. 117 ff. However, there is no reliable information on the deployment of the "Arab Brigade". The basic information comes from Brockdorff's work from 1967, which, however, does not provide any evidence or proof and is probably based on eyewitness accounts. All later works, including those by Kurowski and Bentzien, have obviously copied a lot of Brockdorffs information. Mader's work has been long cited after its publication due to a lack of other sources of information, but it also has considerable shortcomings.

[38] Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Secret Commands of the Second World War), p. 404.

[39] See Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus, pp. 351-355.

[40] This "Arab Brigade" (Arabische Brigade) is not to be confused with the Free Arab Legion („Legion Freies Arabien“) or the German-Arab Training Corps („Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung“). These designations refers to special units (Sonderverband 287 and 288) formed in Greece by the Special Staff F („Sonderstab F“) under the leadership of Hellmuth Felmy, parts of which were then deployed in North Africa and Russia, among other places. Special Staff F (later i.a. General Command for special use, „Generalkommando z.b.V.“) was not subordinate to the Abwehr, but directly to the OKW. Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien, chapters 4.2.1. and 4.2.2, David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War, Cambridge, Mass. 2017, ch.6., further Gerhard Weber, Hellmuth Felmy, Stationen einer militärischen Karriere, Ruhpolding 2010, pp. 137–179. Caution is necessary when using terminology here, as the terms are sometimes used inaccurately or in different ways, even in more recent publications.

From the outset, the Mammut operation faced the problem of not having enough up-to-date information about its target area, Iraq. A single, albeit lengthy, trip such as the one undertaken by Müller was hardly sufficient to adequately understand the complex social, political, military and, indeed, human relationships involved. Attempts were made to call on scientists and specialists.

One of the few people available for the special mission profile for the Mammut company who also held politically acceptable views was Karl Hadank, who was tasked with informing the members about language, life and customs of the Kurds. He also gave a series of lectures on the subject, including at the accommodation in the Alps.

Hadank was born in 1889 and was a linguist (Iranian studies) rather than a Kurdish scholar.[41] He married the writer Gertrud von Wenckstein (1870 - 1936) in 1915. His health had obviously suffered early on, as in 1916 he was not drafted into the front lines or the Landwehr, but into the Landsturm in Rathenow. When his special linguistic skills became known to the military administration, he was sent as an interpreter to the German troops in the Orient (Bandirma, Marmara Sea). At the end of the war in 1918, Hadank was interned, where he fell seriously ill. He then returned home via Konstanz. He lived in Berlin-Friedrichshagen near the Müggelsee until his death in 1945.[42]

As scholar, Hadank got his big chance in 1918.[43] The Prussian Academy of Sciences needed an expert clerk to prepare and publish the papers of Oskar Mann, a well-known Orientalist and linguist who had undertaken extensive travels in the Orient between 1901 and 1907 to research Persian and Kurdish dialects. Mann had died in 1917.[44] His sister Martha Mann had agreed to make his papers available for research. The fact that the Academy chose Hadank for this task was probably due not only to scientific reasons but also to political considerations, as Hadank was not among the leading German Orientalists. The Oskar Mann Estate-Commission at the Academy, chaired by Privy Councillor[45] Prof. Eduard Sachau

[41] For basic information, see the printed document in: ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 219, Gertrud von Wenckstern, died 1 October 1936, Berlin-Friedrichshagen by Professor Dr Reinhard Strecker, Berlin-Hessenwinkel, Neuland-Verlag 1936.

[42] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 218, Müggelseedamm 229. Death noted in: ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 114, note on postcard dated 12 February 1945. Hadank had died a few days before this date.

[43] For the following, see ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200 and -199, files concerning the Oskar Mann papers 1931–1939. See also Karl Hadank, The Dialects of Khunsar, Mahallat, Natänz, Nayin, Sämnan, Sivänd and So-Kohrud, Berlin Leipzig 1926 (= Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen, Kurdish-Persian Research, Ergebnisse einer von 1901 bis 1903 und 1906 bis 1907 in Persien und der Asiatischen Türkei ausgeführten For-schungsreise von Oskar Mann, fortgeführt von Karl Hadank, Section III (North-Western Iranian), Volume 1)), pp. IX–XXII.

[44] Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, Kiel (upcoming), ch. 2.4., and Avzi, Remzi Avci, Mit der Peitsche in den dreckigen Orient: Die Darstellung des Orients in Oskar Manns Reisebriefen, in: Alman Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi - Studien zur deutschen Sprache und Literatur 46/2021, pp. 101-119.

[45] = Geheimer Regierungsrat.

and including Orientalist Prof. Heinrich Lüders[46] , apparently wanted a reliable editor, probably also because it was uncertain how the political situation would develop.[47]

However, there were also fundamental conditions and conflicts within Oriental studies behind this decision. Until the end of the German Empire and beyond, the focus was less on researching the cultural, political, ethnic, etc. way of life of the peoples of the "Middle East" but more on the language and its transmission (e.g. texts). Sachau, who became director of the newly founded Seminar for Oriental Languages in 1898, positioned himself here and pursued a corresponding personnel policy with the backing of the relevant ministries.[48] Hadank is likely to have benefited from this.

Hadank did, however, have very good language skills. He was an Iranist and also understood Turkish and Ossetian. He was a real specialist on the Zaza and Gurani, relatively small tribes in Persia, which Hadank himself regarded as separate ethnic and linguistic groups – distinct from the Kurds, although quite closely related to them.[49]

There had been disputes right from the start of the work, because Hadank had carelessly revealed during a language course taught by Professor Marquardt that he had access to Oskar Mann's papers. Marquardt immediately put Hadank under pressure to hand over the collection. Hadank was able to prevent this with the help of the Academy.[50]

However, the start of work was delayed because Hadank was still ill. After Hadank received Oskar Mann's papers on 6 October 1919 against receipt, [51] he began work, which was repeatedly interrupted by outbreaks of illness. In the mid-1920s, he finally took early retirement as a teacher.[52] He was then

[46] Lüders was a specialist in Buddhist literature and Sanskrit and a staunch advocate of the kinship between Germanic peoples and Indians and their opposition to Muslims. Nevertheless, he was banned from teaching after 1933, presumably for political reasons. Cf. the article „Indien“, in: Der Orient und Wir, Sechs Vorträge des Deutschen Orient-Vereins Berlin, Berlin Leipzig 1935, pp. 68–92. Lüders succeeded Sachau as chairman of the Oskar Mann Estate-Commission after Sachaus death in 1930. The commission also included F.W.K. Müller and a certain Mr. Ermann. ABBAW: PAW (1812–1945), II-VIII-199, p. 47, Prussian Academy of Sciences, No. 45.21 to the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Education, 8 February 1921.

[47] Hadank received the corresponding invitation before the end of the war, on 29 June 1918. ABBAW: PAW (1812–1945), II-VIII-199, p. 17, Hadank, Vertraulicher Bericht zur Abwendung künftiger Prioritätssteitigkeiten über die Aufhellung des Zara (Confidential Report on the Prevention of Future Priority Disputes over the Clarification of the Zara), 7 February 1920.

[48] See Ludmilla Hanisch, Die Nachfolger der Exegeten, Deutschsprachige Erforschung des Vorderen Orients in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden 2003, esp. pp. 36–45.

[49] This insight was and still is a political issue, as language and its classification are important factors in defining (including state) affiliation. See Zilfi Selcan, (ed.), Zur Klassifizierung westiranischer Sprachen von Karl Hadank, published posthumously in Acta Orientalia, 53 (1992), pp. 28f.

[50] ABBAW: PAW (1812 – 1945), II-VIII-199, pp. 16 and 17, including Hadank, Vertraulicher Bericht zur Abwendung künftiger Prioritätssteitigkeiten über die Aufhellung des Zara, 7 February 1920.

[51] ABBAW: PAW (1812–1945), II-VIII-199, confirmation of receipt from Hadank dated 6 October 1919.

[52] ABBAW: PAW (1812–1945), II-VIII-199, p. 74, Academy to the Ministry of Science, Art and Education, No. 1323.24, 5 December 1924.

able to devote more time to the estate, but made only slow progress because he was repeatedly ill. Hadank was also only partially fit for tropical and oriental climates.

His central project was the "Kurdish-Persian Research" (Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen, KPF), a complete edition of the essential linguistic and literary manifestations of the peoples of the region, especially those that were still unknown. Hadank published one volume each on the languages of the Gurani and Zaza peoples for the Third Department in 1926, 1930 and 1932.[53] The fourth and final section was to deal with the Kurds, who were not, however, Hadank's area of expertise. He spoke Kurdish only rudimentarily, and was not really familiar with their way of life.

He therefore applied for a trip to Syria and Iraq, which was financed by the Academy and the Emergency Association of German Science (Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft). The Foreign Office had refused to contribute to the costs.[54] Hadank set off on his journey on 5 November 1932, travelling via Basel to Genoa, where he boarded a German steamer bound for Port Said.[55] From there he travelled to Beirut and on to Damascus, where he met the well-known Emir Djeladet Ali Bedir Khan, a grandson of "the rebellious Emir Bedir Khan known from Moltke's travel letters from Turkey (1835–1839)".[56] Bedir Khan and his brother Dr. Kamuran Bedir Khan led the Khoybun society, an organisation initially tolerated by the French for the promotion of the Kurdish nation and language, but in fact a nationalist association, which Ramzi al-Nafi also joined.[57] Hadank took language lessons from Bedir Khan's secretary Kedrican for several weeks, during which he also inquired about the

[53] The Kurdish-Persian Research (Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen, KPF) had been planned and created by Oskar Mann in four sections, which were continued by Hadank. The series began with the dialects of the Fars region and then continued geographically in a north-westerly direction "towards the periphery". Karl Hadank, The Dialects of Khunsar, Mahallat, Natänz, Nayin, Sämnan, Sivänd and So-Kohrud, Berlin Leipzig 1926 (= Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen, Kurdish-Persian Research, Ergebnisse einer von 1901 bis 1903 und 1906 bis 1907 in Persien und der Asiatischen Türkei ausgeführten Forschungsreise von Oskar Mann, fortgeführt von Karl Hadank, Section III (North-Western Iranian), Volume 1)), p. XXIII. Section II dealt with Lurish, Section III, which was continued by Hadank (although only volumes 1, 2 and 4 were published), dealt with dialects more distant from Persian, such as Gurani and Zaza. Sections I and II had been completed by Oskar Mann. Section IV (Kurdish dialects), begun by Mann, resulted in one published volume on the Mukri Kurds, but was not continued. The third volume of Hadank's Section III was not published. Preliminary work on this may be contained in Hadank's papers. See Zilfi Selcan, (ed.), Zur Klassifizierung westiranischer Sprachen von Karl Hadank, (published posthumously) in Acta Orientalia, 53 (1992), pp. 28–86. Selcan classifies this text as an independent article. However, Hadank seems to have planned it as a preface to the missing third volume of his III. Section der KPF. Ibid., pp. 32 and 52.

[54] ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200, p. 108a, Prussian Academy of Sciences, excerpt from the minutes of the phil-hist. Klasse of 27 October 1932.

[55] For the following, see ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 211, itinerary [Hadank's] and 212, expenses during the trip in 1932.

[56] ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200, p. 124, Hadank, 13th annual report on the work on Oskar Mann's Kurdish-Persian estate, Damascus, 26 November 1932. See also ibid., p. 119, Hadank to Lüders from the Grand Hotel D'Orient Khaouam, Damascus, 26 November 1932. Cf. also Barbara Henning, Narratives of the History of the Ottoman Kurdish Bedirhani Family in Imperial and Post-Imperial Contexts, Bamberg 2018 [download: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/bitstream/uniba/43114/1/BOST13HenningBarbaraDissopusse_A3a.pdf], pp. 553 – 561.

[57] Jordi Tefel, Syria's Kurds, History, Politics and Society, London New York 2009, pp. 16–23. See also David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London, 5th edition, 2014, pp. 468f. Djaladet Ali Bedir Khan also published the bi-monthly magazine Hawar.

situation of the Kurds in Syria. Based on this knowledge he wrote a short handwritten treatise in which he nourished hope for conflicts with Arabs and the potential for an uprising among the Kurds.[58] He also made contact with Kurds and visited the Kurdish quarter of Damascus.

On 6–7 December 1932, he travelled on to Baghdad, where he arrived already ill. After receiving treatment, he was able to make contact with several prominent figures in the city, including former Iraqi minister Mohammed Amin Zaki, German envoy Fritz Grobba, British Orient Secretary Vyvyan Holt and C. J. Edmonds, a well-known British political officer who later published an important work on Iraq.[59]

However, this marked the end of his scientific and linguistic work, as Hadank fell seriously ill towards the end of January 1933. He was bedridden for the next four months and required nursing care. This was anything but guaranteed in Baghdad at the time, as there existed no adequate medical care system and Hadank was a foreigner. He found accommodation in what was probably the only German guesthouse in the city. This stay would prove to be disastrous over time.[60] The guesthouse was run by Hans Neyer and his wife Emmy, who apparently also cared for Hadank. However, Neyer was a more than shady character with a high criminal energy. The German consulate reported that Neyer had made several attempts to defraud local businessmen, e.g. in order to obtain MAN trucks delivered from Germany.[61] Furthermore, he attempted to continuously defame Jewish businessmen, probably in the hope for gaining advantages, maybe getting a chance to rip them of their means. By the time, Hitler had seized power in Germany.[62]

Hadank now came to the attention of Neyer and his wife. They had apparently searched Hadank's luggage and found his money and currency reserves. Despite his serious illness, Hadank became suspicious and probably feared that he would die in Baghdad. Therefore, he gathered his last strength and flew to Gaza with Imperial Airways. The Neyers had also taken his passport and tried to get hold of his suitcase.[63] Hadank apparently also feared an indirect attempt on his life, maybe by assistance of a certain Trumpeter, an accomplice of Neyer. On the flight to Gaza, he described his plight to a Czech man who spoke German and wrote down Hadank's story. Hadank finally managed to get a flight to

[58] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 130, Sachwissenschaften, Damascus, 17 November – December 1932, esp. pp. 14–17.

[59] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 212, publications during the 1932 journey, p. 26f. (The publication by Edmonds: Cecil J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925, London, 1957). Cf. also ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200, Hadank to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, 14th annual report on the work on Oskar Mann's Kurdish-Persian papers, 3 December 1933.

[60] For the following, see ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 74, pp. 1–5, 7f., 16. See also ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200, pp. 127–140. The address: Pension Neyer Moser, Baghdad / Iraq 7 Sarrafijje 18/2/1 11/1/1.

[61] For the following, cf. PAAA, R 78042, Special File Hans Neyer, German Legation in Baghdad, No. 658, Return of Hans Neyer, previously residing here, to Germany, 27 May 1933.

[62] The German Legation in Baghdad noted that his wife Emma Anna Moses, whom Neyer had married in Baghdad on 5 May 1933, was Jewish and that Neyer had been a communist before the Nazis came to power. PAAA, R 78042, German Legation in Baghdad to the Gestapo Office in Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8, 7 September 1935.

[63] Neyer himself had no passport and was only tolerated in Iraq.

Germany. After staying in a special clinic in Munich and undergoing treatment in the Thuringian Forest, he returned to Berlin.[64]

After a period of recovery, he continued his work on the fourth volume of Oskar Mann's "Kurdish-Persian Research," but no more volumes were ever published. Further trips to Iraq were out of the question.[65] From now on, Hadank had to acquire the missing knowledge from books, mainly from the Staatsbibliothek (State Library). This caused considerable problems, because international literature in particular was difficult to obtain through the interlibrary loans system, and it was not easy to buy the books Hadank needed as the State Library had limited funds.

Hadank spent a considerable amount of time in the State Library, where he made extensive excerpts from specialist literature and the key publications of English representatives in the region, primarily Ely Banister Soane, Archibald Milne Hamilton and Rupert Hay. He repeatedly complained to the Academy that he was unable to access foreign specialist literature.

After the war began, these difficulties became even greater. Hadank was ultimately an isolated private scholar, translator and linguist who sat in the State Library and in Friedrichshagen on the Müggelsee.[66] His practical knowledge of the Kurds was limited.

He was particularly embittered because he had been ignored or treated with hostility by the mainstream of Oriental studies until 1933.[67] He harbored a particular hatred for democratic Orientalists, especially Carl Heinrich Becker (1876–1933)[68], who was Prussian Minister of Culture from 1925 to 1930 and whom he accused of homosexual tendencies.[69] After the Nazis seized power, this

[64] Hadank continued to have considerable health problems after that. ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), p. 153, II-VIII-200, Hadank to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, 15th annual report on the work on Oskar Mann's Kurdish-Persian papers, 9 December 1934.

[65] In the mobilised war society, Hadank ultimately even had to fight to keep his nurse. ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-196, certificate from the Prussian Academy of Sciences for Hadank dated 9 February 1943.

[66] ABBAW: PAW (1812–1945), II-VIII-199, passim. Cf. also ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 218.

[67] It should be noted that, as things stand, Hadank never went public. The following source references are all taken from his papers.

[68] On Becker, see Alexander Haridi, Das Paradigma der „islamischen Zivilisation" – oder die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Friedrich Becker (1876 – 1933), Eine wissenschaftlich-geschichtliche Untersuchung, Würzburg 2005.

[69] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nos. 51 and 69. Hadank also claimed that Becker committed suicide in 1933 after a Professor Franz Labinger had slandered him. For the following, cf. ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nos. 34, 36, 40, 41, 46, 60, 67 and 120. Hadank saw Ernst Jäckh, the Deutsch-Morgenländische Gesellschaft (German-Oriental Society) and Max von Oppenheim, who was Jewish, and others as his enemies (ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 29, p. 9). Hadank also criticised prominent figures, in particular the German diplomat Dr Fritz Hesse (1898–1980), chairman of the German-Persian Society, managing director of the Deutscher Orientverein and later one of the diplomatic actors on the road to war with Great Britain in 1939. On Hesse, see Josef Henke, Hitler und England Mitte August 1939, Ein Dokument zur Rolle Fritz Hesses in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, in VjHfZG, 21/1973, H2, pp. 231–238, and Rashid Armin Khatik-Shahidi, German Foreign Policy Towards Iran: The Case of the National Bank of Persia, Oxford (dissertation) 1999, p. 101. Hadank also attacked the well-known Orientalist Snouck Hurgronje. ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 30, p. 95.

aversion intensified,[70] not least because the National Socialist regime had rather limited interest in the Orient. Hadank did not get any fundamental academic recognition, although he did at least privately advocate the introduction of the Führer principle in the selection of professors and the purging of German universities of democratic and Jewish-influenced forces. [71]

Following the example of the Socialist International, Hadank constructed a "Professors' International" which he described as consisting of Jews, Freemasons and Jesuits that had subordinated science to Jewish-inspired humanism and the pursuit of profit. In Hadank's view, Oskar Mann was villified and ignored, just like himself, and the research and study of the Kurdish language and its dialects were suppressed.

The fact that Oskar Mann was largely rejected by the democratically minded Orientalists of the Weimar Republic was in fact due, i.a., to Mann's position in the German Empire.[72] He was an outspoken favourite of Wilhelm II, who received him personally, admitted him to the Order of the Red Eagle, made him a professor and subsidised his travels with approximately 30,000 marks. [73] Oskar Mann's first trip in 1901–03 was a public success. When he returned with typhus, even the press reported on it.[74] During the First World War, Mann was also involved in propaganda and espionage, for example in the establishment of the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, NfO (News Agency for the Orient), founded and led by Max von Oppenheim, and in the censorship of letters from Persia. Mann became head of the Persian Department in the NfO.[75]

This, and also his alignment with the imperialist perspective of the German Empire with regard to the Orient, cannot have gone unnoticed and probably continued to have an effect after 1918, even though a number of Orientalists were actively involved in the First World War or, like Becker, had advocated inciting the Oriental peoples against the enemy through the unscrupulous use of the idea of jihad.[76]

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[70] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 30, p. 68.

[71] Cf. in particular ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 30 (which also discusses the problematic nature of the terms "Orient" and "Oriental", albeit from a clearly anti-Semitic perspective, i.e. as combat terms ostensibly used to oppress the Kurds, among others). See also ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 46 <no page numbers>, note on the Führer principle.

[72] For the following, Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, Kiel (upcoming), ch. 2.4., and Avzi, Remzi Avci, Mit der Peitsche in den dreckigen Orient: Die Darstellung des Orients in Oskar Manns Reisebriefen, in: Alman Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi - Studien zur deutschen Sprache und Literatur 46/2021, pp. 101-119, furthermore Mojtaba Kolivand, Persische und kurdische Reiseberichte, Die Briefe des Berliner Orientalisten Oskar Mann während seiner beiden Expeditionen in den Vorderen Orient 1901 – 1907, Wiesbaden 2014, esp. pp. 9–20.

[73] Cf. also Sachau, Richthofen and Pischel, Letter to the German Emperor on the continuation of field research by Oskar Mann, 25 July 1905, reprinted in: Mojtaba Kolivand, Persische und kurdische Reiseberichte, pp. 436–439 <Dok. 127>.

[74] Mojtaba Kolivand, Stimmen aus der Vergangenheit, Eine kurdisch-musikalische Entdeckung im Nachlass von Oskar Mann, in: Bibliotheks-Magazin, Mitteilungen aus den Staatsbibliotheken in Berlin und München, 3/2012, p. 17.

[75] For the NfO cf. Samuel Krug, Die »Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient« im Kontext globaler Verflechtungen (1914-1921), Strukturen – Akteure – Diskurse, Bielefeld 2020. On Mann see pp. 50, 127 and 162.

[76] See Ludmilla Hanisch, Die Nachfolger der Exegeten, pp. 78–84. A final clarification of the relevant connections still needs to be researched. The state of the art concerning the German planning for Djihad

Mann himself had often expressed himself in his letters in ways that are today questionable, sometimes inhumane, intolerant and racist.[77] Hadank not only followed in his professional footsteps,[78] but also, at least in principle, concerning values and worldview, if perhaps not in such drastic terms as Mann.

Hadank then integrated his research subject into this world view. He glorified pseudo-scientific theories of an alleged direct relationship between the Kurds and the Germans as Indo-Europeans, linking this to his hatred against Jews and English people. The Kurds, he claimed, were oppressed today just as the Germanic tribes had been in the past – now by the Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits and, in their wake, the English. From this perspective, Hadank called for a permanent and fundamental transformation of German Oriental studies into a ‚healthy völkisch' understanding of the German people and its origins („gesundes Volksempfinden").

He also accused Arabs and, above all, Turks of stirring up sentiment against the Kurds and of wanting to take action against them or even exterminate them.[79] In this context, he also took a stand when public discussions about the idea of Europe arose. In this context, he discussed the question of Turkey's belonging to Europe – a topic that is still lingering today, albeit under different circumstances (aspiration to become member of the EU). Hadank rejected this outright and criticised any kind of constitutional or civic integration or naturalisation as inappropriate. In doing so, he also defamed "Negroes", "Indians" and other groups not belonging to the German or European national community and once again suspected Jewish machinations to undermine the Nordic race.[80]

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referred to and, for Max von Oppenheim (1860 – 1946, one of the leading German Orient traveler in the age of imperialism), analysed in Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, Kiel (upcoming), ch. 4.

[77] A particularly striking example: Mann to his mother and sister, Mamukh, 27 April 1903, Mojtaba Kolivand, Persische und kurdische Reiseberichte, Die Briefe des Berliner Orientalisten Oskar Mann während seiner beiden Expeditionen in den Vorderen Orient 1901–1907, Wiesbaden 2014, letter 98, p. 352f. For a closer look on Manns views and expressions , cf. (for the Ottoman Empire) Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, Kiel (upcoming), ch. 2.4., and (for Persia) Avzi, Remzi Avci, Mit der Peitsche in den dreckigen Orient: Die Darstellung des Orients in Oskar Manns Reisebriefen, in: Alman Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi - Studien zur deutschen Sprache und Literatur 46/2021, pp. 101-119.

[78] Mann was a librarian at the Berlin Royal Library („Königliche Bibliothek") which became after the First World War the Prussian State Library („Preußische Staatsbibliothek", today „Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin") and eventually head of the Oriental Manuscripts Department.

[79] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 34, p. 62. In this context, Hadank also addressed, at least implicitly, the tendency towards genocide, for which he already held Atatürk and his "Jewish" foreign minister Rüschtü Aras responsible. ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 29, p. 12. Hadank accused the Turks of pursuing an aggressive policy of extermination against the Kurds and Zaza. ABBAW: PAW (1812-1945), II-VIII-200, p. 36, Hadank, Plan einer Reise nach Baghdad und Mosul zur Erforschung des Westkurdischen und des Zaza („Plan for a trip to Baghdad and Mosul to research Western Kurdish and Zaza, 7 January 1932"), and ibid. p. 50, request for reimbursement, 23 March 1932, and p. 69, Hadank, Gesuch um Bewilligung einer Beihilfe für eine wissenschaftliche Reise zur Erforschung des Kurdischen („Request for approval of a grant for a scientific trip to research Kurdish culture"), to the Foreign Office via the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin, 30 May 1932.

[80] ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 120, esp. pp. 9–13, and ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 67 <without page numbers>, Jüdische Kniffe zur Umgehung bzw. Aushöhlung und Beseitigung der Völkernamen ("Jewish tricks for circumventing, undermining and eliminating ethnic names").

For Hadank, the elevation of the Kurds was a personal concern, which predestined him to become an advisor to Müller and his company Mammut. So he was requested by the OKW. In the end, this led to a fusion of politics, personal sensitivities and science, based on an very thin factual base. Thereby, a detached and rational analysis of the current situation and of the „Mammut" group's real chances of success was rendered very difficult, if not practically impossible.

Hadank is an example of a rather theoretical scholar who was deeply disappointed. Perhaps he hoped to gain personal recognition through the success of undertakings as „Mammut". His shortcomings, however, became evident in his work during the preparatory training of the members of the Mammut company. As Hadank's personal experience of Iraq and the entire region was extremely limited, he had to rely on a fairly narrow canon of mainly British (travel) literature, which is repeatedly mentioned in the interrogation files.[81] In addition, as his papers reveal, German-language travel and adventure literature also played a role.[82] Works such as those by the Swiss author *J. H. Müller, Weiße Städte, Schwarze Zelte (White Cities, Black Tents), Als Agent im Irak (As an Agent in Iraq), Zurich 1940*, and by World War I veteran *Herbert Volck, Öl und Mohammed (Oil and Mohammed), "Der Offizier Hindenburgs" im Kaukasus (Hindenburg's Officer in the Caucasus), Breslau 1938*, are likely to have been of particular importance.

According to his own account, J. H. Müller was recruited by the British in 1936 as an agent to spy on the Iraqi tribes, especially the Shammar. In a way like Lawrence of Arabia, he went to the Shammar and spent several months with them as a Bedouin in the desert. He had also befriended leading sheikhs and thus became a mediator between the British and the Arabs. The author also reports on numerous uprisings, arms smuggling and the constant threat of (civil) war – aspects that must have strengthened hopes for success in stirring up rebellion among the Kurds.

Volck had completed an adventurous journey during the First World War that had taken him through prisoner-of-war camps in Siberia, to Baku and, in particular, to Mosul. He was convinced of the outstanding importance of oil and, according to his own statements, had attempted to conquer the oil fields in Baku for the German Empire, a plan he had also presented to Hindenburg himself. In his work, he attributes all important developments and conflicts to oil, in the manner of conspiracy theories. In particular, he also propagated the idea of an uprising of the Caucasian peoples in favour of Germany and the subsequent occupation of the oil fields by the Germans.

Obviously, Johannes Gottfried Müller, the leader and initiator of the „Mammut" mission, drew his ideas about linking Kurdish uprisings with securing oil supplies from Volck's work. He repeatedly mentions these thoughs in his publications. The partly adventurous and romantic style of these two books, among others, must have had an effect on Müller, who was susceptible to such ideas. [83] There

[81] Here especially Archibald Milne Hamilton, Road Through Kurdistan. The Narrative of an Engineer in Iraq (1937), 3rd edition, London 1958, Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan (1921). Edited by Paul Rich, 2nd edition, San José CA 2001. Additionally, Ely Banister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, London 1912/1926 (reprint 2007).

[82] See Herbert Rittlinger, Faltboot stößt vor, Vom Karpathenurwald ins wilde Kurdistan, Leipzig 1934.

[83] It has not been possible to ascertain whether Müller actually read the work of his namesake. However, this can be assumed, as Hadank mentions the work in his papers. The extent to which the Swiss author actually tells the truth and what path he took in life is also unclear at present and will require further research. However, the book was published and therefore had an impact.

is no evidence that he checked these publications with a critical eye. In any case, at the time when the „Mammut“ mission started, Stalingrad was already lost and hopes for an advance of the Wehrmacht into Iraq were dashed. Concerning the oil fields, the main mission task was now sabotage, probably as a precursor to a Kurdish uprising. It remains speculative how Müller and his superiors gauged the chances of success here.

The second scholar mentioned in the Mammut files was Werner Caskel (1896–1970). He probably had less direct contact with the group than Hadank, but was involved as an expert in connection with Ramzi and provided a detailed list of the tribes in the intended area of operation.[84]

Caskel is considered much more important in German Oriental studies than Hadank[85], who was rather an outsider. Caskel cooperated closely with Max von Oppenheim, co-authored his monumental four-volume work „Die Beduinen“ and was involved in the Max von Oppenheim Foundation, where he worked to rescue and preserve the finds from the excavations at Tel Halaf,[86] and safeguard the extensive library. He also undertook numerous trips to the Orient and knew a considerable number of important personalities in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, among other places.

Born in Danzig in 1896, Caskel first studied theology in Tübingen from 1914, then volunteered for military service in 1915 and was sent to the Ottoman Empire with the German Asia Corps (Deutsches Asienkorps), spending time in Anatolia, Istanbul, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia and also learning Turkish.[87] After the war, he devoted himself increasingly to Islamic studies and Semitic languages, which accordingly played a central role in his doctorate and habilitation. He was very well connected in Oriental research, including with important scholars such as Eugen Mittwoch and August Fischer. In 1923, he was employed by Max von Oppenheim, and in 1930 he was appointed as a private lecturer at the University of Greifswald.

Caskels' path under the Nazi dictatorship is quite remarkable. As a half-Jew born in Danzig, he was actually in the focus of racist persecution by Hitler's regime and eventually forced to end his academic career in 1938. However, Oppenheim who originated also from Jewish origin, was, at least in part, able to protect him. After Oppenheim's death in 1946, Caskel took over the management of the foundation and also stored the remaining parts of Oppenheim's collection and library at his home. Most of the

[84] This list is not printed below. It can be found in the printed German version of this publication, Bernd Lemke und Pherset Rosbeiani (ed.), Unternehmen Mammut, Ein Kommandoeinsatz der Wehrmacht im Nordirak 1943, Bremen 2018, pp. 199 – 202. Unfortunately, not much archival material by or on Caskel is available. Further research is necessary.

[85] It should be noted here that the actual linguistic work of Hadank on the Kurdish language and its dialects should not be underrated just because he was a follower of Nazi ideology. It remains, however, to be seen how much and how intense his findings were used and acknowledged by the kurdologist research after him.

[86] Concerning Oppenheims journeys and excavations up to 1914 cf. Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, Kiel (upcoming), ch. 4 (there all relevant literature for Oppenheims life and work listed).

[87] The main sources for Caskel's life are currently "Aus den Erinnerungen eines Orientalisten" (From the Memoirs of an Orientalist), in: Erwin Gräf (ed.), Festschrift Werner Caskel, Zum siebzigsten Geburtstag 5. März 1966 (Festschrift Werner Caskel, On his 70th birthday, 5 March 1966), dedicated by friends and students, Leiden 1968, pp. 5–30 (essentially a commented memoir by Caskel himself), cf. also the address by Erwin Gräf, pp. 1–4, and the obituary Werner Caskel (1896–1970) by Egbert Meyer, ZDMG 122 (1972), pp. 1–5.

objects had been destroyed in a bombing raid on Berlin in November 1943. Caskel then took all the material with him to Cologne in 1948 when he took up a chair in Oriental Studies there.[88]

The fact that Caskel was not deported was probably due not only to the protection of influential friends, but also to his decision to join the Wehrmacht, which was in need of specialists, especially after the Second World War had begun, at the same time being not a very attractive employer for Orientalists.[89] Unless they were conscripted into military service or other activities, they tended to try to continue in their civilian jobs. Furthermore, a large number of specialists fell victim to the regime, emigrated or was drafted into the armed forces as soldiers.

For Orientalists, service in the Wehrmacht mainly involved subordinate tasks, such as preparing expert reports, providing language services or, as in Mammut's case, training and information. Out of question were decisive positions in the strategic sector and respective administrative or organizational functions.

It is not without irony that Caskel made a name for himself in 1938 with an exposé, after the German staffs had learned that projects for translations of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" were being developed in the Orient. He argued that the conditions in Germany, which were characterised by "momentum and enthusiasm," should be transposed into Arabic in a linguistically adequate manner for Arab readers.[90]

For Caskel, working for the Wehrmacht offered a certain insurance against persecution. However, his professional expertise was very limited in terms of the situation in the Orient in the 20th century, as he was a specialist in early Arabic history (in particular for the time before the Prophet Mohammed). Concerning the Mammut enterprise, he tended to work in the background, possibly also because of Hadank's hostility against him.[91]

[88] Wolfgang Röllig, Legacy of the Past, A Foundation and a Museum, in: Gabriele Teichmann and Gisela Völger (eds.), Fascination Orient. Max von Oppenheim, Cologne 2001, pp. 248–265.

[89] On the following, see Ekkehard Ellinger, Deutsche Orientalistik zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945, Edingen-Neckarhausen 2006, esp. chaps. I.4–I.6 and III.2, as well as Ludmilla Hanisch, Die Nachfolger der Exegeten, pp. 159–173. Further Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz. Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina, Darmstadt 2006.

[90] Stefan Wild, National Socialism in the Arab Near East between 1933 and 1939, in: Die Welt des Islams 25 (1985), pp. 176f.

[91] See the relevant passages in the source section. Further research is needed on Werner Caskel. A final assessment of his work is not possible at this point.

Origin and Life of Ramzi al-Nafi[92]

Ramzi's life and later career are closely linked with the history of South Kurdistan after the First World War. His full name was full name was Ramzi Nafi' Hadji Rashid Agha Waisi Agha Yahya Agha Aduwahab Hares Agha, from the Mamundi tribe, which originates from the mountains of Spilk, 50 km north of Erbil, between Rawanduz and Shaqlawa. They came to Arbil in early 18th century and became urban landowners there. The family also owned several villages in the vicinity of Erbil. On his mother's side, he descended from the prince (Mirani) of Khoschnaw, who had his seat in Shaqlawa. His mother was the niece of Mirani Qadir Beg[93] who was the grandson of Mirani Mustafa Beg.

Ramzi was born in 1917 in Erbil, in the palace of Ataulla Agha, into this very wealthy and influential family. He attended primary school for six years and then attended secondary school in Erbil for three years. He then went to Kirkuk for a year to attend the grammar school there, and then spent another year at the central science-oriented grammar school in Baghdad, where he attended the eleventh grade in 1938.

Later, before graduating from high school, he was forced to leave Baghdad for unknown, presumably political reasons and move to Beirut. He stayed in Beirut from October 1941 to March 1942. There he wanted to enrol as a „Freshman“ at the American University in Beirut[94], but because his previous education did not meet the requirements set by the professors for a specialist degree programme, he was was ultimately not enrolled in a degree programme.

In Beirut, the cosmopolitan intellectual centre of the Orient at the time and a showcase to Europe, the ideological power struggles of the time became particularly obvious. Beirut was also traditionally a place of learning and science for all those who were politically persecuted and oppressed in their home countries throughout the Near and Middle East. Important representatives of this group included the brothers Dr Kamuran Ali Bedirkhan (1895-1978) and Jeladet Ali Bedirkhan (1893-1951) and the followers of Jemil Pasha.[95]

It therefore comes as no surprise that the Kurdish Khoybun Party was founded there. "In 1927, the Bedirkhan brothers, together with other compatriots, founded the Xoybun (Independence)

[92] The following section originates from the Dissertation of Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen »Mammut«. Ein politisch-militärisches Geheimdienstunternehmen in Südkurdistan in den Jahren 1942/43 und seine Vorgeschichte; Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, http://edoc. hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/rosbeiani-pherset-zuber-mohammed-2011-06-08/PDF/rosbeiani.pdf, ch. III.3. Ramzi's career and the development of the Khoybun Party. In the following, only the most important passages and the relevant proofs are included. For more details and further evidence download the dissertation.

[93] There are some comments on this person in W.R. Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan, i.a. chapters IX and XI.

[94] See Mohamad Goran / Neriman Khoschnaw, (eds.) Ramzi Nafi’, Rolaiyeki hawleri Fidakari Sarbaxoiyi Kurdistan, Erbil 2008, p. 117. This account is based on interviewsviews and interviews with Ramzi's family. A „freshman“ is a student in the first year. This time serves to find out if the student is fit enought to carry out and finish the studies successfully.

[95] A complete list of the founding members of the Khoybun Party can be found at: Etudes kurdes. La ligue nationale kurde. Khoyboun. Mythes et réalités de la première organisation nationaliste kurde, Paris 2007, Doc. 3; 4 and 5, pp. 35-42.

organisation. It was the driving force behind the Kurdish Ararat uprising, which was a direct continuation of the uprising of Sheikh Said Piran (1865-1925) in 1925."[96] These revolts aimed to end the Kemalist control in the region around mountain Ararat in East Anatolia. They failed under much bloodshed and led to harsh punishment by the government.

The party was founded at a special conference from 29 September to 25 October 1927 by small exiled groups and associations from northern Kurdistan who had come from Turkeyand associations, following the destruction of the resistance movement in Turkey of, when the majority of the surviving supporters of his movement fled to Beirut and sought a new political home there.[97]

Particularly well-known founding members were: Jeladet Bedir Khan, Mustafa and Bozan Schahin, Hajo Agha, Emin Agha and Memduh Selim from the Syrian region of Man. Delegates from Iraq and Turkey were: Dr. Mehmet Schukru Sakban (a Turkish Kurd who lived in Baghdad), Kerim Rustin from Harput, Kemal Beg from Sulaimaniyya and Fehim Leji from Baghdad.[98]

From the outset the Khoybun Party was a party of the aristocratic ruling elites. This party could never take on the character of a people's party. The poorer classes in the cities and the rural population in all likelihood knew practically nothing about its existence.

The main political goals of the Khoybun were as follows: 1. Struggle against the Turks (Kemalists and Panturans, i.e. the transnational all-Turks movement powered by the Turkish Government) with the aim of establishing a separate Kurdish national territory in Turkey. 2. Joint actions with the Armenians. 3. No secret cooperation with anti-Kemalist partisans and supporters of the Caliphate in Turkey. 4. Good relations with the USSR, Persia and Iraq, because their neutrality was essential for Kurdish independence. 5. Attempts should be made to win the support of the great powers, especially England and France, for the Kurdish cause.[99]

In the last instance, these goals concentrated in two demands: 1. All associations previously banned in Turkey should be united under one umbrella with the name "Khoybun" and 2. Building a strong connection with the Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian people and their governments.

The Khoybun recognised the political agreements in particular between Iraq and Syria regarding the mandate borders. Upon joining the party, all members had to swear an oath. In addition, the Khoybun party also adopted a distinctive emblem.[100]

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[96] Cf. Birgit Ammann, Prinz Kamuran Bedirkhan: Wegbereiter der kurdischen Diaspora in Europa, in: Das kurdische Berlin, ed. by Der Ausländerbeauftragten des Senats und der Berliner Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Kurdologie, Berlin 2003, pp. 46f.

[97] See Serwa Sabir, Kurdistan al-Djenubia 1926-1939 phil. Diss., Sulaimaniyya 2006, pp. 337-338 and Vahé Tachjian, Khoybun and Daschnaktsutiun. An unusual Kurdish-Armenian alliance, in: Kurdish Studies, 3rd year (2003), no. 1+2, Berlin 2003, pp. 55–78, further W. G. Elphinston, The Kurdish Question, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan. 1946), pp. 91 - 103.

[98] Cf. Tachjian, Vahé, Khoybun and Daschnaktsutiun, p. 62.

[99] See Etudes kurdes, Etudes kurdes. La ligue nationale kurde. Khoyboun, p. 14.

[100] See Serwa Sabir, Kurdistan al-Djenubia, p. 341. During Operation „Mammut“, the German agents also had emblems of the Khoybun Party with them.

Party financing was not always guaranteed due to very limited financial resources. According to British reports, the Khoybun Party was secretly supported financially by France and Italy. The Khoybun was set up to be a political union for all those forces fighting for the freedom and independence of Kurdistan. In Turkey, it also worked together with the Armenian Dashnakt Party.[101] During this period, the Dashnak Party fought with secret support from Italy and Greece for the independence of its territory from Turkish rule. It believed that Iranians, Armenians and Kurds should defend themselves against the pan-Turkic threat.[102] Moreover, it expressed the view that all „Aryan“ peoples such as Iranians, Armenians, Kurds, Lurs, Afghans and Indians should unite in national associations to defend themselves against the Kemalist-Turkish threat on the one hand and the Soviet-Communist threat on the other. This is why, in later years, Nazi propaganda about the alleged alliance of all "Aryan peoples"[103] in the fight against world Bolshevism and world Jewry did not fall on deaf ears in many political parties in the Orient.

Political differences and rivalries between members of different clans led to disputes, divisions and resignations in 1932/33. This had a significant negative impact on the party's influence and effectiveness. Furthermore, the cooperation with the Armenian Daschankt Party was ended.[104]

Ramzi began his political career at the age of 14, when he in 1931 took part in a protest demonstration against a private electricity company in his hometown. He also signed a letter of protest to this effect, which was delivered to Erbil City Hall.[105]

Already as a young man, Ramzi became a member of the Khoybun Party because his grandfather was already a fellow of the party. Later, when he moved to Beirut and became acquainted with Prince Kamuran, Ramzi intensified his activities in the Khoybun. At this point Kamuran Bedirkhan himself was no longer a member of the Khoybun, but was still politically active in the fight for the national independence of Kurdistan.

Previously, Ramzi had also joined the Hiwa Party, founded in 1937, and became chairman of the Hiwa for the district of Erbil.[106] As later interrogation files by the British intelligence show that the Khoybun Party was exploited by the Axis powers as an instrument against Turkey. "Many Khoybun politicians still cherish the dream of an independent Kurdistan. Most of the old Khoybun members are still alive

[101] This party was founded in Tiflis in 1890 and initially emerged as a political movement of Armenians in Russia with a Marxist orientation, and was also active underground in the Ottoman Empire. After the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia and the emergence of the Soviet Republic of Armenia, it became a gathering ground for Armenian nationalist forces with a pronounced anti-Soviet tendency, cf. Vahé Tachjian, Khoybun and Daschnaktsutiun p. 55. 164.

[102] See Vahé Tachjian, Khoybun and Daschnaktsutiun, p. 69.

[103] For this subject see p. 37 with FN 145.

[104] See Etudes kurdes, op. cit., p. 22f.

[105] See Qadir, Mahdi Muhammad, Hawler lanewan salani 1914-1930, Erbil, 2008, p. 190.

[106] The notebook left behind by Ramzi contains, among other things, a list of contributions with the names and amounts of party contributions made by Hiwa members in Erbil. See also Serwa Sabir, Kurdistan al-Djenubia, p. 370f.

and some of them are in close contact with the Axis, so that it might well turn out to be the Axis to revive Kurdish aspirations as a stab in the back to Turkey".[107]

According to British reports, the Khoybun Party also had connections with the Minority Congress, which was led by Soviet communists. This congress promised the Khoybun Party in the event that it contributed to destabilising British mandate rule in the countries of the Middle East. However, the intellectuals within the Khoybun Party rejected such offers on the grounds that the British should not be excluded from the establishment of Kurdish independence. The most important representative of the Khoybun in the southern Kurdish region was Dr Mehmet Schukru Sakban (1881-1960), a Kurd from Turkey. He established contacts with many South Kurdish tribal chiefs and leaders, but his political views found relatively little support there.[108] Nevertheless, the Khoybun Party soon spread to many cities of southern Kurdistan, such as Mosul, Erbil, Sulemaniyya, Rawanduz, and others.

During the Second World War, there were also several parties and political movements in Erbil that represented Kurdish affairs. These were: the Khoybun Party (Komalay Khoybun), the Zarathustra Group (Komalay Zardashti), the Group for Kurdish Demands (Komalay Pshtiwani Kurdan), the Group for the Dissemination of Science (Komalay Zansti), the Young Kurds Group (Komalay Lawani Kurd), the Group for Kurdish Language (Komalay dozinawaw Gardani qsai Kurdi) and the Kurdish Aid Association (Komalay Yaridadari Kurd).

In Erbil, the representative of the Khoybun Party, Fahmi Effendi, was also responsible for secret recruitment of members. There, it was secretly known as the "First Group" the British mandate government having infiltrated political associations and groups in all major cities of South Kurdistan. The Khoybun supporters in Erbil were always in contact with Sheikh Mahmud, who was fighting against the English. They also intended to send party supporters from Erbil and Mosul to join him in the Surdash Mountains, where Sheikh Mahmud was waging war. Because the party organisation in Erbil, as in other cities, could only work in secrecy not all members' names have been passed down. The most important representatives whose names we know are: Maruf Chiawuk, Ismail Beg Rawanduzi, Ahmad Agai Naqib and Hadji Rashid Agha Waisi Agha, Ramzi's grandfather.[109]

As early as August 1919, when Sheikh Mahmud rose up against British British Mandate rule in Sulaimaniyya in August 1919, Ramzi's grandfather, Haji Rashid Agha, the city councillor of Erbil[110], agitated alongside the Dizeye tribal leaders in the area around Erbil at around the same time. Because of his active anti-British albeit non-violent partisanship, he was soon removed from his post.

[107] See below (source section, p.112) TNA, KV2-1734, Appendix 'A' to Ramzi's interrogation report dated 4 July 1943.

[108] When compiling all of Ramzi's interrogation reports, the British also used old source material, including some from 1928, in which this fact had already been recorded. See Serwa Sabir, Kurdistan al-Djenubia, p. 340, and TNA, KV2-1734, Appendix "A" to Ramzi's interrogation report of 4 July 1943 (see below, source section). The Chairman of the Khoybun of Erbil was Fahmi Effendi. Sabir, op. cit., p. 342.

[109] See Mahi Muhammad Qadir, Hawler lanewan salani 1914-1930, Erbil, 2008, p. 195.

[110] Ibidem, p. 80.

In the summer of 1919, British Captain W.R. Hay of the Political Department of the Indian Government arrived in the British garrison in Erbil.[111] Hay described the Kurdish tribal leaders residing in the Erbil area as generally corrupt, having acquired their wealth through highway robbery and raids.

During the Ottoman period, they had fought side by side with the Turks but also also caused a great deal of unrest and, in their efforts to gain independence, waited for the British to arrive the British. When the British were granted the League of Nations mandate in 1919 they had immediately changed sides and started anti-British propaganda.

Against this background, Hay made a rather scathing criticism of Hadji Raschid Agha and his eldest son, Ataullah Agha, Ramzi's uncle.[112] This very disparaging assessment by Hay can probably be explained by the fact that Ataullah Agha and his father were probably seen by the British as the most dangerous opponents in the region.[113]

The uprising of the southern Kurds against the British ultimately ended in failure. After Sheikh Mahmud had already been decisively defeated at the Baziyan Pass in June 1919 , the rebels in the Erbil area were also defeated in the in the autumn of the same year. Because of his involvement, Hadji Rashid Agha was arrested on 17 October 1919 and, although he vehemently stated his innocence, he was brought before a British military court and sentenced.[114] Ramzi's father (Nafi' Agha) had also fought against the British during the First World War and afterwards.[115]

Since that time, Ramzi had felt great admiration for his father and grandfather. It is possible that the then ten-year-old Ramzi was already present at some secret meetings of the Khoybun supporters and was naturally very impressed by his grandfather's example . This could also have been one of the reasons why Ramzi later became a member of Khoybun himself. In this sense, he always recognised and revered the co-founder of the Khoybun Party, Prince Kamuran, as a very influential figure, and as the spiritual and political leader of the new Kurdistan.

Prince Kamuran had spent time in Germany in the 1930s and, had great sympathy for German culture - despite the National Socialists' seizure of power in 1933.[116] It is therefore no surprise that Ramzi probably also developed similar affinities. This explains why he later became involved in the Mammut enterprise. Ramzi was probably not really aware that Kamuran and others opportunistically aligned themselves with both sides during the war.

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[111] The following passages refer to the account by W.R. Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan, Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920, London 1921, pp. 160-358.

[112] Ibidem, pp. 160f.

[113] See Mahi Muhammad Qadir, Hawler lanewan salani, 1914–1930, p. 82. Ataullah Agha later became a member of Hizb al-Ikha al-Watani, the party of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. (This information provided by Ramzi's family in January 2011 in an interview with Pherset Rosbeiani).

[114] Ibidem, p. 358.

[115] Vgl. Gottfried Johannes Müller, Im brennenden Orient, S.104.

[116] Cf. below p.49 with FN 192. For the following including Ramzis way to Mammut cf. Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen »Mammut«, ch. III.5 – III.8.

Ramzi was not a Nazi, but an idealist who wanted to promote Kurdish independence from the Empire. His romantic nationalism and lack of life experience—he was only 26 when arrested— may had led him into the clutches of the Abwehr and its apparatus, which included people such as the convinced National Socialist Hadank and the insurgency enthusiast Müller.

In the background here is a fundamental problem of all ethnic and religious groups and their representatives or activists in the Orient during the era of world wars. Some hoped to gain decisive advantages for their own causes by taking sides. However, while the Kurds fought their occupiers and rebelled against the regimes that had deprived them of their political rights, they were often used by the major powers as relatively minor pawns in the conflict between the main belligerents. This is also reflected, on a smaller scale, in Ramzi's role within the Mammut organisation. Ramzi certainly had a much better knowledge of the Kurds than Hadank himself, but –probably i.a. for language problems– he hardly ever intervened in the discussions during the preparations and only spoke to Hadank occasionally about a few linguistic issues. He was and remained an assistant, even after the party landed in the target region. He was unable to establish any connections to important tribal leaders and therefore served almost exclusively as a geographical guide and interpreter. However, Ramzi became the de facto leader of the group, and Müller's role diminished. Ramzi led them from the village of Kharab Kubri, the wrong place they had been dropped off, and brought them safely to Erbil, a distance of over 140 kilometers, while the British Army and Iraqi police were searching for them and offering a reward of 1,000 Iraqi dinars for each of them.

All in all, Ramzi had become involved in an operation carried out by a secret service organisation that was an integral part of a brutal racist ideological war, and whose main advisor for the Kurds (Hadank) was himself a Nazi with only limited knowledge of them. Had Hadank been critical and realistic he would have never advised Müller to carry out such an illusory mission. As will be seen, the Wehrmacht itself viewed „Mammut“ in the first instance as an intelligence operation to gather information, less as an operation to incite a big rebellion.

About the source texts

This edition is an enlarged version of a printed book published in 2018 by Edition Falkenberg (same editors).[117] As the original printed version this volume contains all directly relevant material on this operation, in particular the German file[118] and the detailed interrogation records of the British security authorities, which were released by the British National Archives in 2005. These sources are

[117] In the meantime an article was published that, apart from comments on minor points, all in all came to similar conclusions as our paper version in 2018 (Ludwig Paul, Karl Hadank (1882-1945) and the Kurdish-Persische Forschungen, Ambitions, Achievements, and Ideological Entanglements, in Diyar 1/2020, S. 289 – 309). This digital publication contains all relevant material especially for Karl Hadank from the archive of the BBAW which both publications are based on.

[118] Not all documents of this file BArch RW 5 / 271 are presented here. Routine papers, e.g. duty rosters and daily schedules, have been omitted.

key documents for the knowledge and attitudes of the protagonists towards Iraq and, above all, the Kurds living there. At the same time, they also reveal the capabilities and practices of the British secret services and their attitude towards the German soldiers, in particular with regard to the Mammut group, but also in some details in general.

For this digital version the most significant archival sources concerning the life and the ideological attitude of Karl Hadank from the archive of the Berlin-Brandenburgen Academy of Sciences and further material from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv concerning the essential framework (Abwehr II) for the understanding of the Mammut mission in the context of the Wehrmacht were added, especially a file created for teaching and training (Handakte Verbeek). These documents originate from 1943, when Mammut was carried out and failed. Moreover, many pictures of the social and family background of Ramzi, some ex-post pictures of the original sites where the Mammut group was trained for the mission and links to websites where original historical photos can be found were included. To explain these pictures and to present more information on Ramzi and his background the preceding section on his origin and life has been included.

Both editions are based on source texts that are not always easy to access. This is particularly true of the British interrogation records, some of which are in very poor condition. Furthermore, these are not the original documents, but photocopies made (probably at the time). Some of the content, especially in the lower fifth of each page, was occasionally missing, and numerous passages were damaged. However, the crucial information could be clearly identified, albeit after some painstaking deciphering work.

Overall, the documents were not organised according to a recognisable system, but were partly jumbled together. They therefore had to be rearranged to enable the reader to adequately understand the events. Conjectures are indicated in the footnotes.

It is possible that not all documents have been released yet, but that some are still held by the British Secret Service or the British National Archives, such as the interrogation records of Johann Gottfried Müller (possibly containing information on the „Abwehr“ Department in the High Command of the Wehrmacht, OKW, as well as on Müller's personal affairs). However, the files that are published here provide a comprehensive picture of the Mammut enterprise and its historical background.

The files are arranged chronologically according to the course of events. After Hadanks papers, the preparations (German „Mammut“ file) are presented within the larger framework of the Abwehr (Handakte Verbeek). This is followed by the British files on the capture and a summary report on the entire operation to facilitate orientation for the reader. The core section here contains the detailed interrogation transcripts of the four agents Johann Gottfried Müller, Georg Heinrich Adalbert Konieczny, Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann and Ramzi Nafi Raschid. Finally, the documents on the further fate of the agents are reprinted, as well as Ramzi's vita during the recruitment process. The concluding photo section presents a selection of important people and places.

The concluding list of sources and literature is rather selective. It mainly contains titles that are directly related to the topic or provide background information and analysis of the context, e.g. the Kurds during this period. A complete list of all relevant literature, including on the history of the whole regions and its people, is not provided.

Since the British intelligence specialists conducted extensive cross-examinations and intensive comparisons of the prisoners' statements, the information presented overlaps in some cases. In selecting and reproducing the documents, an effort was made to avoid duplication and repetition as much as possible. However, some information that was already contained in an earlier document was retained if this was necessary to maintain the connection with new aspects.

The original documents were intended for internal use only and are therefore not always stylistically polished. In the British interrogation transcripts, distinctive words and expressions (especially names and places) are rendered in capital letters, presumably to enable internal readers within the secret service apparatus to quickly orient themselves. This has been retained, as it noticeably shapes the character of the texts. To enhance the reading quality especially for the German documents, the manifold abbreviations in the original texts were mostly cleared without using brackets. To compare the original shape of most documents look at the German edition of this publication.[119] There the exact texts are printed, using brackets to clear all terms.

In order to understand the documents, especially the interrogation transcripts, it must always be borne in mind that these are the words of men who were arrested as agents and in fear for their lives. Ramzi, in particular, as an Iraqi citizen, had to expect to be considered a traitor. This was particularly true of the Iraqi secret services, who subjected the Mammut people to particularly harsh interrogations before they were handed over to the British in Cairo. Not least Müller, who at first probably thought he could outwit the guards in Baghdad in the manner of Kara Ben Nemsi, soon found himself confronted with the professional interrogation methods of the British, which allowed no verbal escape.

The statements are therefore not always to be equated with the truth. However, at the end of the day, the British interrogators arrived at a comparatively clear and lucid picture of the whole enterprise. The efficiency of the investigations was high, especially considering that the German files, in particular the ones printed here, were not available to the British.

As far as Hadank's source texts are concerned, every effort has been made to retain the original language. This also applies to expressions that are in some cases racist, particularly those relating to ethnic and religious groups. The editors expressly distance themselves from these expressions. However, these passages cannot be omitted as they are an integral part of Hadanks thinking and writing. The style has been carefully translated into English. Where necessary, adjustments have been made, but kept to a minimum. Some repetitions of core subjects have been retained to demonstrate the litany-like expression by Hadank in these instances.

The historical meaning of „Mammut“ is not its military or political significance but its approach to the Orient and its people - although more or less ex-negativo. It shows how a mixture of limited knowledge, ideological blindness and one-sided sympathy to an ethnic group under these influences can lead to a distorted picture, incorrect advice and failure. Hadank was somehow obsessed with his ideological

[119] Bernd Lemke / Pherset Rosbeiani (Hrsg.), Unternehmen Mammut, Ein Kommandoeinsatz der Wehrmacht im Nordirak 1943, Bremen 2018. A digital edition in German is not intended. For some parts look at Google books.

enemies. He collected every snippet of every statement in publications, journals etc. that he could get sometimes repeating the contents in a litany-like tone.[120]

[120] Of course, this impression is reinforced by the concentrated arrangement of the selected texts in this edition.

Oriental perspectives under race prerogatives: Karl Hadank and the Kurds

The Life of Karl Hadank until the 1920s

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 219

Gertrud von Wenckstern, died 1 October 1936, Berlin-Friedrichshagen[121]

By Professor Dr Reinhard Strecker (ed.), Berlin-Hessenwinkel, Neuland-Verlag 1936

< Gertrud von Wenckstern's own account:>

Death struck right in the middle of this wonderful world: my father died. Soon the day came when I was separated from my mother, taken away from my siblings, taken to the deepest solitude of the forest by a dear old aunt and, as it were, placed in a glass cabinet: there, no breath of the world touched me, no speck of earth stirred me – but: life, the beautiful colourful butterfly, had folded its shining wings tightly together – so it sat there, completely still. Was it dreaming? – Yes. And I dreamed with it.

I travelled home again and again for long-awaited, fleeting moments with my mother; - over the years, I heard a lot of wonderful music – and saw the wide, wide world of God; timidly – then, encouraged by small successes, I began to write stories: 'Unspunnen' appeared in a magazine, then as a book (1912).[122]

<...>

But what I call the 'glass cabinet' was always around me, the doors remained firmly closed – until one fine day Dr Karl Hadank simply opened them.

Life, the beautiful butterfly, now spread its wings again – but they were no longer colourful and shiny – they were blood red: it was 1914.

Our wedding was in May 1915 – our home was by the lake in Friedrichshagen.

In the summer of 1916, my husband was drafted into the Landsturm in Rathenow and came to Brandenburg for eight weeks of training. We found a suitable flat and I was able to go with him to Brandenburg – and when the training was over, I went back to Rathenow with my husband. We had just pitched our tent when an older recruit appeared, looked at my husband searchingly and asked,

[121] Writer of fictional works. Born in 1870 in Wartenberg/Opr. Basic data in: Adolf Bartels, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur (History of German Literature), Leipzig 1928, vol. 8, p. 982.

[122] Gertrud Wenckstern, Unspunnen: historische Erzählung aus dem Berner Oberland, Zurich 1915.

“Are you Karl Hadank? ” 'Yes!‘ 'You have to go to Berlin immediately. You are to go to Turkey as an interpreter!‘

So: pack your bags and go. My husband had to stay in his barracks in Berlin – but he got leave from time to time – so a few weeks flew by until we were separated. Then came the time of field post letters and parcels: they flew back and forth – every day, non-stop – until the holiday season – then on again: field post deliveries non-stop – and suddenly it was over.

Turkey broke its alliance with Germany and signed an armistice. All contact with Germany was cut off – there was no way to find out anything from any authority.

Anyone who has experienced something similar knows what that's like.

It lasted from October 1918 to January 1919. Then a sign of life arrived; it was placed in my hands under romantic circumstances; I now learned that my husband had been ill in the military hospital in Constantinople since October. Then again, no news for weeks; in March, suddenly a card from Konstanz: Homecoming – date still undetermined. And finally my husband was back home – he looked like the real picture of health: he had a fever of 40 degrees.

Now came years full of worry: “Illness – inflation – revaluation”. These words describe everything. But the storms could not break us – we were able to work – my husband on his great scientific works – I on my stories, which gave me so much joy.

<...>

<Background information Prof. Strecker:>

Gertrud von Wenckstern

The forest solitude the poet speaks of was the Ringsleben manor in Mecklenburg, where she received private tuition from an aunt. She later attended school in Stolp and then became a companion in the house of the merchant Pietsch in Memel, whose wife she moved to Berlin with after his death. In 1911, she met the Iranist Dr Hadank at a spa in the Harz mountains, whom she then married in May 1915. The war took her brother, Prof. Dr Adolph von Wenckstern. Her second brother, Karl, was awarded the Pour le Mérite and is now Oberarbeitsführer.[123] One of her sisters is the widow of Wilhelm II's aide-de-camp, Friedrich von Friedeburg (+1933).

[123] A quasi-military rank in the compulsory work service organisation of the Third Reich, the „Reichsarbeitsdienst“ (RAD).

The Kurds in Karl Hadank's ideological world view

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 29 (1933-39), pp. 7 – 18.

a) The peculiar demarcation of borders in West Asia in the 'peace treaty' of <..., corrupted>[124] was carried out according to the same Jewish-Masonic principles as in the peace dictates of Versailles and St. Germain (1919)[125] for Europe. The borders cut right through the Kurdish settlement area. This people, which had previously been divided between three powers, was now torn into five parts.

b) The creation of artificially composed nationality states in Western Asia in the 'peace treaty' <...> was intended in particular to oppress and gradually destroy the Kurds. For these states are composed in such a way that the Kurds are always in the minority compared to Arabs, Turks, Persians and Russians (or Armenians), and this minority is ruthlessly disenfranchised and oppressed.

<...>

The opposition between the Jews and the Kurds and other Iranian mountain peoples is political in nature and, as such, goes back a long way in history. Baghdad, already a centre of Jewish finance during the Caliphate, was at least temporarily threatened or controlled by Iranian mountain peoples such as the Dailemer[126] and Kurds.[127]

<…>

Oppenheim's approach of saying as little as possible about the Kurds, and if anything, then only the worst, became decisive for the academic policy of the 'Orientalists', namely the so-called Islamic

[124] Hadank is referring here to the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, in which the Ottoman Empire lost a large part of its territory, and, in fact, ceased to exist. The Kurdish settlement areas then belonged to Turkey, Russia, Persia and the mandates of France and Great Britain. The Kurds in the latter two areas had actually only changed empires. Originally, as Mark Sykes had proposed in the second half of the First World War (see Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1914, forthcoming), separate states or at least autonomous regions within the Ottoman Empire had been planned for the Kurds and Armenians. However, these hopes were dashed after the Turks under Kemal Atatürk occupied a large part of Asia Minor with massive military force („Turkish War of Independence" 1919 – 1923). These realities were then reflected in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which put an end to all ideas of Kurdish or Armenian autonomy in the region and ultimately defined the territory of present-day Turkey. The standard work on this subject is: Jonathan Conlin, Ozan Ozavci (eds.), They All Made Peace—What Is Peace?: The 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the New Imperial Order, London 2023. Undoubtedly, Hadank is right when he says that Kurds were the losers of the peace treaties and were distributed among several empire. On the other hand, he had not in mind to support a free Kurdistan but saw the Kurds as minor partners of a new strenghtened German empire – a basic feature of most of the Orient traveler in the era until 1945.

[125] The peace treaties for Germany and the Austrian Empire.

[126] Hadank was probably referring to the presumed ancestors of the Zaza Kurds, the Dailamites, who settled in northern Iran on the Caspian Sea in late antiquity and were, at least in part, able to escape assimilation during the Arab conquests in the centuries after Mohammed.

[127] Seen from this perspective, it is no wonder that Hadank followed the political role of the Jews in Iraq very keenly. ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 34 (1930 – 40), Exzerpt aus Jüdischer Rundschau, Nr. 17, 29.2.24, S. 114: Opening of the parliamentary session in Baghdad in April, planned: 90 Muslims, 5 Christians, 5 Jews. „Among them are two representatives of the Jews in Baghdad and one each from Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk." Hadank clearly regarded the „Jüdische Rundschau" as an important source for studying the "enemy".

studies of the Carl Heinrich Becker school, under whose ministry in Prussia during the November Democracy 'Islamic studies' gained dominance.[128] The books by Oskar Mann and Hugo Grothe, who had written very appreciatively about the Kurds, were hushed up as much as possible.

<...>

In the travel book "Zu Land nach Indien durch Persien, Seistan und Belutschistan" (Leipzig 1910), vol. 1, pp. 45, 55 and 61, the Jewish-born[129] geographer Sven Hedin has one-sidedly characterised the Kurds of the border region between Erzerum and Bayezid as robbers. Even worse is when the same author, in his book „Von Pol zu Pol" (12th edition, ibid. 1919), p. 50, written for German youth, speaks in general terms of newly drawn Turkish-Persian borders „where Kurdish robbers make the country unsafe" and he accuses them to lead a (p. 102) „a wretched life of banditry" on the western border and mentions them in the same breath as the Turkmen, who ravaged and devastated Khorasan for many centuries. It is well known[130] that there have been robber Kurds and probably still are. But only a malicious person can[131] <...> portray the entire people as robbers.

<...> His further example of the Jewish way of denigrating Aryan peasant peoples is all the more striking because Sven Hedin cannot praise highly enough Turkish and Mongolian nomadic peoples such as the Kyrgyz (p. 92) and Mongols (p. 264). Such a classification describes the Jewish way of evaluating peoples, which is the opposite of ours.[132]

<...>

<...Those who are erudite[133]> are more interested in Oskar Mann's two volumes „Die Mundart der Mukri-Kurden" (The Dialect of the Mukri-Kurds) with their detailed introductions and extensive notes.

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[128] Hadank's statements regarding Oppenheim are not correct here. Although Oppenheim was firmly committed to the Ottoman Empire for many reasons (including his excavations in Tell Halaf), he did see the Kurds as a valuable and developable, albeit a less important, element in the context of imperial development under German aegis. In fact, Oppenheim viewed the Armenians, the Greeks and, above all, the Christian Syrians with great aversion including racist connotations. That Hadanks views Oppenheim so critically here originates probably from the fact that Oppenheim was of Jewish origin.

[129] In direct connection with this, Hadank, ibid., noted: 'In the 'Jüden Lexikon" (Jewish Encyclopaedia) by Georg Herlitz and <...> Kirschner, vol. II (Berlin 1928), the Jewish writer Lion Fried Stockson remarks on p. 1497: <...> Hedin "descends on his mother's side from Abraham Ludwig Brody, a German Jew who immigrated to Sweden in the mid-18th century and later took the name Hedin." Such denunciatory remarks about other scholars, travellers to the Orient, etc. are frequently found in his paper. Not everything is quoted or mentioned here.

[130] Conjecture.

[131] Conjecture.

[132] What Hadank did not see, or rather did not want to see, is the fact that Hedin was an outspoken Germanophile, a sympathiser of the Third Reich, and was courted accordingly by the National Socialists. See Sarah K. Danielsson, The Explorer's Roadmap to National Socialism, Sven Hedin, Geography and the Path to Genocide. London 2012 and Wolfgang Kaufmann, The Third Reich and Tibet. The home of the 'Eastern swastika' in the sights of the National Socialists. 2nd revised and expanded edition, Ludwigsfelde 2010.

[133] Conjecture.

An example of Jewish slander of the Kurds can be found in the Jüdische Rundschau No. <…, corrupted> 1934.[134] Under the headline „Forgotten Brothers, On the Fate of the Kurdish Jews“ there is, among other things, the provocative sentence „the Kurds among whom they live are a wild tribe.“

<...>

In order to properly appreciate the Jewish geographer's sentimental lament, one should read a section <...> (Mark Sykes)[135]

<...>

Similar feelings of hatred are expressed in the description of the Afghans in the north-western border region of British India by the Jewish archaeologist Marc Aurel Stein[136] in the Jewish Berliner Tagblatt, No. 31, dated 19 January 1933 – where, to mislead readers, he is described as „the outstanding English (!) archaeologist“. (Note: Sir Marc Aurel Stein was born in Budapest in 1862, see Jüdisches Lexikon by Georg Herlitz and Kirschner, Vol. IV, 2 (1930) No. 707. The Hungarian Jew attended the Kreuzschule in Dresden). He portrays the Afghans as barbarians, whom the British government treats in the same way as the ancient Romans treated the „neighbouring predatory barbarian tribes“, meaning the Germanic tribes (note: not even[137] the Roman-minded English historian Edward Gibbon[138] disparaged the Germanic tribes in such a way).

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 120 (1929–39), pp. 9–23

Only a people that comes from Europe or can be proven to have lived in Europe since ancient times can be considered “European” in the scientific sense of the word. Neither of these is the case with the Turks, for example.[139] It is historically certain that the Turks originated in Central Asia and only

[134] No corresponding article could be found in this volume using a full-text search. Unfortunately, there was not enough time for further research.

[135] Mark Sykes was known as an avowed Catholic and architect of the 1916 ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement’ (also known as the ‘Asia Minor Agreement’) which was very much criticsed, named for „imperialistic“ treachery to the oriental people and is until today one of the main ideological targets of radical islamists. It remains unclear which section or text of Sykes Hadank is referring to here. In any case, Sykes wrote numerous papers and publications (see Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899 – 1919), some of which Hadank probably read.

[136] 1862 – 1943, Archaeologist, Geographer, Indologist and Orient Traveler.

[137] Conjecture.

[138] Edward Gibbon (1737–1794) wrote the monumental historical work „The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire“, which is still highly regarded today. In his conclusions, he attributed the decline primarily to the encroaching Germanic tribes, in addition to growing social, physical and mental decadence and, finally, Christianity with its message of salvation which undermined the war spirit and the military capabilities.

[139] This topic has remained highly significant up to the present day. See, for example, the sometimes heated debate in Germany in the late 1990s about Turkey's accession to the EU, which is -at least formally- still possible. Of the numerous publications on this subject, here only Bülent Küçük, Die Türkei und das andere Europa: Phantasmen der Identität im Beitrittsdiskurs (Turkey and the Other Europe: Fantasies of Identity in the

advanced from there in several waves to the Western Asian-European border areas; they did not conquer Constantinople until 1453. But with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, "European" Turkey has disappeared again, except for an insignificant remnant. It should be noted that since the Balkan Wars, there have been repeated population exchanges between Greece and Turkey, between Bulgaria and Turkey, and finally between Romania and Turkey. This has led to the return migration of hundreds of thousands of Turkish-speaking Muslims from Europe to Asia. (Alfred Rosenberg[140], Gestaltung der Idee, 1936).

Nevertheless, even after the elimination of "European" Turkey, the Kemalist Turks continue to proclaim: "We Turks are Europeans" (see, for example, the newspaper article by the Turkish writer Jaqub Chadry), but this is merely a political slogan. In influential Turkish circles, the plan is to adopt "European" civilisation (Hans v. Mzik[141] rightly noted in "Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Wien", vol. 61 (1918), p. 199, that there was and is neither a uniform "Oriental culture" nor a "European culture"), to adopt "European" costumes and fashions (from clothing to beards), to adopt "European" weapons, railways, motor cars, aeroplanes and other things, to build factories, etc. In short, things and institutions are adopted, mere outward appearances are imitated, but the people remain unchanged inside. They only want to behave like "Europeans" in order to be regarded as such or to be treated as equals. Of course, the considerable vagueness of the term "European" is striking. The Turks certainly do not think of the Albanians and Portuguese when they use this term. Recent Turkish history suggests that by "Europe" they usually mean Paris, so Turkish-French Paris is the ideal image that comes to mind when they hear the word "Europe".

The example of the Turks alone shows the confusion that arises when the geographical term "Europe" is reduced to a political slogan. By the same token, Negroes or Indians who dress in European clothes, buy a car, etc. could then call themselves "Europeans". Foreign peoples belonging to other continents can never become "Europeans" in the scientific sense, no matter how much they "Europeanise" themselves outwardly.[142]

<...>

Accession Discourse), Bielefeld 2008, and Gabriele Clemens (ed.), Die Türkei und Europa (Turkey and Europe), Hamburg 2007.

[140] Alfred Rosenberg was the 'chief ideologist' of the Third Reich. His extremely racist work 'Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhundert' (The Myth of the 20th Century) -riddled with irrationalities- was considered an important fundamental work at the time. Rosenberg legitimised, for example, racial concepts such as those adopted in the Nuremberg Laws of 1935. He played a leading role in the war of extermination in Eastern Europe and was executed after being convicted at the Nuremberg Trials in 1946.

[141] 1876 – 1961. Austrian orientalist, historian and geographer.

[142] The assumption, partly based on alleged racial characteristics, that the Turks actually had at least some European traits was quite common among Turkophile observers of the time. See Bernd Lemke, Ewald Banse und der Orient, Bremen 2021, pp. 12–23 (Paul Rohrbach and Ewald Banse in their efforts to equate the Turks, albeit as junior partners, with the Germans or Germanic peoples). Claims and legends related to the 'blue eyes' myth also belong in this context. It was repeatedly noted that people with blue eyes had been encountered while travelling in the Orient, who were possibly descendants of crusaders or earlier common ancestors. The (blue) eye colour also played a prominent role in the "scientific" consideration of the alleged genealogy of peoples. See Peter Rohrbacher, Die Geschichte des Hamiten-Mythos, pp. 126f., pp. 136–138, pp. 198f., p. 207, p. 230.

In Germany, on the other hand, people talk about “America” and “Americanising”. This is also a buzzword used to conceal the origin of certain methods hostile to the people, especially the exploitation of honest workers by financiers.[143] The real originators of such methods are mostly Jews, or their followers and paid spearheads (Freemasons, etc.).

<...>

Instead of talking about a “competition between Germany and England” in a sporting context, it would be more logical and simpler to refer only to the competition between Germans and English people; it is not countries that compete, but people or nations.

<...>

The kind of hide-and-seek that diplomats like to play with certain expressions is impossible for science if it is not to be thrown into turmoil. The more precise and clear scientific terms are, the better. Let us leave country names as they are. Let us beware of allowing them to degenerate into mere political slogans that change with every change of rulers and their plans!

<...>

Politicians may talk about “Europe” while referring to the interests of their state or people, but in science such generalisations are pernicious.[144]

<...>

I already spoke out against the misuse of the term “Europe” in 1924 in the Historische Vierteljahresschrift, issue 2/3, p. 352.

[143] Until the total defeat in 1945, not only important political quarters on the right in Germany but also many academics and scientists believed that America (and the Jews living there) was primarily a capitalist, exploitative country that had to be contained or fought by a Germany ruled by nationalist or ‚völkisch‘ governments, with affiliated neighboring territories in Europe. (The transatlantic idea only gained acceptance from the 1950s onwards as it became clear and manifest that security against Soviet power politics was not possible without this and -for some quarters- that dreams of a widely german dominated Europe as world power were definitely over). This complex topic (including i.a. the question how much in reality Germany under Hitler in itself was capitalist, national-socialist or völkisch) cannot be dealt with here. Cf. only two good contributions Klaus P. Fischer, Hitler and America, Philadelphia 2011 and Rainer Zitelmann, The role of anti-capitalism in Hitler's world view, 13 November 2022, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12551.

[144] These two paragraphs are a good example for Hadank’s understanding of „Science“ and Research, incl. Humanities.

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 67 (1933-39) <unpaginated>:

Jewish tricks to circumvent, undermine and eliminate the names of peoples:

Belittling and harming peoples by reinterpreting the names of peoples as mere legal designations of nationality.

<…>

Avoiding the use of ethnic names, especially Iranian ones[145], is characteristic of the followers of the Jews, especially theologians, and Freemasons.[146]

<...>

[145] These and the following statements by Hadank refer to the idea, which has been gaining strength since the 19th century, that there was a large ethnic group of 'Aryans' that included not only the Germanic peoples, the Indians and the Persians, but also the Kurds. On the history of the "Aryan" myth since the 18th century, see Josef Wiesehöfer, Zur Geschichte der Begriffe 'Arier' und 'Aryan', in: H. Sancisi, Werdenburg und J. W. Drijvers (ed.), The Roots of the European Tradition, Leiden 1990, S. 149 – 166. Motadel, David, Iran and the Aryan Myth, in: Ali M. Ansari (ed.), Perceptions of Iran, History, Myths and Nationalism from Medievial Persia to The Islamic Republic, London New York 2014, S. 119 – 146, Klaus von See, The Aryan Myth, in: Nikolaus Buschmann, Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA, Frankfurt/M. 2003, S. 56 – 98. For a global, particularly Indian, perspective, see Vasant Kaiwar, The Aryan Model of History and the Oriental Renaissance, see also Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race, Aryanism in the British Empire, especially chapters 1 and 6. The historical significance of these ideas (including the imagination in Iran today which is remarkable) in general cannot be discussed in detail here.

[146] Expressions like these three became more and more interchangeable. In his zealous and meticulous quarrel against Jewish or democratically minded scholars (these attributes became increasingly interchangeable for Hadank), Hadank *i.a.* denounced Oskar Mann's successor as head of the Oriental Studies Department at the Prussian State Library, Gotthold Eljakim Weil (1862–1960), as incompetent and unscientific. ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 218, which also includes the almost offended criticism of the Norwegian Indo-Iranist Georg Valentin von Munthe af Morgenstierne (1892 – 1978), who had reviewed one of Hadank's works negatively. For further attacks against other scholars or individuals see also ibid., Nr. 34, p. 7: "Dr. Arthur Byhans' (1872–1942, ethnologist, first director of the "Eurasian Department" of today's Museum of World Cultures and Arts, MARKK) description of the Kurds in Dr. Georg Buschan's "Illustrierte Völkerkunde" vol. II, 1 (Stuttgart 1922), pp. 400 l.Z. – 403, is very disappointing. (The physician and ethnologist Buschan, 1863–1942, was the editor of this important periodical). Instead of basing his description at least on the most important of the numerous accounts by foreign observers and on local linguistic monuments of the Kurds, he <Byhan> contented himself <conjecture> <...> with using information about northern groups in Russian Transcaucasia, without considering that one cannot readily draw conclusions about the entire people from this small, isolated group <conjecture> <...>. Long-disproved errors about the origin, ethnic affinity and religious affiliation of the Kurds are repeated as established facts. His aversion to the Kurds also leads A. Byhan to make inaccurate judgements, so that the uninformed reader is led to believe that he is dealing with a people on a particularly low cultural level."

Not everything can be be listed here. As remarked in the introduction, Hadanks linguistic knowledge and analytical insight should not be dimished from the outset (the editors are, in fact, not linguists, so that they are not qualified to judge Hadanks work and research on Kurdish languages and their history from the perspectives of modern linguistic science).

"It is necessary[147] to restore the meaning of ethnic names, including the adjectives derived from them, to terms of descent.

In an ethnically oriented state, the biological-genealogical concept of ethnicity is the given, indeed the only permissible one, in public life as well as in science. It has grown on native soil, not imported from abroad, as the liberal-democratic concept has.

According to the ethnic view, membership of a people is not transferable, because the people is a blood community.

The people as a community of descent is fundamentally different from the sum of individuals who are merely grouped together externally as holders of the same nationality in a legal community that exists only on paper.

The devaluation of the concept of the people, its degradation to a mere title of ownership under constitutional law, which can be acquired and relinquished at will, was accomplished in Germany in the wake of the emancipation of the Jews in 1812[148]. <...>

In the France of the Third Republic, the inhabitants of all colonies, including those of the Congo region, are considered citoyens francais. Algeria enjoys the privilege of being subordinate to the French Ministry of the Interior and having a seat and a vote in both houses of the Paris Parliament; in other words, part of North Africa is treated as equal to the mother country. Because Algeria is home not only to Berbers and Arabs, but also to mixed-race people of these peoples and Negroes, one can imagine the racial consequences of the French government's methods. The Berbers, Arabs and Negroes insist on their rights.

<...>

One of my Kurdish acquaintances told me about the following experience from 1934. He is sitting in a Parisian café. At the next table, a Negro pays his bill and gives the waiter only five sous as a tip. The waiter expresses his displeasure. The Negro then confidently exclaims: “Je suis Francais.” Note that the Negro already considers himself to be francais, not just citoyen francais. He claims to be a member of the French people, i.e. of the French blood community. The waiter puts him in his place. Quick-witted and equal to the situation, the waiter replies: “Vous n'êtes pas intéressant!” Consider the danger to the existence of the French people that the Jewish-Masonic government of the Third Republic has brought about. The Jews and Freemasons first confused the concepts, then broke down the barriers between the races; officially, the distinction between French and Negroes has ceased to exist.

<...>

Following this we will no longer be surprised that Freemasons assert the unity of what should be separated and give the political term ‘Occident’ a false extension, that the great differences between peoples and races are disregarded.

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[147] Conjecture.

[148] This refers to the Emancipation Edict of 11 March 1812 by Frederick William III.

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 46 (1933 – 39) <unpaginated>

Strictly confidential![149]

The necessity of a restructuring of the humanities in West Asia

The paralysis of Iranian studies and ethnology by the Jews and the necessity of a restructuring of West Asian studies.

Anyone who considers this treatise too long should bear in mind that for thousands of years, the Jews have been employing their most intelligent minds to devise methods and constitutions with which they, like spiders, catch the goyim[150] in their webs. This modest contribution covers only a small part of the schemes and plots that Jewish politicians and Orientalists, as well as their German helpers and tools, have pursued and continue to pursue to the detriment of German science, the German people and the German Reich. These matters cannot be taken seriously enough or investigated thoroughly enough. It is essential to dismantle the Jewish-Masonic system in the Orientalist humanities of West Asia. <...>

No other people in Asia today exhibit as many distinctly Nordic traits as the Iranian mountain peoples. This is precisely why the Jews have done everything in their power to prevent the German people from learning about the Kurds and to slander the Kurds. Jews and those who follow them seek to prevent related peoples from finding each other and cultivating their connections.

Today, the main remnants of Aryan character can be found among the peasant and mountain peoples of western Iran. The Jews are well aware of this, and therefore want to prevent this fact from becoming known to the German people. The slander of the Kurds serves the Jews to reduce German interest in the Kurds to a minimum.

Anyone who reports objectively on the Kurds has the Jews against them from the outset and must also expect to encounter the ill will of non-Jewish "Orientalists". The Jewish professor Wilhelm Printz[151] used a review of Dr. Wolfgang Lang's book on Pamir dialects I in the ZDMG[152] to disparage the authentic text formulations and the respective knowledge of northwestern Iranian languages and Kurdish.

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 34 (1930 – 40), pp. 3 - 21

Among the Iranian peoples, the north-western Iranian Zaza and Guran, who are closest to us in terms of geography, spirit and physique, as well as the Kurds, are the least known even to educated Germans.

[149] The addressee cannot be determined. The following passage is apparently a treatise by Hadank, which he later intended to send. As things stand, it was never completed. The paragraphs presented here seem to be an adaption of the notorious „Protocols of the Elders of Zion" (see below FN 161) to the case of the Kurds in racial terms.

[150] Term for 'non-Jews'.

[151] Indologist and librarian (1887–1942).

[152] Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Journal of the German Oriental Society).

<…>

Writings by non-Jewish authors in the Jewish sense

Jewish and Turkish slander of the Kurds has led non-Jewish, including religiously minded Christian authors, to emphasise one-sidedly emphasise the real or supposed faults and misdeeds of the Kurds.

In doing so, they have completely ignored, if not deliberately concealed, the indisputable merits of the Kurds, including many of the non-Aryan traits and characteristics of this people.

<…>

The Kurds' aversion to living in cities is reminiscent of the behaviour of the ancient Germanic tribes and, in our view, is not a disadvantage but an advantage.

Constant mental war: Karl Hadank and other Orientalists

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 34 (1930 – 40)

From the literature on the Kurds[153]

Examples of Jewish propaganda against the Kurds

Turkish

German writings

English and Russian writings

Mark Sykes[154]

Jüdische Rundschau

[153] The following lines are probably a kind of classification system and important keywords for a planned collection of material.

[154] On the allegations of Sykes as a friend of the Jews, a Catholic and a secret Jesuit, see FN 124 and 135. Further information and points on scholars and their publications (selection) in ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, No. 36, Siegmund Samuel Feist (linguist 1865–1943), Stammeskunde der Juden, Die jüdischen Stämme der Erde in alter und neuer Zeit. Historisch-anthropologische Skizzen, Leipzig 1926 (no further evaluation). Furthermore, ibid., Count Keyserling as an enemy of the Germans, 'I am greater than Hitler', Fridericus, 1933, and ibid., Nr. 48, and Sir Mark Sykes as a 'servant of the Jews'; further titles mentioned, including Cutter Torrey, The Jewish foundation of Islam New York 1933, also on Karl May, including Heinz Stolte, Der Volksschriftsteller Karl May. Finally, ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 41 on Henri Grégoire (Belgian Byzantinist, 1881-1964) „<...> is a student of the theologian Adolf v. Harnack, who – to please the Jews and mock the Germans – wrote in the Jewish Berliner Tagblatt <...> <...>."

p. 10 - 12

Felix von Luschan, died 1924[155]

He does not hold back in his support for the then rulers of the Middle East, the Turks: Prof. Dr. Felix Luschan, Director of the Museum of Ethnology in Berlin.

<…>

p. 11R

A strange interest in mixed-race people.

Instead of the graceful and healthy, he loves to push the degenerate and unusual to the fore – an approach that is least appropriate in introductory writings such as his. Luschan's images of Kurds are repulsive.

F. von Luschan's portrayal of the Kurds seems like an attempt to overcome the image of the Kurds that we encounter in Oskar Mann's Mukri volumes of the Kurdish-Persische Forschungen (KPF) with their many beautiful texts, detailed introductions and annotations.

p. 13

Dr. Fritz Hesse[156] goes so far as to turn certain facts of ethnology on their head in his books on the Mosul question and on Persia.

Numerous observers have testified to the cruelty of the punishments that Persian rulers, judges and administrative officials used to impose. I recall the gouging out of eyes, the bastinado, the horrific atrocities during the Babi persecutions.

[155] Anthropologist, ethnologist, traveller to Africa (1854–1924). Luschan advocated amicable relations between Christians and Jews, for example, and rejected exclusion and discrimination on racist grounds. Luschan was well-known and prominent, is therefore well researched. Christine Stelzig, Felix von Luschan. An art-loving manager at the Royal Museum of Ethnology in Berlin. In: Ulrich van der Heyden, Joachim Zeller (eds.), 'Power and Share in World Domination,' Berlin and German Colonialism, Münster 2005, pp. 131–135, Peter Ruggendorfer, Hubert D. Szemethy (eds.): Felix von Luschan (1854–1924). Life and Work of a Universal Scholar, Vienna 2009, Cornelia Essner, Skulls, Stones and Students. The Multifaceted Anthropologist Felix von Luschan (1854–1924), Berlin 2023. Last not least cf. Miriam Brusius und Matthew Vollgraff, Divided Histories, Legacies of Colonialism, Race Science, and Antisemitism in Berlin's Museums, v.a. S. 12 – 20 [in preparation].

[156] On Hesse, see FN 69 above. The publication referred to is the work Die Mossulfrage, 1925 (special publication of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (No. 1, 1925). Mosul was initially to be awarded to the French. Paris, however, ceded the oil-rich area around the city to the British as part of a settlement. When the borders were redrawn (Lausanne Conference 1923), there were conflicts with the Turks, who claimed this area for themselves.

Nevertheless, Dr. Fritz Hesse denies the cruelty of the Persians.[157] Instead, he unjustifiably directs this accusation against the Kurds. Prof. J.H. Kramers (Leiden)[158] has defended the Kurds against this accusation <in> OLZ[159] and it should be expressly stated here that the barbaric punishment of bastinado is unknown among the Kurds.

<...>

p. 21

Consul Dr. Fritz Hesse looks down on the Kurds with contempt from the perspective of a city dweller and merchant, and is unable to understand the nature of this people.

Dr. Fritz Hesse is biased by Jewish thinking; he judges from the perspective of a merchant and city dweller.

Dr Fritz Hesse views everything from the perspective of a democratically minded city dweller and merchant. Without any understanding of or interest in racial and ethnic characteristics, he writes in a mocking tone about the Kurds, who, in his opinion, have no cities of note.

<...>

p. 26

In his essay "The Kurdish Problem" (Preußische Jahrbücher <..., 223 (1931), p. 117>), the Iranist O.G. v. Wesendonk[160] sides with the Turks, without showing any understanding for the Kurds. As consul general of an internationally, i.e. Jewish and Jesuit-minded government[161], he will certainly have been aware of these circles' aversion to the Kurds.

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[157] It remains unclear what Hadank in the last instance thought of the Persians / Iranians in the framework of the racist interpretations of the „Aryan"-myth. That the whole concept of an ethnic ‚family' of „Aryans" concerning the Persians was instable and therefore critisised already in the period under scrutiny here. See Amir Theilhaber, Von Persophonie zum Arier-Mythos, Orientalistische Zugänge zu einem globalgeschichtlichen Phänomen, in: Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 29 (2020), espec. pp. 216 – 230, https://api-depositonce.tu-berlin.de/server/api/core/bitstreams/359fc3d8-c502-4e6a-87c3-65ebccf7152e/content.

[158] Johannes Hendrik Kramers (1891-1951), Islamic scholar, Arabist, lawyer, among other things. With regard to Arabic, he was a student of Snouck Hurgronje. He acted as an interpreter for Kurdish during the border demarcation around Mosul at the Lausanne Conference in 1923.

[159] Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.

[160] Otto Günther Wesendonk was Consul General in Tiflis from 1923 to 1926. Together with his wife he also wrote the work 'Aus der kaukasischen Welt' (From the Caucasian World).

[161] The sweeping conflation of alleged conspiracies by „Jews" and "Jesuits" was one of the weapons used by the National Socialists and other right wing extremists in particular against the Weimar Republic. This was based on underground literature such as the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'. Freemasons, with their exclusive societies and associations, were similarly denigrated. All three groups were lumped together under the lowest common denominator of 'secret machinations, conspiracy, world domination', with little regard for the massive differences in their organisations and lifestyles. At best, distinctions were made when it came to denouncing

p. 27

<...> <One> can only read with astonishment the summaries in German-language reference works and handbooks from the Jewish-democratic period (1918–1932). As if by agreement, they conceal Moltke[162] <...> and ignore Oskar Mann's two reports on the dialect of the Mukri Kurds. Nor are they concerned with the splendid essay by English Major Noel on the character of the Kurds[163], explained through their proverbs. The falsification of ethnology by Jews and their followers is a murky chapter.

p. 28

What must make us suspicious in the four descriptions[164] of the Kurds in German books from the time of the November Democrats[165] is the observation that we do not encounter isolated errors, as can happen elsewhere, but rather an accumulation of false information that is likely to promote reprehensible doubts. These many instances undeniably lead to a disparagement of the Kurds among the uninformed and to confusion among German readers, who, due to such distorted images, are unable to form accurate views about the Kurds. Nor is it likely to be mere coincidence that Oskar Mann's KPF <Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen>, the leading work that which provides us with a wealth of excellent material from Kurdish sources, remains unmentioned. Even if the KPF was unknown to one of these authors, there were dozens of reports from reliable eyewitnesses from which he could have obtained information. Considering the personal circumstances of the authors in question, it is difficult to dismiss the suspicion that <..., corrupted>.

p. 29 <...>

Since the time of the Jewish-born Imperial Chancellor of Kaiser Wilhelm II, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and his colleague Dr Ernst Jäckh[166], it has been customary in Germany to write about West Asian peoples and events from a Jewish or Turkish government perspective. We must learn once again to

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the various techniques and methods used to allegedly subjugate and exploit the Germanic peoples and Germans. It is not possible to go into more detail on this complex issue at this point.

[162] Helmuth von Moltke (1800–1891), also known as the 'elder Moltke', was a military advisor in the Ottoman Empire from 1836 to 1839, during which time he also took part in campaigns against the Kurds. His letters, published afterwards, are still considered an important source of information about the country and its people. Briefe über die Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839, Berlin 1841, https://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/view/moltke_zustaende_1841?p=3.

[163] Edward William Charles Noel (1886 – 1974), The Character of the Kurds as illustrated by their Proverbs and Popular Sayings, Bulletin of SOAS , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , October 1920 , pp. 79 – 90, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00101673. Noel was a British agent in Kurdistan who used sometimes crafty methods (divide and rule) to try to bring the Kurds under British rule or win them over as allies against the Turks (in some cases by instigating Kurdish uprisings).

[164] Neither books or authors specified. Probably book reviews, but it is unclear whether Hadank's findings were published or not.

[165] The democratic state (Weimar Republic) and its representatives.

[166] Ernst Friedrich Wilhelm Jäckh (1875 – 1959), journalist and publicist. Jäckh was one of the most prominent representatives of Turkophilia (temporarily even „Türkenfieber") before and during the First World War, and also advocated the launch of a holy war, especially against the Empire. Great public influence.

view peoples, people and events in that part of the world from a German and Indo-European perspective.

Page 30:

'The behaviour of the <...> Otto Harrassowitz[167] bookshop in Leipzig as publisher of 'Litterae Orientales', a directory of new publications published four times a year, <...> <is[168]>

<...> disregard for publications in the German language:

The 'Litterae Orientales' ignore both the East Kurdish books and magazines printed in Rowanduz, Silemani and Baghdad, as well as the West Kurdish publications from Damascus. Considering the care with which titles of scholarly works are usually included in ‚Litterae Orientales', the neglect of the Kurds and other Iranian mountain peoples is evident. Added to this is a double mutilation of the book title of my research on Western Kurdish[169] in the <...> issue of ‚Litterae Orientales'.

p. 34f.

The author of the article 'Kurds' in the Great Herder encyclopaedia advocates for the (interests of) the Petroleum Jews.

<...>

At the end of the article 'Kurds' in the so-called Great Herder, 4th edition, vol. 7 (Freiburg/Br. 1933)[170], col. 479, German readers are recommended only one book, not the classical account in Moltke's travelogues, which sounds so appealing to us Germans, nor Oskar Mann's 'Kurdisch-Pers. Forschungen' (Kurdish-Persian Research), but a book written in English by the Jew and Bolshevik Waldemar Jochelson[171] about the peoples of Asian Russia.

<…>

[167] To this day, one of the most important German publishers for Oriental and Slavic studies.

[168] Conjecture.

[169] Hadanks contribution to the „Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen".

[170] The Große Herder was a universal reference work, comparable to the Brockhaus.

[171] 1855 – 1937, Ethnographer for Northern Russia.

p. 43

A brief description of the Kurds is provided by Hans F.K. Günther[172], Die Nordische Rasse bei den Indogermanen Asiens (Munich 1934), pp. 142–145. The outstanding sociologist and race researcher has endeavoured, as far as is possible for someone unfamiliar with the language, to capture the essential characteristics of the Kurdish people.

His extensive study of Indo-European languages was very helpful for him. He was therefore able to do full justice to the Kurds, even though he had only a few sources at his disposal, and not the best ones at that. One ambiguity is disturbing: Günther again uses the imprecise term 'Persian' where only the general term 'Iranian' is appropriate.

<...>

p. 46

Ewald Banses'[173] Lexikon der Geographie (Encyclopaedia of Geography), vol. 1 (Braunschweig and Hamburg 1923) contains an article on the Kurds on p. 778. Banse still relies too heavily on Moritz Wagner's 'Reise nach Persien und dem Lande der Kurden' (Journey to Persia and the Land of the Kurds) (1852).[174] The erroneous view of the fundamental stratification of the Kurds into Aicherets (warrior race) and Guran (peasant race) can be traced back to this. The Guran do not belong to the Kurds, but are a north-western Iranian people (Millingens[175] description of traditional costumes is wrongly generalised in the 'Lexikon der Geographie'). Banse does not mention particularly important source texts at all, neither Moltke's travel letters nor Oskar Mann KPF <Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen>.

p. 47

Ewald Banse, Das Orientbuch, Der alte und der neue Orient (The Book of the Orient - The Old and New Orient), Strasbourg Leipzig 1914, warned on p. 306 – independently of Count von Westarp, Unter Halbmond und Sonne (1913)[176] – against judging the Armenians solely on the basis of the usurers and devious merchants of the cities of the Near East.

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[172] F. K. Günther was probably the most influential racial theorist of the Third Reich, with considerable influence. Peter Schwandt, Hans F. K. Günther. Portrait, Development and Impact of Racist-Nordic Thought, Saarbrücken 2008, and Sabrina Rogahn, Popularising Racism, Hans F. K. Günther's 'Rassenkunden' in Review Literature 1922–1942. Frankfurt am Main 2022.

[173] On Banse, see Bernd Lemke, Ewald Banse und der Orient, Bremen 2021.

[174] Moritz Friedrich Wagner (1813–1887) was a zoologist and travel writer.

[175] Frederick van Millingen (1836–1901, pseudonym Osman Bey) was an anti-Semitic publicist and member of the Ottoman armed forces who also published works on the life and culture of the Kurds.

[176] Eberhard-Joachim von Westarp (travel writer, 1884–1945), Unter Halbmond und Sonne, Im Sattel durch die asiatische Türkei und Persien, Berlin 1913.

<…>

Acts of revenge against the evil Kurds <for[177]> Massacres <…> among the Armenians themselves are rife in modern Armenian literature, material <…> for their strengthening.[178]

<...>

p. 56

(From the literature on the Kurds)

At the end of a short review of the book 'Road through Kurdistan: The narrative of an engineer in Iraq' by Archibald M. Hamilton (London 1937), in BSOAS[179], vol. IX, part 1 (1937), p. 251 M., V. Minorsky[180] writes:

„The Kurds as a nation may be still far from happiness, but the fact that they have captivated the hearts of so many travellers, down to Mr. Hamilton, promises a brighter prospect for this ancient and able people."

However, Minorsky repeatedly contradicted his own better judgement by inserting professionally unjustifiable pointed remarks and taunts against the Kurds, <...> e.g. in a review of Walther Hinz's book published at the same time.[181]

<...>

[177] Conjecture.

[178] Some Kurdish groups, bands and tribal forces actively participated in the genocide of the Armenians in 1915/16. From the extensive literature on the genocide, see e.g. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London New York, 3rd edition 2014, pp. 102–106. This dark chapter in Kurdish history has since been acknowledged and recognised by a number of Kurdish organisations and parties. It shows that minorities such as the Kurds – at least some of them – are not only victims of Turkish violence, but can also become perpetrators. For the -until today problematical- remembering in the face of the negation of the genocide by the Turkish government see Adnan Çelik and Ergin Öpengin, The Armenian Genocide in the Kurdish Novel: Restructuring Identity through Collective Memory, european journal of turkish studies, https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.5291. Further literature cannot be listed here. Respective public declarations from the Kurdish side (e.g. in the Kurdish Autonomous Region) can be accessed in the internet.

[179] Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

[180] Vladimir Fyodorovich Minorsky (1877–1966) was an important Russian Iranist and Kurdologist.

[181] Evidence for the review is difficult to determine ('Arab. LXXXVII, 56'). Walter Hinz (1906–1992) was a German Iranologist and Kurdologist.

p. 60

Prof. Josef Markwart[182], who is subservient to the Jesuits, has an aversion to the Kurds; see his work: Die Entstehung und Wiederherstellung der armenischen Nation (The Emergence and Restoration of the Armenian Nation) (Berlin Schöneberg 1919).

<...>

Prof. Markwart has never worked with Kurds; he has never been to Asia at all, so he is not capable of judgement.

When J. Markwart judges the Kurds according to the role of the Hamidiye[183] of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, it is like judging the German people according to the tens of thousands of German brawlers and adventurers in the French Foreign Legion.

<…>

p. 62

German scholars and technicians in <..., corrupted> false front.

How long will Indo-European suicide politics continue?

Paul H. Kuntze[184], Verlorenes Blut, Deutsche Fremdtruppen in 2000 Jahren germanisch-deutscher Geschichte im Rahmen der allgemeinen Kraftverluste durch die deutsche Auswanderung, (Lost Blood, German foreign troops in 2000 years of Germanic-German history in the context of the general loss of power due to German emigration), Leipzig 1936 offers a harrowing history of German mercenaryism. What we have experienced and are still experiencing in the field of German science is a spectacle no less shameful than that presented by Germans as foreign legionnaires in the service of powers hostile to Germany. Hopefully, the time is not far off when German scholars will realise what a sad role they play as blindly faithful supporters and advocates of Turkish and Arab propaganda against Indo-European peoples.

[182] 1894–1930. Historian and Orientalist (specialising in Iranian and Armenian philology). Markwart was a devout Catholic and therefore a prominent target for Hadank.

[183] For more on the Hamidiye regiments and their specific problems, see Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899–1914 (German and British travellers to the Orient 1899–1914), forthcoming.

[184] Little-known author. Numerous publications on German military history, seafaring and colonies.

ABBAW: NL Mann / Hadank, Nr. 41 (probably 1933 - 1939)

The International Professors and the Iranian Mountain Peoples, A Contribution to the Characterisation of Oriental Studies submissive towards the Jews. Suppression of Iranian Studies by Official Guardians of Science.[185]

<…>

The followers of 'Oriental studies' raised in the Jewish sense still follow the example of the Jewish-Masonic-led League of Nations in Geneva. In science, they disregard small peoples, except when they are Semitic. Iranian peoples and languages are of least importance to them; these are ranked even below Negroes.

<…>

Professors' Mirror[186]

Jewish Masonic-Jesuit-corrupted university science.

The representatives of the Professors' International are characterised by the fact that they value their Jewish colleagues more than their own compatriots and Indo-European racial relatives, and by the fact that they promote the Jewish cause[187]."

<…>

The Professors' International[188]

Supporters of the Professors' International (were and) are those university teachers who place their profession and their colleagues above their own people and the Indo-European cause, and who therefore, for example, join forces with a Jewish colleague to take action against their own compatriots or against Indo-Europeans in general. Internationally minded professors value a Jewish colleague more highly than a non-Jewish scholar who is not a professor.

<...>

[185] Probably also planned as a separate treatise. German original text here: „Die Professoren-Internationale und die iranischen Bergvölker, Ein Beitrag zur Kennzeichnung der judenhörigen Orientalistik. Unterbindung der Iranistik durch amtliche Hüter der Wissenschaft".

[186] German: „Professoren-Spiegel". Here meant as reference to the literary genre of „Mirrors for Princes", in part very critical assessments, balance-sheets and guidances for the ruling classes. Most famous: Nicolo Macchiavelli, Il Principe. Hadank, of course, parallels his well-hated professors with macchiavelistic ruling in Renaissance Italy.

[187] Conjecture.

[188] Hadank were explicit equates with the „Socialist International" (founded 1889), the world wide organisation of all socialist and social democratic parties, one of the most prominent self-defined enemies of the German nation by nationalists and Nazis.

Until 193<..., corrupted>, the Deutsche (!) Morgenländische Gesellschaft[189] had not published a single Persian text, let alone texts in other Iranian languages. In contrast, it has published a large number of Arabic texts, almost exclusively <...> of a theological nature.

<...>

The policy of professors of West Asian linguistics is to give preference to areas that are as remote as possible, both in terms of time and space, especially from a racial and ethnological point of view – in other words: The neglect of living languages, especially those of the Iranian mountain peoples of West Asia, who are most closely related to us, i.e. peoples with an Indo-European core or attitude.

<...>

On the position of Iranian studies in the curriculum of German universities

The conspicuous neglect of Iranian studies by the managing director of the DMG, the theologian Prof. Dr. Paul Kahle[190], is entirely consistent with the obvious exclusion of Iranian studies from German universities.

In these universities, the curriculum for West Asian studies is still based on Jewish precepts. Or: The Jewish curriculum still applies to the representation of West Asian studies. Semitic languages are definitely in the foreground, followed by Turkic languages. Indology, which is strongly cultivated, occupies a special position. Some associate it with Sinology. In contrast, according to Jewish opinion, Iranian studies may not be pursued as an independent subject. Teaching in Avestan[191] is usually carried out by Sanskritists as an appendage to Indology. Teaching in Modern Persian is relegated to second place behind Arabic and Turkish by Islamic scholars – i.e. theologians – and is of interest to them mainly as the language of the mystics (Sufis). Incidentally, teaching Modern Persian cannot be considered representative of Iranian studies, as Modern Persian is only one of many Iranian languages and, from a racial point of view, is no longer the most important Iranian language today.

<…>

Suppression of Iranian studies

The study of Kurdish and Northwest Asian languages (Western and Eastern Kurdish, Gurani, Ossetic and Afghan, Zara) is being artificially suppressed by German university professors. A request made by the Kurdish prince Dr. jur. Kamuran Dali Bedir Khan[192] at the beginning of December 1934 to the then

[189] DMG (German [!] Oriental Society). Exclamation mark in the original, [the ed.].

[190] 1875–1964. Kahle was a Protestant theologian who specialised in the Hebrew language. During the Third Reich, he fell out of favour for helping Jews and was also threatened. He therefore emigrated to England in 1939.

[191] Ancient Persian language.

[192] The Bedir-Khans advocated Kurdish independence, not least against the Turks. Hadank had met Kamuran Bedir-Khan's brother (who was staying in Germany at the time), Celadet, in Damascus in 1932. Barbara

director of the Seminar for Oriental Languages, Prof. H. H. Schaeder[193], to establish a Kurdish language programme initially went unanswered, so that the prince left after several months of waiting in vain. A negative response arrived later, with the usual justification (pretext) that there was no money available for this. Why had the director not applied for the necessary funds for the new financial year? Strangely enough, Prof. Schaeder was in a great hurry in 1934 and also had the funds to hire a second professor of Arabic at the seminar; he appointed a young man to this position who had not lived and studied among Arabs in Asia, but only had the advantage of being his student. Professor Schaeder has also never been to Asia. Thus, the attempt to bring a Kurd to Germany for the first time as a teacher of this important Iranian language failed due to the resistance of the only [!] professor of Iranian [![194]] philology at German universities at the time.

How much longer will German university professors treat the peoples of north-western Iran and the Kurds as second-class citizens? How long will they continue to disregard their languages as unworthy of research?

<...>

The practice of the Jews and compliant German professors (namely theologians and "Orientalists") of setting prohibitively high prices for works on Iranian Studies whose publication they could not prevent or circumvent, so that only professors with their high salaries could afford such treasures.

Josef Strzygowski[195], Georg Wolfgang Schulz[196], <…> and Oskar Mann fell victim to the ruling clique of the Professors' International and its followers.

‚University science'

The behaviour of internationally minded university professors – and that was the majority of university teachers until recently – has led to some circles of our people turning away with disgust and contempt not only from university life, but from science in general. Certainly not with good reason, because science <...> was and is fortunately not synonymous with the way it is represented by university teachers. Dr. Wolfgang Schulz, who was appointed university professor in Munich at an advanced age,

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Henning, Narratives of the History of the Ottoman Kurdish Bedirhani Family in Imperial and Post-Imperial Contexts, Bamberg 2018 [downloadable at: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/bitstream/uniba/43114/1/BOST13HenningBarbaraDissopusse_A3a.pdf, pp. 553–561. Not least because of this, Hadank harboured hopes of promoting Kurdish independence. The Mammut enterprise must be seen in this overall context. The Bedir-Khans played an important role in the Kurdish independence movement. See above p. 21 – 25 in the Introduction.

[193] Hans-Heinrich Schaeder (1896–1956), Iranist and historian of religion.

[194] Exclamation marks i.o., the ed.

[195] 1862–1941. Austrian art historian who developed race-based theories regarding the Indo-Europeans. Hostility towards the Jewish archaeologist Ernst Herzfeld. Gertrude Bell regarded him as one of her archaeological mentors. See Bernd Lemke, Deutsche und britische Orientreisende 1899–1914 (German and British Travellers to the Orient 1899–1914), forthcoming.

[196] No further information on this person could be obtained.

considered the situation in 1935 to be so serious that he wrote an essay in defence of science: “Science and Life” – published in the January 1936 issue of “Völkische Kultur”:

‘When I applied to the Jewish director or librarian of the Prussian State Library[197] to purchase a Kurdish magazine or Kurdish books, I encountered passive resistance. The procurement of Kurdish books fails due to the reluctance of the large bookstore Otto Harrassowitz in Leipzig to offer anything other than theological [!][198] Kurdish literature.’

It testifies to an obvious lack of scientific seriousness and sense of responsibility on the part of university professors that they either ignored or slandered Oskar Mann's KPF. But it has often been noticed that these civil servant guardians of science have primarily acted as politicians and pursued personal goals.

<...>

The morals of the international professorate

Those who, under the guise of calm, dispassionate language, tell untruths, conceal what needs to be said, commit forgeries, steal the intellectual property of other scholars and their good reputation, have, according to the prevailing view, done nothing wrong and may continue unchallenged in their office as ‘confessors’ – of what, actually? – and as an educator of students. But if the slandered and robbed person defends himself and identifies the official perpetrator for what he is, then he is ostracised by the professoriate. From then on, he is barred from the journals published by professors.

The tendency to form castes continues to exist among university professors. Excessive professional pride prevents some of them from integrating into the German people.[199] The professors consider themselves to be the experts, alongside whom they neither recognise nor allow others to rise. The sinologist Dr Friedrich Otte[200] confronted them with bitter truths in the January 1936 issue of OLZ.[201]

[197] This probably refers to Gotthold Weil.

[198] Exclamation mark i. o., the ed.

[199] This mixture of racism, offendedness and hatred especially against science and research is -despite all differences in the general framework in the last 100 years- not too far away from the attitude of certain political parties and leaders in Europe and the US nowadays. This pertains also to the transported contents, although Hadank had explicit individual grievances – his blocked career.

[200] Temporary professor at Peking University. Specialist in Chinese economics and demography, among other subjects.

[201] Orientalische Literaturzeitung.

Preparation and planning of the operation

Federal Archives Military Archives

BArch RW 5 / 688 (Handakte Major Verbeek, Abwehr Abteilung II)

Defensive activity in the east <undated>

<…>

Working methods and tasks

Abwehr I Signal heads, interrogations, informants, long-distance operations with Agentenfunkgerät[202] Difficulties in preparation, ID cards, cover stories.

Abwehr III Cooperation with Ic/AO[203] of the army and GFP[204] Partisan reconnaissance, III-F game.[205]

Abwehr II particularly important for special purposes, as tasks are often similar (e.g. Africa), i.e. stratagems and guerrilla warfare are always at the forefront.

a.) Reconnaissance: minorities, social structure, political weaknesses, general mood <…>.

b.) Sabotage: Core area of Abwehr II. Successes very difficult. <…> Therefore, long-range operations here. <…>

c.) Combat missions: contrast to z.b.V.[206] There, operational use of objects, therefore rare opportunity for guerrilla warfare here. <…>

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[202] Radio transmitters specially developed for employment by Agents. Good information (incl. technical aspects) in Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, e.g. p. 40.

[203] The „Ic“ was the so-called „Dritter Generalstabsoffizier“ in general staffs, especially in divisions and higher. He was responsible for all Intelligence, e.g. for reconnoitre the situation of the enemy. AO means „Abwehroffizier“. He was the liaison officer to the Abwehr and responsible for getting all corresponding information and exchange with the other departments and agencies. For more information cf. Magnus Pahl, Fremde Heere Ost, espec. chs. II and III.

[204] Geheime Feldpolizei. Military police under control of the Abwehr. The members of the GFP were recruited mostly from the Gestapo and the criminal investigation department (Kriminalpolizei). Massive war crimes, i.a. killings of civilians etc. especially on the Eastern Front.

[205] = Funkspiel / Englandspiel, an operation of the Abwehr and the Sicherheitspolizei from 1941 to transmit false information to the British Intelligence after its spy network had been infiltrated in the Netherlands. It was at least in part successful, e.g. by misleading supplies from the air. The parachuted goods were then captured by the Germans. For the background cf. Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, p. 7.

[206] „zur besonderen Verwendung“. In the following Abwehr-documents this abbreviation pertains to the „Division Brandenburg“ that was originally set up as Lehrregiment „Brandenburg“ z.b.V 800 (first origins as Baulehrkompanie z.b.V). Although the Division Brandenburg was employed into special missions that were different from the tasks of the front line divisions, i.a. its units were scattered and broken down into small

d.) Insurrection: Schamil scheme[207], prerequisites and possibilities

Very old means of warfare. Examples:

Ireland – Sir Roger Casement[208]

Colonel Lawrence – Arabia[209]

C.S.R. crisis – Sudetenland[210]

Defection of Croatia <from Yugoslavia 1941>

e.) Subversion: In contrast to insurrection, a very modern method, born out of total war. Authoritarian states and minority states are particularly vulnerable, making Russia a particularly suitable target.[211] Potentially decisive in war. The smallest connections are important. Types of deployment: leaflets <...>, agents, couriers, defectors. Subversive side effects of legions.[212] Commando troops and insurrections.

<…>

detachment for secret warfare, it was organised as a ‚normal' division with respective staff elements, and its soldiers had a corps feeling. The other elements, e.g. of Abwehr II, including the Mammut group, were small, isolated units and therefore more or less independent although they formally subordinated to the Brandenburg Division. So, in this direct context, the latter is listed unter „z.b.V." whereas the other mission groups were subsumised under the short key „Abwehr". In the following documents, the naming („Division") is not always clear. The Lehrregiment 800 was renamed in Nov. 1942 as Sonderverband Brandenburg. In April 1943 it was in fact renamed as Division but immediately put under regular Wehrmacht command. Only one subunit was retained at the Abwehr and later renamed Lehrregiment „Kurfürst", and finally put unter unter the SS (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) in Juni 1944.

[207] Most likely, the Schamil operation (carried out across the Caucasus to incite a rebellion against Stalin to get the oilfields in the region) was used as a role model for Mammut. However, evidence is lacking.

[208] 1864 – 1916. Irish nationalist who tried to get German support in the First World War for the fight to liberate Ireland from British rule. Executed on 3rd August 1916.

[209] The legendary T.E. Lawrence who led the arabian revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. The literature on Lawrence and this campaign is massive. No titles will be named here. Bernd Lemke will publish a book and an article on this subject soon. There the relevant literature will be named and discussed.

[210] The Abwehr, espcially Abwehr II and the Brandenburg Regiment participated intensively in secret operations against European countries (i.a. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslawia, Poland, France) in the course of the violent expansion of the III. Reich from 1937, including inciting revolts from the German and other ethnic and political groups (e.g. the „Sudetendeutsche", inhabitants of the Sudetes, a mountain chain at the Western border to Germany)). For the basics of the following examples in this document cf. the relevant chapters in Werner Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos, ch. I – VIII and pp. 419 – 430 (although martial and adventurous language and style in this book).

[211] Cf. ibid., chs. IX – XVIII. The war in Russia was the main framework for all Abwehr-II-missions including the Mammut operation.

[212] For this type of subversion cf. above p. 10 with FN 40 concerning *i.a.* the „Arab Legion".

Cooperation

A matter of personality. Delivery by V-people.[213] Procurement of material/information about the enemy. Cooperation between Kommando-troops[214] and z.b.V. task force. Exchange of experiences.

Final considerations

Separate tasks <of all those involved in the Abwehr-organisation>, which complement each other. Danger of becoming one-sided.

Abwehr I – III: Not enough fighting spirit. Self-sufficiency. Getting bogged down in administration.

z.b.V.: Too strongly rooted in troop-based thinking, therefore too strong a focus on the object and overlooking the possibilities of guerrilla warfare.

<handwritten:> Mistakes of both.

<handwritten on top of the paragraph:> Lesson from the campaign in Russia:

All work against an opponent such as the Russian only makes sense if one knows the opponent well. Not only their methods of combat, but also their mentality and its origins. This requires studying the history of the country, the peoples of the region and their development, the social structure of the country and, last but not least, the ideology of the opponent. In the combat zone of Abwehr, to which the <Brandenburg> division belongs with particularly important tasks, mastery of this knowledge and its continuous improvement is just as important as the handling of weapons.

If we examine these questions in depth, we see that these things are of increased importance for all fighters in the East, knowing that the fight in the East is a fight for life and death. In this struggle, the question of the meaning of this war in the East is of tremendous importance, because if we view the war only as a power struggle, we will certainly be defeated. However, if we succeed in making the ethos that sustains us in this struggle politically effective, i.e. in making our ideas of a new and better Europe understandable to our opponents and thus harnessing the latent forces there against Bolshevism for our own purposes, then we can and will win.

No one should say that these are political decisions that can only be made at the highest levels of leadership. The idea matures from the will and recognition of many; the right moment for action must be left to the leadership.

In this sense, the good soldier of this world war is also a political soldier, and a troop assigned special tasks should always remember that special demands are also made of it in this intellectual battlefield.

[213] = „Vertrauensleute“. In the following mixed citation will be applied for reasons of clearness, e.g. „V-man“ = „Vertrauensmann“. A full translation of the term into English would be misleading.

[214] As with „V-people“: „Kommando-troops“ = command units.

<Handwritten marginal note at the bottom of p.1:> 9. III. 43

Development of Kommando activity

The term "K<ommando> deployment" was newly coined for Abwehr II in the Eastern Campaign. In a sense, its precursors were the "Sudeten German Freischar"[215] and Ukrainian units[216]. In terms of the nature of the deployment, it was similar to operations such as those carried out in camouflage uniforms in the Western Campaign.

<…>

Conditions in the East <Russia>

1. Minorities

2. Political opponents of the Soviet system

3. Materialistic thinking of the masses

4. Russian attitude

5. Partial lack of a pronounced sense of national identity

Development:

First attempts near Kiev in early August 1941, deployment of minorities (Ukrainians), resistance from <Wehrmacht> troops. Motivation to convince the army <Wehrmacht>. Further development in the 17th Army. Almost simultaneous similar developments in the north.

Deployment partly alone, partly with German troops.

Large-scale operation "Graukopf"[217]

Recognition of the need for training and education.

First ethnic and political subunits formed. Often former Soviet officers as troop leaders. Experience in composition (minorities, exclusive officer troops).

<…>

[215] See Brockdorff as quoted in FN 210. Paramilitary units of German members of the Sudetendeutsche were trained and employed to destabilize Chechoslavakia to support German conquest. They stood in the tradition of the „Freikorps“, military oder quasi-military units consisting mostly of German ex-soldiers in the brutal fights in East after the end of the First World War.

[216] The same pattern applied to the war in Russia. Ukrainians often cooperated with German military and police units because they were hostile to the Soviet government and tried to liberate Ukraine from russian rule.

[217] Special operation 1942 in the rear of the Russian combat lines in the area of the Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) to cause disruption and disorganization. High losses on both sides. Mentioned by Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, p. 30.

Two phases of preparation:

1. Establishment of a resident apparatus without stating the purpose. Engagement in cover tasks, e.g. Abwehr-III tasks. Very careful screening and testing of people, if necessary in other locations. Concealment of the actual purpose of the operation. Isolation of the individual resident groups from each other. Development of a reporting network, secret quarters, etc. Connection of the residents with opposing groups to camouflage their work for Germany. Careful isolation of the actual connection with the residents. No military apparatus in the organisation as a matter of principle. Up to this point, preparatory development without higher orders, under the sole responsibility of Department Abwehr II.

2. Establishment of the actual retreat-action[218] only on higher orders and in close contact with the Wehrmacht commander. Here, too, keep tasks secret for as long as possible, give V-people only general information, camouflage the area of operation as much as possible.

Tasks:

a) Inciting the population against the occupying power

b) Passive resistance

c) Minor sabotage

d) Occasional sabotage without specific targets

e) Object sabotage

f) Detonation of prepared charges (engineers)

g) Communication (Agentenfunkgerät)

h) Guerrilla warfare, gang activity

Cooperation with engineers, reference to technical possibilities.

Advising troops on camouflage. Leaving behind German destruction groups (z.b.V.).

<…>

Understanding of Abwehr II only possible from a historical perspective. <…>

Initially, Abwehr-I-Ministerial Work more scientific, purely exploratory possibilities. 1937: first independent department.

[218] In general, „Rückzugsaktion“ (R-Aktion) was a camouflage term for the tasks of the Geheime Feldpolizei of securing or destroying evidence or files and other sources at the rear of retreating Wehrmacht units. Here, it meant the retreat of command units, e.g. from the hinterland of the enemy, after their mission was ended.

1938: first major task against CSR. Strong involvement of minorities (Sudeten Germans)[219] and political opposition groups (Gayda)[220].

Preparation of Sabotage work, simultaneously Zersetzungs[221] work. Actual success was achieved through Z-work. This also includes the establishment of the Sudeten German Freikorps.

Further Z-work during the division of the rest of Czechoslovakia[222].

This development focused attention even more strongly than before on working with ethnic groups, rather than with individuals detached from their ethnic background. In contrast, religious and political groups receded strongly into the background, without however being forgotten. Thorough investigation of the circumstances was always the starting point for the work. The same development occurred during the first truly warlike events of the Polish campaign[223]. Support from ethnic Germans and Ukrainians.

<...>

What can we and what must we take from this period of ethnic work?

Exploration and knowledge of ethnic interrelationships remain the basis of Abwehr II work. In terms of tasks, this provides an opportunity to advise general staffs, in particular to bring in suitable experts. This requires the creation and maintenance of connections. Maintaining these connections is not only the responsibility of the rear services, but must also be continuously supported by every employee in frontline operations. The nomination of new employees and reports on individuals who are particularly interested in our areas can lead to a remarkable intensification of our work.

Do not just think about your own area of responsibility. Suitable people for the East can be found in the West and vice versa.

<...>

Maintain close contact with departments working in a similar field (W/Pr).[224] Observe political developments and form your own opinion. Exercise restraint in all current political issues. Do not disregard established guidelines concerning ethnical groups and politics.

<…>

In terms of approach and effect, there is a difference between Z<ersetzungs>- and S<pionage>-work concerning Kommando-deployment. Two fundamental distinctions are necessary here: K-operations

[219] See above FN 210.

[220] Radola Gajda alias Rudolf Geidl (1892 – 1948), Czechoslovakian collaborator.

[221] = Disruption and Disintigration of enemy forces and institutions.

[222] = Besetzung der „Resttschechei“, occupation of the remaining Czech state in March 1939 after the border territories (Sudetenland) had been ceased by the government in Prague after the Munich agreement in 1938.

[223] Forceful attack attack on Poland from 1st September 1939 and beginning of the Second World War.

[224] = Wehrmachtpropaganda.

resulting from the insurrection of ethnic or political groups, and troop-based K-operations from one's own front. The starting point has always been the ethnic struggle; the somewhat lansquenet[225] development in the East is a special development that should not be generalised.

<...>

<...> suggestions concerning the establishment of indigenous formations as a result of the Abwehr II work should be regarded as a genuine and deliberate reaction and evaluated positively. The timely handover of such associations to the front troops does not mean turning away from a task that has been taken on, but is a wise exercise in self-restraint. New opportunities for K-deployment arising from the ethnic struggle are emerging in the south-east, where the possibilities have not yet been exhausted, but are also limited by the political situation.[226]

In addition to these major and classic tasks of Abwehr-II work, other tasks such as property protection, etc., actually take a back seat. Nevertheless, even here, careful observation of all possibilities can reveal surprising developments at any time.

This element of development is perhaps one of the most striking features of the entire Abwehr-II craft. Without flexibility and a hunter's zeal in seeking out new opportunities, it will never be possible to do good work. In this respect, the <Abwehr->II man is akin to the true entrepreneur, who always sets the limits of his activity as far as his means and success allow.

Never forget that people are always at the heart of all our work and that you cannot lead people without humanity. Wisdom and knowledge soon cease to be effective here if the heart does not speak alongside them. This, which I would like to describe figuratively as warmth, is probably the greatest secret of our success. Precisely because we often have to be inhuman, we must cultivate humanity all the more.[227]

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[225] „Landsknechte“, mercenaries in the armies of the Early Modern Period. They acquired a powerful warlike myth, especially in Germany until 1945. After Germany had lost the First World War, the „Landsknecht“ became a symbol of freedom, manliness, endurance and extremist revolt against the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar Republik. The Freikorps had embodied the Landsknecht ideal through their largely unbound warfare and their independence from state organisation and control by parliaments. From 1933 onwards, the SS in particular integrated this myth into their ideology and used it as role model for its members. In the Second World War, especially elite formations such as the paratroopers instrumentalised the ‘Landsknecht’ as their own ideal. On the surface, the focus was on the idea of strength, male self-determination and military capability for war, but the image increasingly developed into a justification for terror, violence and arbitrary cruelty – characteristics that Landsknechts in the early modern period had indeed displayed in many ways. Knut Stang, Ritter, Landsknecht, Legionär, militärmythische Leitbilder in der Ideologie der SS, Frankfurt/M. 2009.

[226] This is the framework where command missions to Kurdistan belong. The Mammut mission was originally planned to incite a Kurdish revolt, secure oil fields and other critical infrastructure, then integrate into the front troops after the Wehrmacht had crossed the Kaukasus and pushed into Iraq. After the battle of Stalingrad was lost, all such plans were obsolete (and it is to be doubted very much if Hitler had ever even thought of authorizing such a campaign). Command formations in this kind of framework were actually not new (cf. Sonderstab F, Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien, ch. 4.2.2. and pp. 319 – 322, special formations for Iran). All this shows very clearly how much the Kurds were considered under instrumental auspices.

[227] This most inhuman and cynical statement shows under which criteria Abwehr II planned its missions using ethnic groups like the Kurds. Another question is if Verbeek really believed what he wrote down here.

Closely related to this humanity is tact. Tact is the prerequisite for an Abwehr officer par excellence. Without this quality, even the best and most dedicated Abwehr officer is doomed to fail. Tact not only towards superiors, against whom one may have to assert one's opinion, but also towards subordinates, in order to keep them within the military framework despite the loosening of the military structure caused by the work, and especially towards V-people and colleagues from other cultures.

Finally, love for the cause. Without an inner connection to the work, without a sense of vocation, achievements will always remain superficial, and the development of the work in particular cannot be decisively influenced. However, this idea of Abwehr-II work is something that cannot be left to leadership alone; on the contrary, the impetus must rise from below to the leadership, where it is given its final form. The creative moment lies within each of us and must be nurtured by everyone.

<…>

Abwehr II[228]

Task: To influence the course of military events by means other than conventional warfare, to weaken the military strength of an enemy and, if necessary, to protect objects abroad that are important for one's own warfare but are not sufficiently protected.

Implementation:

Reconnaissance

Preparation

Implementation

1.) Reconnaissance: National, social and political structure of potential enemy states. Cooperation with Abwehr I and I-Wi[229].

Testing tensions and divisions within a state structure to prepare for a possible war (war of nerves).

2.) Preparation: Formation of integrated groups. Provision. Idle capacity as with all defensive positions. Effectiveness of the "fleet in being".

[228] The following two documents presents the whole range of tasks for Abwehr II with a list of keywords set up for training schedules. It may be left to the reader to decide if and how the Mammut group, and especially its leader, Müller, fulfilled the criteria given by Verbeek here and in the preceding documents.

[229] („Wirtschaft“) = industrial / business espionage.

3.) Implementation

Sabotage

Combat missions (engl. „commandos“).

Insurrection

Subversion

Property protection

a) Sabotage: <…> Targets:

Loud Sabotage: Transport facilities, ships, bridges, economic centres (petroleum) food supply (no poisons or germs), military installations = object deployment.

Silent Sabotage: passive resistance, minor economic sabotage, disorganisation, transport sabotage

<…> Difficulties in transporting sabotage material. Large quantities of explosives.

b) Combat missions. Founding of the Rgt. z.b.V. 800. Actions of this regiment ultimately, Abwehr-II work.[230] <…>

Combat mission characterised by stratagems and guerrilla warfare.[231]

Historical example: Trojan horse.

Odysseus, the first Abwehr-II clerk.[232]

Combat missions often linked to insurrection.

Examples of war[233]:

Upper Silesia.

Battle for the Iron Gate.[234]

[230] Add „although this regiment (and afterwards division) is organized on conventional military lines“.

[231] For following lists of special mission in Europe and Russia cf. the publications of Bentzien, Kurowski and Brockdorff.

[232] The reference to historical or literature of the classic antique is typical for German military since the 19th century (e.g. Hannibals victory at Cannae) . Nevertheless, naming Odysseus as a spying clerk („Sachbearbeiter“) is really interesting.

[233] Again, for the following examples cf. the relevant chapters in Werner Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos, as quoted above.

[234] Special mission of the Brandenburg Regiment (later: Division) in 1941 to occupy the Iron Gate, a most important gorge of the Danube between Romania and Yugoslavia. The command units prevented that the Yugoslavian army sank concrete laden ships and block the way into the country.

z.b.V. Operations Western campaign.

Eastern campaign. <…>

c) Insurrection: Oldest form of subversion, oppressed peoples and minorities. Modern form of war preparation. Classic example: C.S.R. More recent example: Croatia.

d) Subversion: Cooperation with W/Pr and political bodies (AA[235]).

Historical examples:

Austro-Hungarian monarchy

British propaganda in the World War

Sir Roger Casement – Ireland (insurrection)[236]

Lenin to Russia[237]

Colonel Lawrence of Arabia (insurrection)

<…>

e) Property protection[238]

Upper Silesia

Holland (Wegweiser affair)[239]

Romania Oil protection

Serbia Transport protection

Russia, Baltic States and Ukraine

Schamil (with insurrection)[240]

---

[235] Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Office (Ministry).

[236] See above, FN 208.

[237] This keyword pertains to the transport of Lenin from his exile in Switzerland to St. Petersburg with German trains in April 1917. The German High Command and government expected -not unrealistically- that Lenins arrival would destabilize the Russian monarchy including the army and help Germany win the war. Russia ended its war effort in March 1918 (Peace Treaty of Brest-Litowsk).

[238] The following keywords concerning the different war theatres are very general, and will be therefore not further explained.

[239] Not clear. Maybe the deliberate forging of signposts to confuse the enemy as in Romania (Ploesti, see next bullet point), cf. Hans Bentzien, Division Brandenburg, p. 108.

[240] See FN 207.

Concluding remarks:

No pattern possible, maximum flexibility and imagination required. Much more necessary idle time for learning.

<…>

Introduction to Sabotage <handwritten note on p.2 of the document: 9.III.43>

<…>

General characterization: S<abotage> in the light of romanticised banditry. Requires the existence of a state of war, <…>. Changes from passive resistance to active destruction. Boundaries are fluid, often merging into uprising and revolution. Secondary effects are always very important and often more far-reaching than primary effects.

<…>

Sabotage comes into play when an opponent can no longer be reached with open means of combat. The term is particularly broad in times of upheaval: every opponent of the system is a saboteur. <...> This is particularly stark in the USSR, where there is a danger of sabotage, every accident is seen as deliberate disruption, and the disruptive and corrosive effect of sabotage is particularly evident, even without actual damage.[241] Moments of attrition are always a side effect, hence the secrecy surrounding cases of sabotage from the public.

<…>

Sabotage is an attempt by the weaker party to harm the stronger party. Even in war, the external enemy is always the weaker party on the battlefield of one's own country.

Sabotage is a special kind of "small-scale warfare", a weapon of cunning.

In addition to disruption and destruction, it is always accompanied by psychological warfare.

Sabotage as a precursor to war:

What used to be light troops at the beginning of the war is now sabotage, reinforced by the press and radio. Sabotage is often used to lure opponents out of their reserves.

<...>

[241] This also applied, albeit in different circumstances, to the Empire, e.g. in Egypt and elsewhere. Cf. the books by Martin Thomas, e.g. Empire and Intelligence, further Harald Fischer-Tiné (ed.), Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, Cham 2016, espec. the articles by Norman Etherington and Daniel Brückenhaus. In the case of Iraq the Allies were also especially sensitive concerning all enemy activities in and around the Persian Gulf and its coast. For this theatre see the works cited below FN 460.

Sabotage in war:

Increased significance in today's total war. Attack on:

1) The enemy's means of transport

2) Economy, especially key positions

3) Enemy's means of warfare and troops

4) Leading figures <…>

5) The enemy's morale

Type of sabotage:

1) Operational sabotage against specific targets

2) Sabotage with political objectives

3) General disruptive sabotage, minor sabotage

Means of sabotage:

1) Explosives and incendiary devices. Overestimation of these means. First, precise knowledge of the effects of the means is necessary <...>

2) Silent means. Incorrect economic management, disorganisation, and ultimately also the elimination of persons belonging here. <...>

3) Means of minor sabotage. Heavy wire, matches, sand, chemical agents. <...>

Agents of sabotage

V-man or, better said, Sabotage-man. Loner

Principles of selection:

1) If possible, from the enemy's population, at least precise knowledge of this choice.

2) People who, as foreign workers, have access to enemy territory <…>.

3) Natural-born saboteurs (e.g. Macedonians).

4) The man from your own camp whom you can be absolutely sure of.

5) Do not forget women.

Prerequisites

General information about the necessity of gaining clarity about the enemy and the people to be deployed against them. The phrase "no one can beat us" is foolish in everyday life, in politics and in war, and downright criminal in all covert operations, because every failure is not only a useless waste of material and time, but also plays into the hands of the enemy, who can turn it against you.

Reasons / motivation for agents:

1) Money and material values

2) Political considerations <...>

3) Adventurers (affairists)

Physical and professional aptitude:

1) Physical aptitude

2) Technical aptitude

3) Level of intelligence

4) Appearance, adaptation to environment, manners

5) Bringing together and cooperation between two agents

Training

1) Technical training

2) Any necessary ideological training <…>

3) Sports training, marching, swimming, etc., self-defence

4) Map reading, compass

5) Legend formation, school-like memorisation

Types of training

1) Agent schools. Dangers of betrayal and endangering entire groups of agents. Danger of betrayal
by women

2) Individual training of longer duration

3) Rapid training at the front

Equipment

1) Sabotage equipment. Weight, camouflage, type of detonator

2) Clothing, civilian or uniform. Pay attention to details <...>

3) Identity cards, aliases in connection with cover story

4) Provisions, money <…>

5) Small details: haircut, dentures, scars, tattoos, habits: example – throwing a ball into the lap of a
woman dressed as a man.<…>

Object reconnaissance

1) Abwehr-Man[242] knows the undercover agent and is looking for a suitable object for him, or vice versa.

2) Procurement of materials. Maps, photographs. Interrogation for reconnaissance purposes. It is
important to organise the materials in a meaningful way.

3) Exploring the possibilities of attack. Let the undercover agent assist in this.

4) Explore the approach route and economic conditions. Question as many people as possible. Mistrust the information provided.

[242] = Agent.

Development of the sabotage plan

1) Ideal solution

2) Alternative plans

3) Alternative targets

4) Return

Employment of the Sabotage-man

1) Legal entry

2) Parachute drop

3) Entry via the green border or through the lines

4) Support before deployment

Kommando activity

<…>

What must the mission leader bring with them?

1) Personal qualities

2) Knowledge of human nature, empathy

3) Tact, knowing when to be strict and when to be friendly

4) Prudence, thinking of everything even without H<eeres>D<ienst>V<orschrift>[243]

5) Bravery and ingenuity in stratagems

6) Civil courage

Communication with Kommando-troop

1) Own language skills

2) Interpreters, prerequisites for these (ethnic Germans, Ukrainians)

[243] = general regulations of the German Army. In this context meant as getting around red tape.

Selection of Kommando-people

1) Pre-selection by researchers (officer)

2) Compilation according to national or other criteria. Defectors?

3) Physical fitness (hunger)

<…>

Lecture to the Air Attaché on 10 December 1943 at Kurfürst[244]

Introduction:

Note that the Abwehr is often accused from outside of working too separately from each other and sometimes against each other. But Abwehr III's task is to ward off enemies and ensure as much peace and quiet as possible, Abwehr I's task is to obtain information as unnoticed and quietly as possible, while Abwehr II, in contrast, is always in the thick of things, ready to make itself as noticeable as possible. (Enfant terrible). These tasks require such different mentalities and such different circles of people to work with that the strictest separation is absolutely necessary for practical and security reasons.

Origin of Abwehr II:

<…>

From the outset, intense focus on foreign ethnic groups, German ethnic groups abroad, cooperation with foreign institutes. This led to an interest in all ethnographic questions and problems of ethnic psychology. From the outset, focus on groups of people, not individuals.

Development of the work:

Knowledge of minorities suggested that they could be exploited for the purposes of warfare. This led to tasks and opportunities that have remained unchanged in their basic features since then, but have undergone enormous changes in tactics.

[244] Lehrregiment z.b.V. 1001 Kurfürst (established in 1943 from a sub-unit of the Sonderverband Brandenburg after the latter was renamand Division Brandenburg und put under direct Wehrmacht command after being diverted from of the Abwehr). http://www.archivportal-d.de/item/6AXX6N7NKXSLYVOPO73JHZ5BSMPLOWUG. For its position in the organisation ob the Abwehr until June 1944 cf. Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, pp. 10 - 13. Not to be confused with the bunker complex and head quarter „Kurfürst“ of General Staff of the Luftwaffe (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) in Geltow/Schwielowsee near Potsdam. (This site is still used by the Bundeswehr today (Einsatzführungskommando)). The „Air Attaché“ named in the headline of the document is most likely the liaison officer of the Luftwaffe within the Lehrregiment Kurfürst.

1) Exploration of the fault lines in the enemy's structure

2) Undermining the enemy's will to defend from within

3) Sabotage of the enemy's war potential

4) Combat action using means of insurrection and stratagems

5) Protection of important objects (industrial areas, buildings, etc.) in areas that are not or not yet under German control

These tasks were first carried out during the liberation of the Sudetenland, then during the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the protection of the East Upper Silesian industrial area is particularly noteworthy.

Immediately after the Polish campaign, it was recognised that these Abw<wehr>-II tasks could not be carried out without troops, which led to the formation of the Brandenburg Training Regiment z.b.V. 800[245], from which the Brandenburg Division was later developed. The main focus of operations from the front was combat operations using stratagems, in particular the combat-style protection of objects. Later developments led to more troop-based operations and thus away from Abwehr-II tasks, so that today Division Brandenburg is an independent unit within the Ausland/Abwehr.

The need to quickly transport relatively large task forces to important points in enemy territory led to early cooperation with the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, this cooperation did not have an impact on personnel, as the Luftwaffe was unable to assign any officers to Abwehr.

Developments during the war:

<...>

The Eastern Campaign brought about a revolution in Abwehr II work, posing new tasks with its minority problems <of the Soviet Union>, Ukrainians, White Russians, Caucasian peoples and Turkic peoples.[246] The effort to fight the Soviets with the help of these minorities and the Great Russians[247] who were hostile to Stalin's system initially placed great demands on personnel, which could at least be met to some extent by setting up numerous new Abwehr troops. A completely new type of combat procedure then developed, involving small units from the ranks of the Eastern peoples, which were used both tactically and for subversive purposes by means of stratagems. This then gave

[245] For the development of this unit see above p. 9 with FN 32 and p. 52 with FN 206.

[246] For reasons for space it is not possible here and in the following to give further information on all these ethnic group in the Soviet Union and the corresponding conflicts with the Stalin government.

[247] „Großrussen“, (probably monarchistic) supporters of a imperial Great Russia. Not to be confused with Stalins propaganda concerning the „Great Russians“, i.e. the assumed big conglomerations of all „Russians“ (incl. the Ukrainians and others) as the basis for his dictatorship.

rise to larger formations in many places. For example, the Vlasov Army[248] emerged from a Russian troop set up by Abwehr-II, and the situation was similar in the south with the formation of units of Cossacks, Turkmen, etc. In addition, numerous operations were launched behind enemy lines, whether they were purely sabotage operations or efforts to incite insurrection among minorities, especially in the Caucasus. The Luftwaffe played a major role in this by providing aircraft. In addition to the Gartenfeld squadron, which was specially assigned for this purpose, the Luftflotten[249] also provided generous assistance by making aircraft available, for which the department would like to express its gratitude at this point.

The tightening of the ring around Fortress Europe is giving rise to new tasks, which in many ways resemble those that arose at the beginning of the war. The ethnic mix of the Balkans in particular provides starting points that require a special degree of agility, empathy and psychological tact, especially in those places where we are forced to surrender territory, not only in the Balkans.

For understandable reasons, this war in the dark cannot be discussed as long as the relevant actions have not yet been completed. In many respects, it is the tragedy of the Abwehr officer that even in his closest circle of friends he cannot stand out with his achievements, that he often has to take a back seat.

Another peculiarity of the Abwehr-II mission is that, even less than in the other two departments, there is no fixed work schedule. This flexibility is both a strength and a weakness. It is a weakness in that it is easy for the work to be pushed aside from the actual tasks and then easily lost in troop operations, and a strength because it demands and develops versatility from every man, often even from privates and corporals, which enables the unit to carry out completely new tasks arising from the situation. In this respect, the mobility of the defence corresponds to the mobility of the air force.

<...>

[248] Anti-soviet „liberation army“, recruited and trained by the Germans from autumn 1944. Andrej Vlassow was executed in Moscow on 1st August 1946.

[249] The largest combat units of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War.

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Foreign Office Abwehr

Abwehr Department II/Or

Berlin, 14 January 1943

Re: Special Operation "MAMMUT"

Head of the operation: Lieutenant Gottfried-Johannes Müller

Deployment order

Purpose of the operation:

Carrying out sabotage and I[250]-Operations in the area of Kerkuk[251] -Suleimanje.

Method of execution:

Establishing contact with Sheikh Mahmut and other Kurdish sheikhs.

Creation of safe houses for other operations.

Disruption of enemy troop supplies, Baghdad-Kirkuk railway line (explosions, minor sabotage).

Sabotage in the oil fields of Kirkuk.

Interruption and destruction of telephone lines.

Sabotage actions against supply depots, roads and airfields.

Implementation of all special defensive measures (possibly protection of the oil fields) that arise due to the situation (advance of German troops from the Caucasus, behaviour of Turkey, etc.).

Abwehr I activities[252]. Reconnaissance of enemy measures, roads, crossings, fortifications, behaviour of other Kurdish tribes.

[250] = Sabotage und Insurgierung. Norbert Müller et al. (eds.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, p. 319, interprets the abbreviation as "insurgency" (i.e. incitement of uprisings). See also Thomas Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland / Abwehr, p. 118, with footnote 60.

[251] = Kirkuk.

[252] The "Abwehrabteilung I" was responsible for the "Geheimer Meldedienst" (secret intelligence service), i.e. espionage, while Abteilung Abwehr II, to which Müller and the Mammut company also belonged, was responsible for sabotage and subversion. Department III was responsible for counter-espionage. For the

Control of the operation by Abw. II via liaison officer. Planning and decision-making are the responsibility of OKW/Abw.II.

Economic support and budget are provided by order of Z/F[253] .

Radio communication via liaison officer, who is assigned to an Abwehr-Kdo. (Intelligence section) of the Caucasus Army with Abwehr II. Encryption according to special instructions.

Personal and technical equipment: The operation will be led by a German officer. In addition, the operation includes a number of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men who are familiar with the country and speak the language. It is divided into two parts:

Deployment of a German officer, a German escort and a Kurdish V-man (contact person) by parachute jump.

After the above group has gained a foothold: deployment of a group of approx. 5 non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel by parachute jump, who will either be divided among the various Kurdish tribes as trainers and leaders of Kurdish sabotage troops or deployed as a single sabotage troop.[254]

Technical equipment according to special instructions.

Code name: MAMMUT

Funding: Morning gift for Sheikh Mahmut £1,000

Morning gift for Sheikh Haji Agha Bassar [Hadschu Agha Bassar][255] £500

Contribution for other sheikhs, purchases, £500

Fund for preparations 15,000 Reichsmark

Lt. Gottfried-Johannes Müller, OKW Dept. Ausl/Abw II

Berlin, 5 December 1942

structure of the Abwehr, see Norbert Müller et al. (eds.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, pp. 51–63.

[253] This group was responsible for finances in the central department of the Abwehr.

[254] This group and other successor groups were never deployed.

[255] The name Hadschu Agha Bassar is recorded incorrectly by Müller here. The correct spelling is Sheikh Hadschi Abas Agha.

Unternehmen ~~Said~~ ~~Schaswar~~ Mammut[256]

I.

A. Purpose for proposing the above undertaking:

In 1935/1936, I undertook a study trip through the Middle East: Turkey, the island of Rhodes, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq.[257]

From Baghdad, I travelled to Kurdistan with the personal support of the King of the Kurds, Sheikh Mahmud. He gave me his picture with a warm dedication as identification. Sheikh Mahmud was in exile in Baghdad at the time. Via Kirkuk and Chem Chamal, I reached Suleimanje. There I met his son, Sheikh Latif, who was managing his father's estates in his absence. I also became acquainted with and was invited by Sheikh Jelal, the then representative of the Kurds in the Iraqi government – a relative, Sheikh Mohamed, who was a senior road construction official in northern Iraq.

Although the Englishmen present in Suleimanje (one English captain plus two Scots attending frequently) watched my dealings with the Kurds with suspicion, we were warmly welcomed by the Kurdish sheikhs and invited to a banquet and horse rides in the vicinity of Suleimanje.

Non-Kurds are strictly forbidden from entering the area north and east of Suleimanje. If anyone dares to push their way by the police stations located on the edge of the mountains, they will most likely be murdered in the interior of Kurdistan. "Stranger" is synonymous with "enemy"! The Arabs do not dare to enter the Kurdish areas, which is why the tribes living in the mountains are completely independent and do not pay taxes or levies to the state.

With the help of Sheikh Latif, I managed to reach the mountains north of Suleimanje unnoticed by the police. There I was a guest for some time of a gang leader of Sheikh Mahmud, the Schuach Maschid in Haladin, with whom I went on hunting expeditions further into the interior. For my personal protection, I was accompanied by a confidant of Sheikh Mahmud, Omar ben Hadschi Yussef from Kirkuk.

Once I visited the highest Muslim dignitary in Kurdistan, Sheikh Abdul Kerim, in Schadallah, who, through the intercession of Schuach Maschid, allowed me to be the first foreigner and non-Muslim to enter the mosque courtyard in Schadallah and take photographs there.

Later, I visited the ruler of the Pishdar region[258] , Sheikh Hadschi Agha Bassar in Gabilon (not his headquarters, he was hunting in the Gabilon area at the time), who also welcomed me warmly. One of his sons, who administers his father's territories in Persian territory ("colonies"), also came to

[256] Deletion i.orig., BL.

[257] Müller also published a book on this subject: Johann Gottfried Müller, Einbruch ins verschlossene Kurdistan, Reutlingen 1937 (4th edition, Saarbrücken 2005). Cf. also Im brennenden Orient, Salam 1959. For more information on this and the following, as well as on the background to the operation, see the explanations and references in the Introduction.

[258] The Pishdar are a Kurdish tribe in the east of today's Kurdish Autonomous Region. At the same time, the name refers to an area or administrative district.

Gabilon after a 14-day ride to meet me. He invited me to visit him later. However, I was unable to do so.

Thanks to a few lucky medical successes, I quickly gained a reputation as a "miracle doctor"; as a result, sick and wounded people were often brought to me, and my medicines were quickly used up. In order to fetch more medicines from my supplies in Suleimanje, I wanted to return to Suleimanje., but at the instigation of the English captain in Sulaimanje, I was arrested after leaving the Kurdish mountains (my prolonged absence had been noticed) and, despite the Kurds' great bitterness, I had to return to Baghdad within 48 hours.

I noticed that the Kurds were friendly towards Germany:

1. Sheikh Mahmud welcomed me so warmly because I identified myself as German. When I asked him about his attitude towards the English, he replied with a meaningful look and said, "It's not yet the end of the day," meaning that the time would come when he could settle scores with the English, who were currently holding him in Baghdad.

2. In a Kurdish chaichana (tea house) in the Chem Chamal area[259] , I found pictures of the rulers of Iraq, Iran, Arabia and Egypt, as well as a picture of Sheikh Mahmud and a large picture of Adolf Hitler.

3. Sheikh Haji Agha Bassar still fondly remembered German officers he had met on Persian soil during the World War. He showed me a pair of binoculars he had received from them at the time and exclaimed in broken German: "Deutschland über alles!"

4. The Kurdish people are informed about the political situation around the world by travelling storytellers who gather their knowledge in Baghdad and other places. They spoke enthusiastically about freedom-loving Germany and their national hero, the Führer, about whom they knew little more than that he would make Germany great again and had the same enemies as they did: the English and the Jews. These facts were enough to bring Germany very close to the hearts of the Kurds.

B. Kerkuk area – Suleimanje

Kirkuk lies on a plain. About 5 km to the east and north, the mountains begin, about 8 km of hills, but with many gorges, then merging into high and highest mountains.

A good road leads from Kirkuk to Suleimanje, with a good foundation, asphalted, approx. 8 m wide and fairly flat. To the south and north of this road, mountain ranges run in a west-east direction, very rugged, inhabited by the Hamawant, the warlike tribe of Sheikh Mahmud.

On both sides of the Persian border northeast of Suleimanje lies the territory of Sheikh Agha Bassar, located in the middle of the high mountains.

[259] Cemcemal is a Kurdish city between Sulaimania and Kirkuk. Today it lies in the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

Kerkuk and Suleimanje are purely Kurdish towns and, although occupied by the English and Arabs, are completely loyal to Sheikh Mahmud.

The winter is harsh and long (late October to late May). During this time, the natives are practically frozen.

The summer is very pleasant and similar to the climate in Sweden.

C. National character:

The Kurds are Aryan; tall, blond; partly warlike, partly settled farmers. They are excellent hunters and marksmen, and good horsemen. They are brave and cruel in battle. Hospitality is sacred. Until now, there has been great rivalry between the tribal princes. This has led to constant raids on each other.

D. Living conditions:

The Kurds in inner Kurdistan live from livestock breeding and agriculture. The work is generally done by the women. The soil is only cultivable in the valleys, very poor and stony.

The Kurds' standard of living is extremely low. The daily meal consists of a little rice, some flatbread, possibly some mutton and a few olives. Beverages: coffee, tea. Religion: Strict Mohammedan (Sunni). Deep in the interior, there is said to be a sect of "devil worshippers"([260]); religious rites are kept strictly secret.

E. Tribal structure: See separate treatise by Dr. Caskel.[261]

F) Tribal chiefs

Sheikh Mahmud plays the dominant role among the Kurdish princes. For years, he has been striving to create a united, independent Kurdistan. In 1925, he had himself proclaimed King of the Kurds and from then on repeatedly led uprisings against the hated English and Arabs (the Arabs are despised by the Kurds!). The uprising of 1930 was crushed by the enemy's superior forces.[262] Sheikh Mahmud was taken prisoner and moved to Baghdad in exile as a "hostage". There he allegedly received £1,000 a

[260] This probably refers to the Yazidis. See also Bernd Lemke (ed.), Wegweiser zur Geschichte Irak und Syrien, Paderborn 2016, p. 148, downloadable at: https://www.mgfa-potsdam.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/irakundsyrien.

[261] Dr Werner Caskel (1896-1970), historian and Orientalist, worked with Baron Max von Oppenheim on his excavations at Tel Halaf until 1918 and was employed by the Abwehr (German military intelligence) in military geography for the Middle East. See the relevant comments in the introduction. The treatise mentioned could not be found in the files.

[262] Mahmud suffered his decisive defeat against the British in 1931. See Bernd Lemke, Kolonialgeschichte als Vorläufer für modernes "Nation-Building"? Britische Pazifikationsversuche in Kurdistan und der North-West Frontier Province 1918-1947, in: Tanja Bührer, Christian Stachelbeck and Dierk Walter (eds.), Imperialkrieg von 1500 bis heute, Strukturen – Akteure – Lernprozesse (Imperial War from 1500 to the Present: Structures – Actors – Learning Processes), Paderborn 2011, p. 284. Although he continued to assert his claims to rule over Kurdistan, he did not organise any further large-scale uprisings and entered into further compromises with the British. See also footnote 308 below.

month from the British, which he used to secretly buy weapons and ammunition. He ruled his territories through his son Sheikh Latif in Suleimanje.

In 1939, Sheikh Mahmud was released and returned to his territories. Since then, the British have been trying by all means to win him over with money and promises. In October 1942, a British delegation visited him to obtain 5,000 of his warriors. Further reports speak of recruitment of Kurds for work on fortifications.

Today, all of Kurdistan (including the Turkish and Persian areas) looks to Sheikh Mahmud with excitement, because it knows that only he can lead the great uprising against their enemies.

Sheikh Mahmud is now forced to make a pact with the British in order to have backing against the Turks, Persians and Arabs, each of whom would like to swallow up the Kurds and their territory. However, this pact does not mean that he will not turn against the English overnight if he believes that another power is more likely to help him achieve his goal of creating an independent Kurdistan. He will stop at nothing to achieve this.

It is precisely this desire to become the ruler of an independent Kurdistan that could now be fuelled, as other forces with the same goal are already at work (Russians in Turkish Kurdistan, Mehmet Raschid in the Lake Urmia region, initially with the Russians, later against them).

Sheikh Agha Bassar, who borders Sheikh Mahmud's territories, has been his rival up to now. He could never quite understand why Sheikh Mahmud occasionally made deals with the British. Sheikh Agha Bassar is pro-German, a good ruler, loved and honoured by his subjects. He is particularly keen to develop the school system in his territories.

Although Sheikh Agha Bassar does not play as prominent a role as Sheikh Mahmud, he is nevertheless a factor to be reckoned with, as he controls significant lands in the area around Suleimanje, next to Sheikh Mahmud, and has a considerable number of warriors at his disposal, whose cooperation could prove decisive.

<…>

G. Police power, control of the central governments:

In the plain in front of the Kurdish mountains (Kirkuk – Suleimanje), Arab military and police troops, British troops and air bases. Securing the oil fields. Protection against renewed Kurdish revolts. These protection forces are said to have been significantly reinforced in recent months.

Immediately on the edge of the Kurdish mountains (north-east of Kirkuk, Chem-Chemal, north-west and east of Suleimanje) are fortified police stations.

Inside Kurdistan, complete independence for the Kurdish tribes. Unrestricted rule by the sheikhs.

H, possibilities for military operations in Kurdistan:

In the border areas ("plains"), which are occupied by Anglo-Arab troops and can be easily supplied via the Baghdad railway, roads, etc., no regular operations by Kurdish tribes are possible because

a. the enemy can use heavy weapons, tanks, etc. there, and

b. the Kurds cannot withstand the moral impact of these weapons and would almost certainly flee or be wiped out.

Mountains: In winter, all movement is paralysed by heavy snowfall and the lack of roads.

In summer (May-October), Kurdish troops are very agile on foot and on horseback!

The mountains offer many hiding places and isolated valleys. Troops can thus be brought under cover close (approx. 5-8 km) to the main cities (Kirkuk, Suleimanje, etc.) under cover Raids on key points are therefore easily possible ("element of surprise").

Points captured in this way can be held for a period of time in conjunction with sustained destruction of enemy supply routes and continuous attacks on enemy troops (guerrilla warfare). This will be possible for approx. 2-3 weeks. Beyond that, enemy pressure may become too strong. It would then be necessary to bring in heavy weapons (anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, possibly armoured vehicles) to arrive timely to continue defending the points that have been taken.

The rapid deployment of these relief troops is only possible by air, by airdrop, tow-gliders or landing at prepared landing sites, as there are only mountain trails in the mountains, which are difficult to pass even with donkeys or horses.

Armament:

Many, but not all, Kurds own a rifle, although these are of various, mostly older, makes. The British are said to have recently supplied the Kurds with automatic firearms.

There is a gunsmith in every larger village. Every Kurd carries a sharp, curved Chanschar dagger in his "Bschdenn" (belly band).

If they were to be regularly armed, the Kurds would probably need new rifles (these could be captured rifles!).

Ammunition: There is a constant shortage and large quantities may need to be supplied.

Food: The Kurds and their pack animals are very frugal. However, groups that have come together cannot live off their own produce, as the land is not very fertile and it is very difficult to obtain supplies from the remote valleys. Food depots would have to be set up where produce could be bought and collected from the countryside as a precaution. Raids for food can also be carried out on Persian territory. In addition, dried fruit and dried meat (mutton) must be acquired (possibly canned vegetables by air). No canned meat, as there is mistrust due to the prohibition of pork.

J. From the above, it can be concluded that:

1. that it is possible for me to gain a foothold in inner Kurdistan as a "friend of the king".

2. that I have justified hopes of winning the Kurds over to the German cause.

3. that it is possible to organise the Kurdish gangs inconspicuously and later bring them close to the targets of the coup.

4. to carry out the raid and

5. hold the captured objects for several weeks.

II.

I therefore propose the following operation:

Name of the operation: "Said Schaswar[263] "

Participants: see Kriegsstärkenachweis (Troop Strength Schedule)

Mission objective: Occupy and protect the oil fields and refineries in Kirkuk and the surrounding area from destruction, occupy military targets and public buildings (post office, telegraph, railway), hold the relevant targets until German troops arrive, and in preparation for this, reconnoitre and secure German advance routes.

In order to conceal the actual operation (occupation of oil fields, etc.), possibly withdraw troops from the oil fields, but at the same time tie down enemy troops elsewhere, the operation would have to be divided into two parts:

a. Careful organisation and transport of Kurdish tribes to the oil fields and military bases in Kirkuk, Chem Chemal and Suleimanje.

b. Continuous unrest of the enemy through guerrilla warfare with ever-changing tactics on the Persian border on Persian soil, northeast to east of Suleimanje.

Planned course of action:

Re a): 1.) Detailed preparations (see special report).

2.) Jump at the drop zone (determined during a reconnaissance flight) in the area approx. 25 km north of Suleimanje by Lt. Müller, a radio operator and a Kurd.

3.) Setting up a hideout, immediately establishing radio contact with the liaison officer.

4.) Dispatch of the Kurd with a message to Sheikh Mahmud and Sheikh Agha Bassar. Arrangement of separate meetings with them.

[263] This designation was subsequently deleted and replaced by "Unternehmen Mammut".

5.) Meeting with Sheikh Mahmud and Agha Bassar. Attempt to win them over to our cause through personal influence as a "friend", gifts and promises. Offer German assistance in creating an independent Kurdish state under Sheikh Mahmud. Make it clear that it is vital for this new state that the oil wells, refineries, etc. are not destroyed by the British. This would provide significant sources of income for the Kurds through well-paid jobs and for the state of Kurdistan in general (i.e. for Sheikh Mahmud's pocket). Improvement of the Kurds' standard of living, etc., etc.

6.) Organise the Kurdish tribes, especially the Hamawant, the warlike tribe of Sheikh Mahmud to the north-east and south-east of Kirkuk.

Supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment; arming and training. Preparation down to the smallest detail for a planned coup.

7.) Establishment of food, weapons and ammunition depots.

8.) Organise a V[264]-man network in the oil fields and military installations. Prepare every detail for the moment of the coup. Take particular care in preparing this network so that the English do not notice anything – otherwise the attempt to <make the British> withdraw troops from Kirkuk to other places by means of small-scale warfare fails. Under no circumstances this must lead to the reinforcement of <British> troops.

9.) Reconnaissance and securing of German advance routes, air landing sites, etc.

10.) Maintain constant radio contact with the liaison officer, relay messages, request materials, etc., receive radio messages with requests; relay requests from the German leadership via the liaison officer.

11.) Carry out the meticulously planned raid on the relevant targets as described above at the most favourable moment, if possible approx. 2-3 weeks before the arrival of German units (possibly paratroopers) and simultaneously with other operations in Iraqi-Arab territory.

12.) Securing the captured objects

a. defensively

b. offensively by raiding enemy units, supply lines, etc. (guerrilla warfare).

Re b.: <…> Organisation and training of guerrilla warfare and sabotage squads from and within the various Kurdish tribes on the Persian-Iraqi border.

[264] Verbindungsmann = "liaison" or "trusted person," i.e., indigenous agents. These are to be distinguished from the "liaison officers" of the Wehrmacht (including those repeatedly mentioned here in connection with Operation Mammoth). The latter were soldiers who were supposed to coordinate and harmonise the various agencies involved within the structure of the Wehrmacht itself.

Purpose:

1.) Constant harassment of the enemy through raids, sabotage, insurgency. Constantly changing tactics.

2.) To divert attention from the oil fields and ensure absolute calm there.

3.) To achieve the withdrawal of as many enemy troops as possible from the oil fields.

4.) Reconnaissance of fortification work, new road and railway construction, troop strengths, troop concentrations, mood of the local population and the military, material transports, etc.

Composition of the troops:

1 German squad leader

1 Kurdish interpreter

2-3 Kurds

I am assigning a total of 5 squads.[265] I need 6 soldiers to be selected + 1 radio operator + 1 doctor. (Doctor particularly important for winning over the population).

One of the 6 soldiers should be an officer. Special training for this group according to a specific training plan.

Deployment according to my instructions by aircraft (jump or, if possible, landing of the aircraft at a prepared landing site). This would be announced by radio transmitter, and the aircraft would be guided in by radio, light signals and airdrops.

III.

Table of Organisation and Equipment[266]

a. Overall command:

1 officer	Head of the operation	1 submachine gun and 1 PPK pistol
1 undercover agent	Kurd, interpreter	1 rifle and 1 pistol PPK
1 sergeant	Radio operator	1 rifle and 1 pistol PPK

[265] These troops were never formed.

[266] „Kriegsstärkenachweis“. Engl. abbrev. TOE.

b. Small-scale warfare

1 officer	Group leader	1 submachine gun and 1 PPK pistol
2 non-commissioned officers	Squad leader	1 rifle and 1 PPK pistol each
2 V-men	Leaders of small squads	1 rifle and 1 PPK pistol each
1 Private	Radio operator	1 rifle and 1 PPK pistol
1 medic		1 pistol (PPK)

c. Counterpart at army headquarters:

1 liaison officer		1 pistol PPK
1 radio operator, NCO[267]	Radio operator	1 rifle and 1 pistol PPK
1 officer, permanent navigational advisor and escort of the operational aircraft		1 pistol PPK

IV.

Required weapons, ammunition and equipment (except for the weapons listed above)

For a.

1 hunting rifle (triple-barrelled)	200 rounds of ammunition
for 1 submachine gun	200 rounds of ammunition
for 2 rifles	200 rounds of ammunition each
for 3 PPK pistols	200 rounds of ammunition each

1 special radio with spare parts, equipment and other devices, see special requirements.

For b.

for 1 submachine gun	500 rounds of ammunition
for 5 rifles	500 rounds of ammunition each
for 5 PPK pistols	500 rounds of ammunition each
1 heavy .M.G. 34	2500 rounds of ammunition

[267] Non-Commissioned Officer = „Unteroffizier“.

1 special radio with spare parts, explosives, equipment and other devices, see special requirements.

For c.

for 1 rifle	100 rounds of ammunition
for 32 PPK pistols	100 rounds of ammunition each

1 radio with spare parts

Equipment for the Kurdish tribes:

Prepare and drop on demand in cargo parachutes or land the aircraft in question at a prepared landing site.

3,000 rifles (captured weapons, preferably English or Russian, but uniform)

3,000 sidearms (captured weapons to go with the above rifles)

250 rounds of ammunition for each of the above rifles

1,000 pistols (captured weapons)

150 rounds of ammunition for each of the above pistols

300 machine guns (captured weapons, if possible, English or Russian, but uniform)

5,000 rounds of ammunition for each of the above machine guns.

<…>

As soon as German troops advance further into the Caucasus:

1.) Set up the "remote station" at the army headquarters

2.) Further training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare

3.) Procurement of materials

4.) Reconnaissance and photographic flight to the drop zone

If German troops advance on Erbil:

1.) Mission flight Lt. Müller with staff

2.) After gaining a foothold and winning over the Kurdish tribes, the "small-scale warfare group" follows.

Cost of the operation.

Sheikh Mahmud	£1,000 Morning gift[268]
Abas Agha	£500 Morning gift
Transport	£500 Morning gift for S-troops and V-man network Oil fields

For preparations provision of 5000 Reichsmarks for the purchase of various items of equipment, additional provisions, costs for exercises and courses.

Gifts, as per special request.[269]

Nothing can be said yet about the costs of deploying the Kurdish tribes, as the weapons delivered are already very valuable to the people. In any case, I will try to present the raid as a purely Kurdish affair, whereby they should be grateful that I am supplying them with weapons and ammunition and providing them with military advice.

Operation MAMMUT

Berlin, 5 February 1943.

Memo on the meeting with the Kurd **Mukri** from the Regenwurm camp[270] .

4 Feb

Careful contact established by Lt. Müller. Questioned about his connections to Kurdistan. Claims to have a cousin in Sakiz who used to be anti-British and also has other relatives in influential positions in Kurdistan.

[268] In orig. „Morgengabe“.

[269] According to the request dated 23 March 1943, the following were intended for this purpose: 200 miniature Korans with magnifying glasses (Fa.J. Steinbrenner, Winterberg –Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren), 25 ceremonial daggers, 50 metal pocket mirrors, 250 simple mechanical pencils, 24 four-colour silver pencils, children's toys, 50 notebooks with gold edging and red covers, 30 wristwatches, 30 petrol lighters, 30 Brownings, 500 matchbooks.

[270] The "Regenwurmlager" was located in Meseritz and housed Allied prisoners of war from their colonial territories, especially from the Orient, as well as volunteers. The Abwehr (German military intelligence) and the Lehrregiment (training regiment) or later Sonderverband Brandenburg (from 1. April 1943 as Division z.b.V. 800 directly integrated into the Wehrmacht command structure) attempted to recruit forces for their missions here. Primary information on this: http://www.heimatkreis-meseritz.de/4_50.htm (and following pages 4_51 – 52 and 4_25). For Mukri, see the British interrogation records below, p. 140. He is likely to be the same person referred to there as "Monatcher Ali". It is not certain whether he belonged to the ethnic group or tribe of the "Mukri" Kurds living in western Iran.

Current political views unknown. Attempted to get Mukri to make a proposal for an operation in Kurdistan on his own initiative. Actually considered the possibility of helping Iran by establishing relations with Kurdish tribes and causing disruption in the areas occupied by the British.

My suggestion: From a hiding place in the Kurdish mountains, I-er[271] should work in Iran and II-er[272] should work in the oil fields of Iraq.

5 Feb

Discussed possible missions with Mukri again.

My suggestion: Mukri should consider participating in my mission. It is necessary that we discuss all the pros and cons in detail. Therefore, Mukri should come to me in Klagenfurt from 14 to 28 February 1943 to participate in my skiing and climbing training.

It is expressly stated that no pressure will be exerted on Mukri in any way; he is free to decide as he wishes. Mukri accepts the proposal. He is to arrive in Klagenfurt on 14 February in civilian ski clothing, disguised as "Albert May" with a military ID card.

Dr Wagner is asked to arrange his leave, ski equipment, etc. with Meseritz.

5 February 1943

Müller, Lieutenant

<...>

MAMMUT mission, Berlin, 31 March 1943

File note on the discussions between Lt. Müller, commander of operations, and Major Kuebbart and Special Commander (Sonderführer) Weise from the General Staff Foreign Forces/East (Fremde Heere Ost) III[273] .

Initially, particular emphasis is to be placed on Abw. I activities[274] in the western Iran, northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey area. Much more important than supply disruptions, etc. is to obtain

[271] Task of Department Abwehr I (= espionage).

[272] Abwehr II ("Sabotage and Subversion"). Müller and his group belonged to this department.

[273] This department was part of the Army High Command (OKH) in Zossen. Its task was to collect and analyse all information about the armed forces of other countries, especially enemy countries (enemy situation). The standard work on this department: Magnus Pahl, Fremde Heere Ost.

With regard to the Orient, the responsibilities here have not been correctly identified. The armed forces of the Western powers (especially Great Britain) stationed and deployed there fell within the remit of the "Foreign Armies West" department, no matter if colonial troops were involved or not.

[274] Espionage.

accurate documentation on military operations in this area. Of particular interest is the supply of the western Iranian and Iraqi lines of communication from south to north: What and how much material is being transported and where to?

Furthermore: Where, how many, and what troop concentrations are there? What is happening in the south and south-east of Turkey?

At the appropriate time, Abw. II activities can then be deployed[275] : disruptions in the oil fields of Kirkuk and Mosul, supply disruptions, etc.

Drop zone: Sf. (Stabsfeldwebel) Weiss is an excellent expert on Iran; he considers the Sakiz area[276] to be dangerous as a drop zone, as Russia, England, America, Turkey and Iran itself have an extensive network of informants there. He therefore suggests a location further east (the Khumain area[277]); he knows this area very well personally, has good connections there and believes that we could find safe shelter there, from where we could then advance westwards on the basis of recommendations. Incidentally, there is also supposed to be a landing site there.

This reasonable proposal will be kept in mind, as we must first wait for the Kurds[278] to arrive in Khumain to determine what connections they have in the Sakiz area and how they assess the situation.

Task forces: The composition of the groups and the nature of the mission (first Group I and later Group II) are considered very reasonable and advantageous.

Preparations: The operation can only take place if the mission is prepared down to the smallest detail. This includes, in particular, a thorough study of the terrain of the entire operational area with regard to roads, railways, bridges, locations, tribes, etc.

It has been determined that General Staff Foreign Forces/East (Fremde Heere Ost) (III) contains a wealth of material (including a large amount of image material). The processing will take approximately two weeks. It is therefore proposed that the head of the office,[279] ask the Gen.St.Fr.H./Ost (III) to assign the group led by Mj. Kuebbart to this task with the support of Mammut.

At the same time, we request that you propose that the above-mentioned Sf. Weiss be sent to Berlin for two weeks with the necessary documents. Prior to this, Lt. Müller would need to have a discussion lasting several days with Gen.St.Fr.H./Ost(III).

Müller

Lieutenant

<…>

[275] Sabotage and subversion.

[276] The present-day city of Saqqez in western Iran. The spelling varies.

[277] This is probably a small region near the city of Hamadan in the direction of Tehran.

[278] This refers to the interpreters and guides hoped for by the organisation. Ramzi eventually took on this role.

[279] Admiral Canaris.

Unternehmen Mammut

Berlin, 26 June 1943

Lecture note

The Kurdish liaison officer Ramsi Nafi Raschid [(parachuted with Lt. Müller)][280] has developed excellently and promises to provide outstanding support to Unternehmen Mammut. He comes from a respected sheikh family known to be hostile to England. Personally, he is a highly educated man (3 years at the American University of Beirut).

In detailed discussions, V-Raschid explained that support from a number of German experts will be necessary in establishing the Kurdish state and that this is also welcomed by young Kurdish nationalists. This can only be in Germany's interest, as it will guarantee a profound pro-German influence on the local population.

V-Raschid therefore asks us to make the necessary preparations now and to bring the following people proposed by the head of operations to Kurdistan shortly:

1. A German doctor.
   Task:
   a) Treatment of <members of> Unternehmen Mammut and the associated organisation, if necessary also high-ranking Kurdish sheikhs and their relatives.
   b) Training young Kurds as medical assistants ("paramedics"). This will create an additional organisation that will serve our purposes and be spread across the entire area of operation.

2. Due to high infant and maternal mortality rates: A German female doctor. (According to local custom, women will only allow female doctors to treat them).
   Task:
   a) Treatment of female members of our Kurdish organisation and female relatives of high-ranking Kurdish sheikhs.
   b) Training Kurdish girls as nurses and midwives. This will create a female organisation that serves our purposes and is spread across the entire area of operation.
   The enemy powers have not yet been able to set up anything similar.

3. A German engineer for civil engineering.
   Task:
   Surveying the country and drawing up plans for the future construction of the state. (where to build canals, roads, power stations, etc. etc.). This will enable us to study the country in detail for our purposes.

4. A German geologist (for reasons of camouflage, however, only employed as an assistant to the above engineer).

[280] This passage was added later. At this point, Müller's group had already landed in Iraq.

Task: Geological survey of the country for our purposes.
(where is oil, copper, iron, silver, etc. etc.?)

5. A German economist
   Task:
   Ongoing consultation with the „young Kurdish“ organisation[281] on issues of economic state building.

<…>

We kindly request that the above requirements be approved in principle.

Regarding 2), a suitable candidate has already been found. She is a medical student <…> residing in Freiburg i. Br. <…>. The assessment by the mission leader, Lt. Müller, revealed her full willingness to serve in the mission area at a later date.

We therefore request that Miss <…> be entrusted with the task of a German doctor in the defence service.

<…> is 29 years old, unmarried, and is currently preparing for her state medical examination, which she was unable to take earlier because she was forced to interrupt her studies several times due to a lack of funds and financial support from other sources, and had to earn her living and pay her living expenses through practical work. <…> is an exceptionally talented, physically fit, and resilient woman who has long wanted to work in the tropics.

In order to ensure that she can be deployed as soon as possible, we request that she be given the financial means to take her state examination without further interruption at the next possible date (February/March 1944) and to acquire the necessary tropical specialisation training at the Military Tropical Reserve Hospital (Tropen-Reserve-Lazarett) 118 in Berlin-Dahlem.

The funds required for this are RM (Reichsmark) 200 (two hundred) per month for a period of initially 6 months, for which approval is requested.

Dr. Messow[282]

Lieutenant and V.O.

[281] This term is based on the "Young Turk" movement in the Ottoman Empire. However, there was no "Young Kurdish" movement of the same calibre and significance as the Young Turks before 1918.

[282] Reserve Lieutenant Dr Hans-Christof Messow (radio code name "Messner") acted as liaison officer for the organisation. Messow was probably an Abwehr officer who, among other things, operated the radio station in Crimea (radio code name "Seehund", which was also the code name for Private Johannes Müller, the brother of G. J. Müller) and forwarded messages to the Foreign Affairs/Abwehr II department or to the OKW in Berlin. Initially, this may have been linked to the hope of being able to quickly inform and request troops on their march through the Caucasus. However, the Caucasus had long since been cleared when Operation Mammoth got underway.

Head of Abwehr Department II

Nr. 1475/43 g.Kdos. II

<To>

Head of Abwehr Department I

Berlin, 9 July 1943

Enclosed is the report from Lieutenant Colonel Staubwasser[283] to the Chief of Foreign Armies West (Fremde Heere West) dated 13 June 1943.

We fully agree with the opinion expressed therein that, when deploying task forces to distant important areas, the closest possible cooperation between the Abwehr and the Foreign Armies Department should be sought. However, the report by Lieutenant Colonel Staubwasser, Chief of Staff of the Foreign Armies Department, is based on a number of erroneous assumptions and requires correction.[284]

The commander, Lt. Müller, is a fully trained officer of the Secret Intelligence Service who was already deployed in military intelligence abroad in 1938/39. Since the beginning of the planning of the operation, in addition to preparing his Abw. II assignments, he has been in close contact with the Abw. I departments interested in military intelligence (primarily I Luft and I M), as well as with the Air Force Command (Lt.-Cmd. Blumensaat) and OKW/Wi. Stab (Wi Ausland (Major Schuon)).

Contact with the Foreign Armies Department was established before the operation was finally set up. However, Abw. II had assumed that Foreign Armies East, rather than Foreign Armies West, was responsible[285] , and Major Kübart, who belonged to the latter department, cooperated with the commander and his assistant from the planning stage through to implementation. Foreign Armies East sent another employee Special Commander (Sonderführer) Weiss to instruct and inform the members of the squad. The participants in the operation were also informed about the conditions in the foreign armed forces under consideration on the basis of photographic documentation compiled by the General Staff of the Army[286] , Foreign Armies East II Department).

Incidentally, Lieutenant Colonel Staubwasser's opinion that the squad should engage exclusively in military intelligence gathering until the arrival of the second squad – one to two months – is based on

[283] Presumably Anton Staubwasser (b. 18. Okt. 1908), General Staff Officer Ic <Military Intelligence> Army Group B (France).

[284] This revealed a massive conflict of competence and interests. The OKH considered risky operations to stir up rebellion in the Orient to be pointless and insisted on exclusive concentration on espionage. This was hardly compatible with Müller's ambitious goals and the fundamental orientation of Abwehr II.

[285] See FN 273 on p. 83.

[286] = Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres OKH).

an obvious misunderstanding. During the specified period, the first group must establish contact with Kurdish personalities, investigate possible areas of operation and the most important targets, and prepare the planned subversive work.

The transmission of military intelligence is only intended to the extent that military operations can be investigated and forwarded via the established intelligence connection.

The request of the Foreign Armies West department to send the second team of the company for two days of briefing to Foreign Armies West before the mission will be gladly accommodated.

Lahousen[287]

Colonel d.G. and Head of Department

Unternehmen MAMMUT.

Memo for the department head

The Mammut group returned to Berlin as ordered after parachuting in Wiener-Neustadt on 19 April 1943. Previous training: radio, language, physical training, sextant. Training commenced in each case.

The conditions found at the Bodental hut[288] proved to be so advantageous in every respect that the training made rapid progress and can only be continued there successfully enough that we will be fully trained by the time we are deployed.

Because the accommodation, space, training facilities, etc. are considered exemplary, the mission leader immediately requested a visit from a superior upon arrival there.

It is requested that the training that has been started not be interrupted any longer and that it be allowed to continue in Bodental with immediate effect. The group would have to leave for Klagenfurt at 8:40 p.m. tonight, as journeys for duty are prohibited from tomorrow.

Until then, any ongoing issues, including those relating to the technical group, will be discussed by the mission leader.

Reasons why the training cannot be carried out as effectively in Meseritz, Brandenburg or anywhere else, other than Bodental:

1.) Physical training: Due to their stay in Berlin, etc., the participants are not physically fit enough to easily endure the expected strain. The food in Berlin, with whole milk, etc., is unlike anything else in Germany.

[287]Erwin Heinrich René Lahousen Edler von Vivremont (1897-1955) was head of Abwehr II from 1939 to 1943. He belonged to the resistance circles around Admiral Canaris, but was not investigated by the Gestapo and SS due to his transfer to the front in mid-1943. See also the comments in the introduction above.

[288] The Bodental is a remote Austrian Alpine valley on the Slovenian border between Klagenfurt and Ljubljana.

The terrain is similar to the terrain where they will later be deployed: high mountains, including snow. No extra journey to high mountain training is necessary.

2.) Radio training: All conceivable unfavourable conditions are present: long distances, mountains, forests and water all around. We can expect similar conditions in the operational area. After two days, however, contact was established with Belzig and then improved continuously. It is necessary that each participant be able to carry out radio communication with all its difficulties independently and on a regular basis.

3.) Sextant training: Atmospheric conditions particularly good due to high altitude. By staying together continuously, every favourable astronomical situation can be exploited immediately. Great importance must be attached to position determination training, as the map documents for the operational area are extremely inaccurate.

4.) Language training: Language teacher Dr. Hadank is available for lessons at any time. He has time in Berlin to translate important English documents about the area of operation and present them to the group in a concentrated form. Dr. Hadank was left behind in Berlin and will continue the translations he has started until the group returns.

5.) Camouflage is the best you can get in every way. It couldn't be better in Berlin or anywhere else: Kraft durch Freude[289] hut, i.e. holidaymakers, valley floor in general and hut very remote. Area sparsely populated.

6.) Foster comradship: Mammut is made up of (older) intellectually gifted people who have all held managerial or independent positions themselves. It is necessary to forge unbreakable comradship through daily interaction, shared hardships, etc.

7.) Training of operation leader; It has become apparent that Lt. Müller can only attend his own training when he is away from Berlin. For the rest of his holiday at home, he should not be distracted from his own training by the daily difficulties in procurement, etc. In addition, he can only get to know his people and establish more than just a superior-subordinate relationship if he is with them all the time.

8.) A lot of riding is required in the operational area. It is possible to receive riding training in Klagenfurt. This has already been approved by the relevant department leader.

9.) Dental treatment: During the training, our Mammut Man Schmidt II[290] , who is a dentist, will be able to treat all participants with his equipment so that they can go into action once their treatment is complete. Treatment will be provided as part of the service.

[289] „Kraft durch Freude“ was the totalitarian leisure and holiday organisation that organised cheap journeys, trips and holiday camps for the German population.

[290] Karl Schmidt, also known as "Klein-Schmidt", was a member of the second Mammut group, which was never deployed.

10.) According to a telephone conversation with Dr. Wolff[291] , Ramzi Nafi Raschid will arrive in Germany in the next few days. He has already been taken care of by him. This Kurd is allegedly willing to perform all services. Dr. Wolff has gained a good impression of him.

The commander wants to ensure that this Kurdish liaison person has as little contact with anyone other than his own people as possible. It is also not a good idea to let him get to know city life or even to put him up in barracks. Instead, it is best if he stays in the high mountains (where he comes from) with the other Mammut people and undergoes the necessary training there.

11.) During the next training period, the indigenous clothing[292] must be made to measure for each participant under the guidance of the Kurd or according to existing documents.

Müller

Lieutenant and Operations Commander

Unternehmen Mammut

Berlin, 19 April 1943

File note

Regarding the parachute jump on 17 April 1943 in Wiener Neustadt[293] under the command of Feldwebel Paulus.

1.) On 14 April 1943, the participants in Operation Mammut received detailed jump instructions from Feldwebel Paulus in Bodental.

2.) On the evening of 16 April 1943, the Mammut personnel arrived in Wiener Neustadt. Excellent treatment, accommodation and special meals.

[291] This was an Abwehr agent in Sofia (probably a code name). See also below, p. 90 with FN 291 and p. 174 with FN 509. In 1941, the head of the office operated under the name Dr. Delius (real name: Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Otto Wagner). See Norbert Müller (ed.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, pp. 177, 475 and 511. However, it is unclear exactly how the positions were filled or what changes were made. According to the available information, Otto Wagner is not the same person as the Sonderführer Wagner repeatedly mentioned in the source texts. Concerning Wolff, Ernst Schmidl reports that from 1942 he was member of the Sicherheitsdienst SD, the competing intelligence organization against the Abwehr, and was as SS-Obersturmbannführer heading the SD-office Istanbul. Ernst Schmidl, Hitlers Spion, Österreichs Stimme, Die zwei Leben des Wilhelm Hendricks-Hamburger (1917 – 2011), Innsbruck Wien Bozen 2020, p. 54.

[292] „Eingeborenenkleidung“.

[293] This military airport served as an important launching site for the German Air Force in the Balkan campaign of 1941 and subsequently became very important due to its protected location. It was severely damaged by an Allied bombing raid from Tunisia on 13 August 1943, but remained in operation until the end of the war.

3.) On 17 April 1943
a) 8:00 a.m. Departure of the Mammut personnel in the Ju 52 for a 25-minute sightseeing flight: familiarisation with flying, especially for those who have never flown before.
b) 9:00 a.m. Take-off of Feldwebel Paulus in the Ju 52. Demonstration of a test jump from 500 m onto the airfield; special attention: correct touch-down.
c) 10:00 a.m. Take-off of the Mammut team for parachute jumps from an altitude of 550 m onto the particularly hard, stony airfield.
First approach, jump of group 1: Lt. Müller, Private Hoffmann, Private Konieczny.

Second approach, jump by Group 2: Dr. Öhler[294] , Schmidt I[295], Müller Johannes, Kelaiter[296] , Schmidt II, Gröning.

4.) Special incidents:

Sergeant Dr. Öhler sprained both ankles; he can walk if necessary, but must undergo treatment at the medical centre at Wiener-Neustadt Air Base for several days. Schmidt I bit his tongue during the rollover. According to the examination by the medical officer there, he will be healed in a few days.

It is noteworthy that the two above-mentioned individuals had a particularly high fall speed due to their heavy body weight. During operational jumps, they should therefore be given little additional load, while the other participants can still be given some additional load.

Fall speed during the jump in Wiener-Neustadt: approx. 6 - 6½ m/sec. Distance between men after landing: approx. 25 - 100 m.

5) A test jump such as the one we carried out is absolutely necessary before a sharp parachute mission and should be performed from a greater height (e.g. than in our case from 550 m):

a) To overcome a certain amount of fear before the jump.

b) The mission leader has complete control over the state of mind of his men. He can dismiss those who hesitate before the jump in good time, and if they are unsuitable for other duties.

6.) Status of Feldwebel Paulus: Due to his outstanding expertise, P. enjoys the full trust of the mission leader and all Mammut personnel for his comradship, calmness and discipline during deployment. He was asked to take part in the mission as a deployer, which he gladly accepted.

It is therefore requested from Abwehr II that Fw. Paulus be assigned as the drop master for the mission flight. This is particularly necessary for psychological reasons.

[294]Special Leader (Z) Sergeant Dr. Karl Heinz Oehler was an astronomer and desert explorer. See Phersed Rosbeiani, Das "Unternehmen Mammut", p. 208.

[295] More information on the two Schmidts in the following section of this documentation.

[296] It should read "Kelaita".

7.) Jump with coupled load parachute:

It is regrettable that previous attempts at test jumps with a coupled load parachute have encountered such difficulties that there is still insufficient operational experience in this area. It is therefore all the more gratifying that Fw. Paulus will now be able to make a number of test jumps in Wiener Neustadt.

It is already clear that the load of the U-Mammut will be distributed as follows:

Group 1:

a) One complete emergency kit per person, including clothing, weapons, food, first aid supplies, etc.; one participant, one complete Radio Device <"Fu-Gerät"> 99/10 packed on the chest.

b) From the requested resources, additional emergency equipment for each participant on the 50 kg load parachute. This includes a second complete Radio Device 99/10. (This provides the best guarantee that at least one device will arrive in good condition, on which the mission depends.)

c) The remainder of clothing, equipment, weapons, food, etc. in large cargo containers.

Group 2:

a) Emergency equipment on the body as above

b) Additional emergency equipment on a coupled 50 kg parachute

c) One large 1000 kg drop bomb: Remaining items for Group 1 and material for Group 2.

8.) Packaging of drop containers, etc.: It was agreed with Oberleutnant Figulla[297] and Fw. Paulus that, after the ordered return to Berlin, a request would be made for the immediate resumption of training in Bodental. Three days before departure for the mission, the U-Mammut participants are to return to Berlin to pack the equipment, which would have been procured and ready under the guidance of Fw. Paulus as described above or in accordance with the experience gained in the meantime.

Müller

Lieutenant

[297] According to Norbert Müller (ed.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, p. 493, First Lieutenant Figulla was a member of Group A (Soviet Union) of Abwehr II. He was Fw Paulus' superior as drop master, i.e. responsible for the agents' jump from the transport aircraft.

FILE NOTE on the presentation by Major Dr. Schuon from Group Wi/Rü[298] during the mission exercise at the Bodental hut above Unterbergen / Klagenfurt on 6/7 May 1943.

At the suggestion of the Wi/Rü group, Major Dr. Schuon took an active part in the preparations for Operation Mammut for two days in order to ensure the best possible form of cooperation later on.

So far, almost all reports have come from native liaison officers, which in many cases are of questionable value, as the natives tend to exaggerate.

Wi/Rü therefore urgently needs accurate and reliably verified information from the area of operation, covering the entire field of the defence industry, about which we still know very little, especially in Iraq.

Of particular importance are all types of armaments industry facilities (factories, repair workshops, depots, etc.), the entire transport system (especially the condition and capacity of roads and railways, the location of fuel depots, etc.). It is also important to know the extent to which the population is already working or is considered as useful for work, which tribes are pro- or anti-British, or have not yet taken a position, etc.

After working through the material together, it was decided that the following points were particularly important in the limited area of the mission:

1. How strong are supplies from Persia to the USSR?

2. Where are new supply routes being established?

3. What is the situation in this regard, particularly in the Rumandiz[299] -canyon?

4. What kind of material from Iraq's own production is going to the USSR?

5. How far have the coal deposits been mined recently?

6. How much has oil and petrol production increased?

7. To what extent does the Mosul area serve as a staging area for British and American troops opposite Turkey?

8. What is the situation with military aviation?

It was finally agreed that all messages concerning Wi/Rü received by the liaison officer at the general controlling authority <of the mission> would be forwarded to the appropriate department in accordance with the distribution list and evaluated immediately. A written summary of all individual points will be sent separately to the mission by Maj. Dr. Schuon.

Dr. Messow, Lieutenant and liaison officer, U. Mammut, Berlin, 13 June 1943

[298] = Amtsgruppe Wi/Rü (Wehrwirtschaft/Rüstung) beim OKW (Department military economy / Armament, High Command of the Armed Forces).

[299] The correct name is Rawanduz. This town is located on an important road (partly a gorge) in the north-east of present-day Iraq. It leads to Mahabad in Iran.

Testament of Lt. Gottfried Müller, commander of the operation

1. Care for the participants.

During the mission, the relatives of the participants should be able to contact Abwehr II/Orient[300] at any time for information and advice and, if necessary, receive assistance of any kind, even if it is not directly related to the official duties. This is because the men should go into action with the certainty that they can leave their families without worry, especially when performing this special task.

2. Assistance in carrying out tasks in the area of operation.

It will often be necessary to send requested items (material or messages) to the task force as quickly as possible. To ensure this, it is necessary that all possible means are used both in procurement and for transport – if necessary, even if this means deviating from the normal chain of command and overcoming possible reservations on the part of the administration. Once things are up and running in the area of operation, delays can have a significant impact on the success of the entire mission.

The task force will endeavour to pass on all necessary replenishment requests as early as possible and to take any difficulties into account from the outset. However, if something is requested as urgent, this means that there will be real danger if all possible measures are not taken.

3. Promotions and awards.

The Mammut mission is a military operation of at least exceptional hardship. Although it is undertaken voluntarily and willingly by the participants, it significantly strengthens their enthusiasm for the mission during their indefinite absence from home if each individual feels that the special nature of this mission is appropriately recognised at home.

The promotion already submitted by the liaison officer and, at a later stage, award proposals should be approved on the basis of the adequate assessment of the mission.

4. Measures.

a) If no contact can be established with Group I within four weeks of departure:

Radio communication in the mountains is a delicate matter and often requires lengthy trials of the antenna system before a radio connection can finally be established. It is also possible that Group I will

[300] The existing specialist literature provides only fragmentary information on "Abwehr II Orient", if it ever existed at all (see introduction above, p. 7f.). Abwehr II had various (sub) "groups" with specific "areas of operation" (West, East, Southeast, Overseas and Technology). Norbert Müller (ed.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, p. 55 and p. 462f. (reprint of telephone directory) is unclear about the origins and development of Abwehr II / Or<ient>. In the spring/summer of 1943, there was a "Group O" headed by Lieutenant Colonel Putz, which included Captain Dr Eisenberg and Sonderführer Dr Wagner, who led operations in Persia. This is likely to have been Abw II / Or (however, it is unclear which group was responsible for the "East", i.e. the Soviet Union – possibly "Group A" under Colonel Stolze). Putz, who may have belonged to the resistance circles around Admiral Canaris and who may therefore have been executed, and Wagner disappeared without their fate being clarified. Adrian O'Sullivan, Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran), The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45, Houndmills New York 2015, esp. pp. 67–72. The whole thing remains rather shrouded in mystery, but is of secondary importance to Operation Mammut.

have to remain in hiding for such a long time after jumping that it will be impossible to set up the radio station for the time being. For safety reasons, the first radio contact should not be expected before two weeks have elapsed after jumping.

No measures are necessary at this point.

b) If no contact can be established with Group I within 6 weeks of departure:

In this case, the radio equipment taken on board must initially be assumed to have been lost or destroyed.

A drop container with a load parachute must then be assembled immediately (urgently!) and dropped at the next opportunity from a location specified by the liaison officer in advance from a specific date.

Contents of this drop container: Complete Radio Device 99/10 radio equipment with generator, weapons and ammunition, food, medication, gifts.

c) If no contact has been established with Group I within four months of the jump:

It must then be assumed that all Fu equipment and the subsequently dropped container with replacements as under b) have been lost or destroyed, or that Group I has been captured.

Further supplies are then initially pointless, as in the former case Group I will attempt to send messages home by as many other means as possible (via the task force in the Kashga region[301], by messenger, verbally or in writing to the German representation in Ankara or another Turkish location or similar). These methods would naturally take a long time.

9) If no contact has been established with Group I within six months of departure:

Then it is no longer to be expected that any sign of life will come, and Group II is to be disbanded. However, it is recommended that the men of Group II (if possible together) be incorporated into a Abwehr unit, as they have been thoroughly trained and this work should not have been in vain.

5. Deployment of Group II

Initially, Group II is to be kept on standby under constant further training by the liaison officer, even if they cannot be called upon for a longer period of time despite active radio contact.

[301] This was Operation Franz, which consisted of six members and jumped southeast of Tehran on 29 March 1943. This group was supposed to make contact with Franz Mayr, a German agent who had been active since 1940, and join forces with the Qashqai tribe to fight against the Allies. On 14/15 July 1943, the "Anton" group, consisting of three SS men and an Iranian interpreter, also jumped. They were joined by the German agent Bernhardt Schulze-Holthus. These two operations were very similar to Operation Mammut in terms of structure, tasks and composition. Although they did not fail immediately, they also suffered from a similar lack of knowledge about the country and its people. In addition, there was uncertainty about the objectives. Everything ultimately ended in failure. Mayr and the "Franz" group were arrested in the second half of August 1943. Schulze-Holthus and the "Anton" group were handed over to the British in March 1944 by the Kaschkai, who had already realised at the beginning of 1943 that the tide of war had turned. Burkhard Ganzer, Deutsche Agenten bei iranischen Stämmen 1942 – 44, Ein Augenzeugenbericht, Berlin 2008, Chapters 3 and 4.

The two men already requested but still missing from the total strength (Kopf and Schmelzle) are to be integrated into Group II as soon as possible. If a further man is considered necessary, the approval of the mission leader must be obtained in advance.

The liaison officer must remain in close contact with the Abwehr Flieger[302] and the mission flight of Group II must be taken into account at all times in the planning.

When Group II is called, this resupply flight must be feasible within a few days, as the situation in the operational area may temporarily deteriorate again later, preventing the drop.

6. Measures to be taken after deployment of Group II if contact is lost:

In this case, it must be assumed that a major change of position, radio failure or capture had been necessary.

After a certain amount of time (at the discretion of the liaison officer), another drop container as described in 4 b) should be dropped at the next opportunity. The liaison officer and radio operator remain at their posts to await the possible re-establishment of contact, even if the entire group has been captured, as the indigenous organisation may already have the means to continue working on its own and establish contact with the remote station.

7. Request for supplies.

From previous discussions, particularly with the Kurdish V-man Raschid[303], it is clear that rifles, pistols and appropriate ammunition are the most essential items for the Kurdish tribes. The liaison officer must take preparatory measures to ensure that, when requested, the material can be delivered in full and by the fastest means possible. (Under certain circumstances, the aircraft may be able to land, the mission leader as a trained reconnaissance pilot is able to determine whether a suitable landing site is available or not).

This question of supplies is of the utmost importance and CANNOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ENOUGH; the entire mission depends on it.

For various reasons, the importance of this will not be able to be emphasised in radio messages from the mission area.

Therefore, we would like to conclude by underlining the importance of the supply issue and requesting that both task forces be supported at all times and by all means necessary so that their work and ultimate success are not jeopardised in any way by interference from home.

Draft signed: Müller

Lieutenant and commander

Written and submitted on the day of Group I's deployment: Dr. Messow, Lieutenant and liaison officer

[302] This probably refers to Sergeant Paulus as the liaison officer to the Air Force Command.

[303] = Ramzi.

UNTERNEHMEN MAMMUT

File note on meeting with Feldwebel Paulus (Technical Group) on 9 March 1943.

Present:

Lt. Müller, Lt. Dr. Messow: U<nternehmen> Mammut

Feldwebel Paulus Liaison Officer Abw.II/Luftwaffenführungsstab

Field Sergeant P. is a parachute jump specialist with extensive experience from operations in Crete and various Abw. II missions in the south of the Eastern Front. P. provides the following practical information for carrying out such operations.

1) Jump.

The parachute with a hand-operated ripcord that has been used to date does not guarantee 100% safety for those who are not constantly practising. For jumpers who are jumping for the first time or only once, therefore, only the RZ 16 or RZ 20 parachute with automatic release is recommended, coupled with the small 25 kg and possibly also 75 kg load parachute. Advantages of the automatic parachute: low jump height, jumpers land close together with their loads. Tests are underway to further improve the coupling of man and load.

The Ju 52 is best suited for jumping, but its use is limited over long distances. The converted He 111 is best. Jumping from the Ju 290[304] is also relatively easy.[305]

P. does not consider longer jump training to be necessary. A short, instructional training course is sufficient, in which the only important thing is that the jumpers can get to their feet easily and safely at night, loaded with equipment (foot and knee bandages are important!). P. is prepared to provide this practical instruction. Prolonged practice in packing the parachute is unnecessary, as the parachutes are guaranteed to be ready for use in this type of operation.

For psychological reasons and to guarantee that the jump will function reliably, it is highly recommended to provide an experienced jumpmaster.

In order to reliably reach the jump or drop zone even in the event of a loss of radio contact, an absolute (geographical) point must be determined in advance.

Equipment.

For the jump, only take the essentials for the initial period; everything else will be brought on the second flight with the first supply drop.

[304] Junker Ju 290, a transport aircraft developed from the Ju 90 civil airliner.

[305] For the inadequacies of German aircraft types for such an undertaking, see below.

Most suitable clothing: wear the so-called parachute suit (over the uniform), which can later be used as weather protection and camouflage.

The new combat pistol is essential among the hand weapons.

Provisions.

For the first few weeks, take jump rations. In addition, additional quantities of long-life bread, bacon or rolled ham, chocolate cola <"Schoka-Kola">, drops, saccharin, salt, compressed tea (very economical and effective, retains its aroma for a long time) will be needed. Of canned foods, lard is most advantageous, followed by liver and blood sausage. You can never take enough smoked meats with you! Pervitin[306] is the best vitamin-rich stimulant. Fill any unused space in weapon containers and similar items with ship's biscuits!

Müller

Lieutenant

<…>

28 June 1943

[306] Pervitin was a widely distributed drug in the Wehrmacht to enhance endurance and mental power especially for bomber and tank crews but also generally for all soldiers. Today it is known as the party drug „Crystal Meth".

Contents of the letter of recommendation for Mammut to Osman-Pascha-Zade Izzet Bey[307] (from the Dschaf tribe[308]) in Sulemanije.

"I am writing in the hope of success for our joint endeavours and am pleased to be able to introduce such a comrade to you. I ask you to treat him with complete openness and to help him. He will explain everything else to you." At the end, he mentions his business partner (1939), the engineer Hasan Machsumi (son-in-law of the addressee).

The author of the letter is the Circassian Sehakir Bey Merschan in Saloniki, a walnut wood merchant who undertook a business trip to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1939, immediately before the war.

28 June 1943

Contents of the letter of recommendation for Mammut to Hasan Bey Fehmi Dschaf,[309] Halebdsche.[310]

"The bearer of this letter will provide you with more detailed information about the matter. I am delighted to be able to introduce you to such a comrade. Please be honest with him and help him! He signs himself as a "relative of Nuri Pasha" (= Nuri Said, the current Prime Minister of Iraq) and refers to his business partner (1939), the engineer Hasan Machzumi (like the addressee, the son-in-law of Osman Pasha-Zade Izzet Bey).

[307] Member of the local dignitaries. Osman Pasha Zade Izzet Bey (from the Dschaf tribe) lived in Sulaimaniya and was anti-British.

[308] This and other letters of recommendation demonstrate Müller's very limited knowledge. The Dschaf were the only tribe in the Barzinjis' immediate homeland (Sulaimania district) that did not support Mahmud's uprisings to any significant extent. Müller probably hoped to create a united front. However, the socio-political and economic structure of the Kurds was and is complex and fundamentally different from that of Western states and societies. Kurdish 'society' (in fact, it is difficult to speak of a „unitary society“) is still today characterised by complicated conflicts.
In the first half of the 20th century, structures and modes of behaviour were even more volatile and flexible. Even the basic division into tribes, clans and households provides only insufficient information about the circumstances, as the number of tribe members often fluctuated and could not be precisely defined (e.g. immigration to a strong, successful tribe by inventing personal relationships and kinship). In addition, there were groups of people who did not belong to any tribe but were nevertheless related to leaders (e.g. Aghas). Furthermore, powerful sheikh families (which also cannot automatically be equated with "tribes") had considerable influence, in particular the Barzinjs, Mahmud's family (which, however, lost considerable influence in the 19th century), the Barzanis and their rivals, the Talabanis. Membership of one of the important Sufi orders also played a major role. It was difficult or impossible to build a stable united front with sufficient clout against the empire. On the contrary, the British in particular had learned from experience that their intervention, favouring individual tribes and leaders, almost automatically led to opposition from other forces. The definitive standard work here is still Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State: Politics and Society in Kurdistan, 2nd completely revised edition, Berlin 2003, chapters 2–4, especially pp. 410–416.

[309] Hasan Fahmi Jaf (1905–1973) was the son of Mahmud Pasha Jaf, with Fahmi as his surname. He was a writer and translator, an important tribal notable, and a member of the Iraqi Parliament during the monarchical period.

[310] This refers to the city of Hallabja on the Iraqi-Iranian border.

Contents of the letter of recommendation for Mammut to Sheikh Mahmud.

The writer refers to the acquaintance between the bearer of the letter and Sheikh Mahmud and the photograph that was given as a gift[311]. He is pleased to be in contact with him again in this way. In 1937 (should read 1936), he had unfortunately been forced to reject the Sheikh's call for an uprising because the followers of the murdered Bekr Sidki[312] did not have the courage to carry out such an act. He asks for every possible support for the bearer of the letter.

The author of the letter is Major Lazar, former head of the cavalry school in Baghdad, one of Bekr Sidki's main supporters, who was banished from Iraq after Sidki's assassination, lived temporarily in Syria in 1939 and has since been living in Athens as a merchant.

28 June 1943

Contents of the letter of recommendation for Mammut to Esad Emin Ketene and Hussein Ali Ketene (Turkish notables) in Kirkuk.[313]

"I am writing in the hope of success for our joint endeavours. I am pleased to be able to introduce such a comrade to you and ask for your unreserved openness towards him and your assistance. He will explain everything else to you."

The author of the letter is the Circassian Schakir Bey Merschan in Saloniki, a walnut wood merchant who undertook a business trip to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1939, immediately before the war, and also visited Kirkuk. The addressees appear to have Circassian women.

<…>

[311] See above p. 72.

[312] Bakr Sidqi (1885–1937) was a Kurdish general in the Iraqi army who, after the British Mandate and the achievement of independence in 1932, gained national fame despite his origins by taking action against the Assyrians, from whose ranks the British armed forces before had recruited auxiliary troops ("Levies"). The climax was the massacre of Simmel (northern Iraq) in 1933, in which several thousand people were killed. Sidqi staged a coup against the government in Baghdad in 1936, but was killed by rival officers in 1937.

[313] = Kirkuk. The two individuals mentioned were local dignitaries and, prior to 1918, Ottoman notables.

Unternehmen Mammut

Berlin, 24 June 1943.

File note on mission flight I. Group.

Group I of Unternehmen Mammut (mission leader Lt. Gottfr. Müller, Privates <“Gefreite“> Hoffmann and Konieczny, as well as Verbindungsmann Raschid) and Group III (V.O. <liaison officer> Lt. Dr. Messow and radio operator Gefreiter Johannes Müller) took off on 15 June at 12:40 in a "Condor"[314] bound for the operational airfield in Sarabus (25 km north of Simferopol).

They landed in Sarabus at 6:30 p.m. after a smooth flight. Since the previous notification by radio message to the N.B.O.[315] Schwarzmeer[316] had not reached the flight control in S., nothing had been prepared upon arrival; however, the task force and crew were able to find primitive accommodation in the area of the air base.

Due to favourable weather conditions, the mission was scheduled to take off the following evening. No reports on the weather south of the Black Sea were available; the pilot, Captain Liemann, therefore did not expect any significant changes. In a final briefing between the pilot, mission commander and liaison officer, the course, drop zone and time were finalised.

The mission took off on 16 June at 6.30 p.m. under cloudless skies and with almost no wind. Apart from the crew and the task force, only Fw. Paulus flew along as a spotter (see his detailed flight report below). Contrary to expectations, the weather conditions over Turkey were unfavourable; thick clouds obscured visibility and, due to the peaks in south-eastern Anatolia reaching heights of over 4,000 metres, forced the aircraft to fly at an altitude of almost 5,000 metres, requiring the use of oxygen masks in some cases. Visibility over the mission area was better again, but severely impaired by ground fog. This circumstance and the fact that the small town of Rania was brightly lit over a large area led to navigation errors, so that it took some time to locate the exact drop zone, where the drop was then made between 23:30 and 0:00 (details and lessons learned for the next flight, see Feldwebel Paulus' report). The aircraft was not flashed or fired upon at any point during the flight. Due to damage that could only be repaired in Tempelhof, the return flight with the flying crew and liaison officer could not take place until 18 June.

<…>

Field Officer (OA) Paulus

Abw. II/AL., Berlin, 12 July 1943

[314] Fw 200 Condor, actually a civilian transport aircraft, which was used in the Second World War as a reconnaissance aircraft, long-range bomber and transport aircraft. See also FN 317.

[315] „Nachrichtenbeschaffungsoffizier: "Intelligence officer" (of the Abwehr).

[316] Black Sea.

Parachute mission report on Operation Mammut (I. Group).

1.) The group took off on 16 June 1943 at 6.43 p.m. in Sarabus near Simferopol with an Fw 200[317] of the 2nd Supply Unit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force[318] .

The aircraft flew over the Turkish border at Yaliköy (west of Trebizond) at 8:56 p.m. in darkness, heading for the south-eastern tip of Lake Van. Except for the coast, where visibility was clear, the entire country of Turkey was completely covered in clouds, contrary to the weather forecast. Even Lake Van, the first point of reference, was covered by a solid cloud cover, so the course had to be changed based on time. Likewise, Lake Zab, from whose northern tip the ordered drop-off point was to be approached, was completely obscured from view.

The aircraft therefore flew further south to obtain reliable orientation with the help of other prominent landmarks, where the cloud cover soon cleared. A river running directly south became visible. To ascertain whether this was the Little Zab, the captain flew along the river to the point where it turns west, but found this spot covered again. The aircraft returned along the same route to the northern tip of the lake, which was calculated based on time due to poor visibility, and turned eastward from the river, heading northwest toward the drop-off point. It passed a town on the west bank of the river, whose houses and streets were brightly lit by electric lights. Its location corresponded exactly to the cartographic information about the town of Rania. At 0.05 a.m., the group was dropped off. The drop-off point was east of the river and just north of the town of Dera, which was unlit and could not be identified. Apart from the aircraft's course, the following circumstances led to the conclusion that this was the designated drop-off point:[319]

1. the north-south course of the river, which corresponded to that of the Zab River,

2. the illuminated town, which had to be Rania,

3. the observation that, just north of the drop-off point, the river forked in accordance with the map, and that shortly afterwards high mountains – presumably Bethirken and Berimka[320] – were flown over,

4. the fact that on the return flight, the Turkish coast, which was approached on a direct course, was reached exactly according to the time calculation.

[317] During the Second World War, the German Air Force had only a very limited number of long-range aircraft at its disposal. Like the Focke-Wulff Fw 200 Condor, these were mostly used for supply missions and were generally not designed for dropping parachute loads.

[318] = Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (part of Göring's official title as commander of aviation in Germany), meant here for the Luftwaffe in strategical sense.

[319] This information is incorrect. The group that jumped did not land in the designated area on the Iraqi-Persian border, but northwest of Mosul, on the eastern side of the Tigris, specifically in the village of Kharab Kubar.

[320] Presumably Bethirken and Berimka were flown over; however, Paulus records the names of the two mountains incorrectly here. The first mountain, referred to as Bethirken, should be Betrkheen, while the second could not be identified with certainty. Both mountains are located in the Rania region.

Nothing was seen of the town of Ruwandiz, which was supposed to be darkened and which the return flight was supposed to pass near according to the course taken.

The aircraft landed in Sarabus at 3:53 a.m.

The absolute altitude during the flight over land was 4,500 to 5,000 metres. Although the oxygen content of the air was completely sufficient when the body was at rest, the oxygen containers were tapped so heavily by the task force, despite several warnings, even at lower altitudes over the sea that they were almost empty by the time the weapons containers were relocated, which was very strenuous for the drop-off crew. This, and the fact that some of the passengers immediately expended the oxygen they had inhaled in unnecessary movements, makes it advisable to clarify the powers of the drop master in future cases, who, due to the flying demands on the other crew members, is the only one who can ensure that the oxygen containers are used sparingly.

2.) The drop procedure took place as follows:

The altitude above ground level was between 600 and 900 metres. The drop master was unable to provide more precise information as he only had an altimeter that measured absolute altitude due to a lack of electrical equipment. It was not possible to descend further as the mountain range in the direction of flight was surrounded by distant cloud masses. Although the drop zone was clear, visibility was severely impaired due to very hazy weather.

The terrain was slightly undulating and appeared to be almost completely devoid of vegetation. No human settlements were identified in the immediate vicinity of the drop zone.

The landing conditions were extremely unfavourable due to the very limited space in the aircraft. Contrary to the claim of the mission commander, who referred to tests carried out in Rangsdorf, not all four weapon containers could be placed in the drop door, but only two at a time. The remaining two were placed close by so that they could be tipped out one after the other over the container placed in the door.

After the first two containers had been dropped, a member of the crew dropped the third container (125 kg), which had to be placed in the door first, on my head. This caused a brief delay, which I cannot calculate more precisely due to the shock I suffered (I lost consciousness for some time after the drop). The release of the fourth container and the jump of the four men took place very quickly.

Upon landing in Sarabus, it became apparent that the base edge of a parachute had become caught on the tail skid (which must not be retracted during flight on the FW 200). Accordingly, one parachute became entangled in the tail skid and only fell off after the base edge was severed. However, as the base edge clearly shows, the suspension lines connecting the load to the canopy were not cut during this separation, but only separated from the base edge (they are sewn to it and only enter the longitudinal seam of the canopy behind it). It is therefore entirely possible that the canopy opened correctly with its load, as any fissures caused by the tension of the open canopy would have been caught at the latest at the cross seams of the lowest canopy panels. On the other hand, a loss of load would have to be expected if the canopy became twisted or knotted during the time when its base edge was torn off, so that it could no longer open.

Accidents of this kind, which are extremely rare, cannot be ruled out in terms of jumping technique and are part of the special operational risk of parachutists.[321] They can be explained by the fact that the aircraft enters an air pocket at the moment of release and catches the parachute as it sags.

The parachute involved in the accident cannot be determined from the base edge, as parachutes for individual persons were also used for the weapon containers due to their heavy weight. Shortly after the drop signal, and according to their statements, the crew members noticed a noticeable shaking of the aircraft (which I myself did not notice) after jettisoning the second container.

If this observation is correct, the following assumptions can be made about the arrival of the jumpers and loads:

The four jumpers must have found each other quickly, and locating the fourth and third weapon containers, which were dropped in quick succession directly in front of the men, cannot have caused any significant difficulties. On the other hand, due to the delay in dropping the third container mentioned above, it is to be expected that the first and second containers had to be searched for for a longer period of time.

The loss of a weapon container seriously impairs the operation if it contained a radio. The company was equipped with two devices, one of which was carried by the men themselves and the other was stored in the fourth weapon container. I consider it impossible that the accident involved this last container to be dropped. On the other hand, it is possible that the pedal set for both radio devices was in the container that may have been lost and that this is why the intended power source is missing. However, if the group is technically capable of doing so, it should be able to work using the power grid.

3.) The loss of a load possibly caused by the accident described in 2.) and the difficulties that may have arisen in locating the weapon containers would have been avoided if the mission leader had followed the suggestions of the drop master regarding the technical execution of the operation. Back in April, he was warned against using weapon containers, with urgent reference to the bad experiences that had been made in the past (especially by the Moritz task force of the Schamil company[322]); no guarantee could be given that the device would be found if it was loaded in this way.

In order to ensure that the equipment was dropped without a hitch, I also carried out a number of jump tests in April under the supervision of Oblt. Figulla using the coupling method[323] , so that the safe arrival of all men and loads could be guaranteed.

Lt. Müller <the mission leader> then agreed to jump using the coupling method, despite the necessary restrictions on equipment. However, his requirements were so extensive that he later ordered the

[321] The members of the Mammut operation did not belong to the paratrooper corps.

[322] This unit of Lehrregiment 800 / Sonderverband Brandenburg was supposed to incite local tribes against the Soviet government in Moscow during the advance into the Caucasus (second half of 1942) in order to open a second front and secure oil wells. This led to fighting with Soviet militias near Grozny, followed by a retreat to German lines. BArch RW 49/143. After the disaster at Stalingrad, such plans were abandoned. Schamil also mention by Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, p. 30.

[323] This refers to the direct connection of the material to the respective parachutist or the connection of different loads using appropriately large parachutes or more than one parachute.

addition of five weapon containers to the coupled rucksacks, with the equipment essential for the mission to be packed in the coupled loads.

Additional concerns were raised by the drop master when an inspection of the FW 200 revealed that this aircraft was even less suitable for dropping weapon containers than the aircraft used previously. Nevertheless, the mission leader insisted that four containers be taken along in addition to the four backpacks.

When I returned from my first mission with an FW 200 on 10 June, I immediately informed the mission leader that, based on my experience, this aircraft could only safely carry a maximum of two containers during night missions.

Although he agreed with this opinion, he did not change his order. Furthermore, despite several urgent requests, he had the material, which had initially been packed in the rucksacks, repacked into the weapon containers, thus dispensing with the coupling procedure altogether. He responded to the objections of the drop master by remarking that his men now had reservations about the coupled jump. These reservations were shared above all by his V-man[324] , who had no idea about the jump procedure. He had to defer to this man's opinion.

My repeated attempt shortly before the start in Rangsdorf to persuade the mission leader to at least take a single coupled rucksack containing the most urgent necessities was also rejected, with reference to the opinion of the V-man, who, incidentally, was not supposed to take the rucksack at all.

In the coupling procedure, as already proposed and planned by other companies, the Tretsatz <foot-operated power generator> could have been dropped in addition to the backpacks, so that its immediate recovery would have been ensured.

Paulus

Sergeant

[324] Ramzi.

Abw II /Or

Berlin, 23 July 1943

"Radio message <…>;

To Ida for posters for Lindner[325]

1st squadron Unternehmen Mammut Night of 16 to 17 June 1943 in northern Iraq over Dera eastwards Erbil jumped off. 3 officers, 1 Kurd. British air attaché informed deputy Turkish chief of staff that 3 German officers had been captured. Departure allegedly took place from Crimea. Alleged violation of Turkish territory. The British air attaché's report mentions three aircraft. Further radio messages from Baghdad give reason to believe that the Germans who jumped are to be treated as spies. It has become known (this information must not be used under any circumstances) that a query was made to the Geneva Convention from Baghdad. Auswärtiges Amt has stated that it is unable to take any action. Is it possible to take action via the German Embassy or military attaché? Violation of Turkish neutrality is not an option. The company may have taken the route via Lake Urmia. Names of the officers: Major Müller[326] , Lieutenants Hoffmann, Konieczny.[327] Auswärtiges Amt refers from here to an immediate attempt via Kestner, military attaché, embassy. Reference is made to the report of the German Embassy Military Attaché dated 8 July 1943 on the discussion with the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Colonel General Asim Gündüz.

Zwilling - Eisen[328]“

[325] These code names could not be identified.

[326] Müller was only a lieutenant on the payroll.

[327] Hoffmann and Konieczny were not officers, but enlisted men.

[328] This is a code name. Apparently, metaphors relating to "twins" were primarily used to name the intelligence stations in the Orient. See also the comments on "Kastor" and "Pollux" below. See pp. 137 - 139.

Failure of the mission and arrest of the agents

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

MOST SECRET

Special Security Report No. 1.

Defence Security Office

C.I.C.I.[329] Iraq

(Baghdad)

4th July, 1943.

Dropping of Enemy Agents by Parachute.

1. Enemy Action
   (a) At about midnight on 16/17 June, a moonlit but slightly cloudy night, aircraft flew over the village of Kharab Kubar[330] in Northern Iraq, and dropped in the vicinity of the village at least one parachutist and fur parachutes loaded with wooden cases containing small arms, ammunition and supplies.
   (b) These parachutes and boxes were discovered by villagers on the following morning.
   (c) The parachutes that were attached to the boxes were made out of white silk but a personnel parachute that was later discovered in the same area beside a discarded parachute – harness and uniform, was camouflaged green and brown.
2. Examination of the Boxes
   The following points were noted during an examination of the boxes and of the discarded personnel parachute equipment:
   (a) The four boxes were of a similar pattern – oblong 41/2 x 11/4 x 11/4 – and all were marked FL. 29699. One was labelled SONDERSTAB WALLEY[331].

[329] C.I.C.I. = Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq.

[330] This village is located on the northern border of Iraq, northwest of Mosul. See also p. 109f.

[331] This was probably transport equipment belonging to a special unit for espionage (control centre 'Walli'), which was set up near Warsaw in June 1941 to prepare and then carry out espionage and agent activities in the Soviet Union. Later, in line with the structure of the Abwehr, further 'Walli' units were added (then Walli I, II and III). Magnus Pahl, Fremde Heere Ost, pp. 133 – 140. Thomas Menzel, Organisationsgeschichte des Amtes Ausland / Abwehr (Organisational History of the Foreign Office / Abwehr), p. 123, general instructive information in Rudolf F. Staritz, Abwehrfunk, p. 26f. Furthermore, see Andreas Weigelt et al. (eds.), Todesurteile sowjetischer Militärtribunale gegen Deutsche (1944 – 1947) (Death Sentences of Soviet Military Tribunals against Germans (1944 – 1947)), A Historical-Biographical Study, Göttingen 2017, pp. 290 – 295.

(b) An Army shirt was marked with a cloth Reichswehr badge on the right breast.
(c) The tropical medical chest which was very elaborate and contained pamphlets regarding tropical diseases, had been made up at Hauptsanitätspark Berlin on 3 May 1943.
(d) The contents of the boxes included:
(i) Enough food to keep a party of five men for three or four weeks.
(ii) A number of tins of saddle soap.
(iii) A complete set of extensively marked maps for North Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.
(iv) A manual of short-wave W/T, a pedal operated power generator and one complete and one incomplete W/T set <…>.
(v) A small yellow box with an aerial.
(vi) Photographs of Sheikh Mahmud inscribed to Mr. <…, corrupted>.[332]
(vii) A series of photographs of a tour of Europeans in Iraqi Kurdistan.
(viii) A flagpole standard without a flag and tie-pins, decorated with the Kurdish Nationalist colours, arrnged the wrong way.
These colours and also those of the Khoybun Society, (see Appendix A).

Photographs

An examination of the photographs brought to light the factors

1932

(a) The two Europeans in the photographs referred to in para 2(d)(vii) were identified as two Germans who toured in early summer 1938 the area Sharbazar – Pizhder – Surdash – Enradagh – Halabja.[333]
(b) Their tour which was claimed to be for journalistic reasons lasted a month.
(c) They visited Sheikh Mahmud in Baghdad.
(d) The Christian name of one of them was Joseph.[334]
(e) On their return to Germany the two Germans sent magazines to their hosts and asked several Kurds including Sheikhs for Kurdish clothes. None were sent however.

4. Conclusion
The following inferences were drawn from the examination of the contents of the boxes and the facts get out in para. 3:
(a) The party was composed of German Air Force Special Service Troops, possibly SONDERKOMMANDO DORA[335].

[332] The correct wording should be: ‘dedicated to a Mr Müller with the year 1936’. The image is reproduced in Müller's book, Einbruch ins verschlossene Kurdistan, Saarbrücken, 2nd edition, 2005, p. 82 (with Mahmoud's dedication to Müller in Kurdish).

[333] This corresponds to Müller's account of his journey, except for the date, which should be 1936. The areas mentioned are sub-regions that are mainly located in today's Kurdish Autonomous Region.

[334] This was probably Müller's companion on this trip, the "Tyrolean student Sepp". Johann Gottfried Müller, Einbruch ins verschlossene Kurdistan (Break-in into Locked Kurdistan), Reutlingen 1937 (4th edition Saarbrücken 2005), p. 14 et seq.

[335] The report here refers probably to the "Dora" operation carried out by the German agent Franz Mayr in Persia (two agents were sent on 28 June 1943 to incite the Bakhtiari tribe and sabotage Allied facilities). This is

(b) The party's intention was sabotage and the instigation of Kurdish unrest.
(c) The assistance was expected of a local reception party that had been in recent communication with the enemy and would provide horse and donkey transport.
(d) The apparent absence of such local assistance suggested that the party landed in the wrong place.

3. Counter-Action
(a) The first parachute was discovered by a shepherd at sunrise on the morning of 17 June. The other three parachutes were discovered a little later by a peasant. Both discoveries were promptly reported to the Headman of the village, who posted guards over the boxes, but did not set out till after noon to report the matter to the Police Post at Fil-fail. Fil-fail is some eight miles away from Kharab Kubar[336] and has no telepone, so that a policeman had to be despatched to report at Tel Kaif[337], which is some eight miles distant from Fil-fail.
(b) As regards counter action, the whole of the first day was consequently wasted, since it was not until sunset that the police arrived to relieve the villagers who had been posted by the Head of the village to guard the parachutes, by which time it is reasonable to assume that the contents of the boxes, one of which had been broken in the descent, had been pilfered by the villagers, and it was not till 21.30 hours that Officer Commanding, R.A.F. Station Mosul, learnt that there had been, that was described to him as an aircraft crash near Tel Kaif. He at once drove out to the secene of action, collected the boxes and their contents, and informed the appropriate authorities.
(c) As a result of this preliminary delay, it was not until the morning of 18 June that the police were able to get down to their job.
(d) On the 29 June, however, three enemy parachutists were apprehended in the Erbil area, largely through the initiative shown by the Air Liaison Officer's interpreter, and on the following day a fourth, an Iraqi, was taken into custody.

<…>

not to be confused with the "Sonderkommando Dora", a task force set up in June 1942 by Lehrregiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg, which was to advance through the Sahara to Lake Chad and obtain information there or investigate possibilities for disrupting or interrupting enemy supply routes. The latter undertaking failed. BArch RW 5/733. Müller and the members of the "Mammut" operation were not actually integrated into the chain of command of the Brandenburg Lehrregiment 800 / Sonderverband, but were directly subordinate to Abwehr II. The Sonderverband Division, for its part, was not subordinate to the Luftwaffe, but to the Abwehr, and in 1943 directly integrated into the Wehrmacht command chain.

[336] For this location: https://www.google.com/maps/place/%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8+%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1,+Ninawa%E2%80%AD/@36.5751804,42.9002059,16z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m6!3m5!1s0x400875e40b8c7211:0x82a8ade41840aee3!8m2!3d36.5743442!4d42.9049784!16s%2Fg%2F11b6bq1z6l?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI2MDIyMi4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.

[337] Tel-Kaif or Tel Kapa is also called Tel Keppe.

The Capture.
(a) On the evening of 18 June information was recieved by A.L.O. Mosul that four strangers had been observed that morning the village of Seimahla <…>, a village a mile and a half East of Kharab Kubar.[338]
(b) (i) Investigations conducted in Seimahla by A.L.O. Mosul revealed that at 07.00 hourse on 18 June four strangers approached the village along a track that led roughly in the direction of Kharab Kubar.
(ii) The strangers were dressed as ‚Kurda'and not as the usual inhabitants of that area.[339]
(iii) At the first house in the village, they asked a woman for ‚sheena' (sour milk). One of them offered in payment two fifty-fils[340] pieces (2/-d.) which were refused (the offer of payment was a marked breach of etiquette).
(iv) The stranger then asked the way to Mosul, stating in answer to a question that he and his friends were shooting gazelle and hars. On being asked how they would be doing this without shot guns and rifles, the spokesman said that they each had a pistol.
(v) Only one of the men spoke. He employed indifferently the Zakho dialect of Kurdish. His Arabic, which was not good, was of the Baghdadi variety. The men did not speak among themselves.

(vi) All four men were well built and of medium height, they had fair complexions, small moustaches and had a Nordic look. They were dressed in the Kurdish style in good quality <…, corrupted> -black material with Sirwal trousers[341] as opposed to the boll-bottomed pattern, i.e., their trousers were very full round the body and thighs, close fitting at the ankles. They did not appear to be carrying anything with them.
(vii) The four men on leaving the village took the track leading to Mahweir, two and a half miles south – east of Seimahla.
I The description of the four strangers were widely circulated and a reward of one thousand Dinars a head was offered for their capture.
(d) On 28 June, A.L.O. Erbil was informed that four men answering to the description of the four presumed parachutists had been seen at the ferry over the Zab at Guwair.[342]

I(i) On 28 June a man called Salih Mulla Aziz of Kayhaflush village in Qadha[343] Rania balked to four men whom he found sitting in a cave <…> near Byuka village[344]. They were in Kurdish dress and three of them seemed to be foreigners speaking little or no Kurdish though the fourth, the spokesman, was

[338] These two villages are located about 20 km northwest of Tel Keppe. See Map Action, OCHA, Iraq – Ninewa Governorate, Mosul District, URL: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Ninewa_Gov_Mosul_District.pdf for more information on this and the following locations.

[339] Müller had obviously believed that the region was exclusively or largely inhabited by Kurds. In fact, there was and still is a mixed population, even though the majority of the inhabitants were Kurds.

[340] Until the 1990s, the sub-unit of the Iraqi dinar (1000 fils = 1 dinar).

[341] Wide bloomers, widely worn legwear for men on the Arabian Peninsula.

[342] Village on the Great Zab near Khabat, approx. 30 km from Arbil.

[343] Administrative or district area.

[344] This village is located in the mountainous region about 20 km east of Arbil. See Map Action, OCHA, Iraq – Erbil Governorate, Erbil District, URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Erbil_Gov_Erbil_District.pdf-. It is also referred to as Bioka in the following.

a Kurd from Erbil or from the Dizal <?> tribe. Salih's suspicions were aroused and he proceeded to Erbil to report the matter to the A.L.O.
(ii) The A.L.O. was away on duty, but he instructed his interpreter, who informed him of the matter over the telephone, to report the matter to the Mutasarrif.[345]

(iii)The Mutasarrif, the Commandant of Police and the A.L.O's interpreter with a cordon of police, met off to Byuka immediately, where after extracting by show of arms the necessary information from the somewhat reluctant villagers, the A.L.O's interpreter with the assistance of the police, apprehended three of the four men in some nearby rushes.

The names of the three prisoners are Major Müller, First Lieutenant Hoffmann and Lieut. Konieczny, a Medical Officer[346].

An Iraqi named Ramzi Nafi Raschid who landed with the party was apprehended the following day.

1. Movement of enemy aircraft[347].
   (a) The movement of unidentified aircraft over Iraq by night has been reported on several occasions since the night of 16/17th June. And though it is not yet clear what inferences are to be drawn from these reports, it is possible that they will prove to be important.
   (b) The following movements have been reported:
   (i) On morning of 17 Jun aircraft over Kasruk flying east to Ruwanduz, later reported over Pustashan headed for Persia.
   (ii) In 23 June at 01.05 hourse aircraft circled over Mosul for 20 minutes.
   (iii) On 25 June aircraft passed Tel Kaif 00.45 hours
   Fesh Khabour[348] 01.00 hours
   Mosul 01.20 hours
   Fesh Khabour 01.30 hourse
   (iv) On 27 June at 21.30 hours aircraft passed over Mosul.
   (v) On 29 June at 02.25 hours aircraft passed over River Great Zab at Eski Kellek.[349]
   (vi) A member of the Air Force Levies[350] returning from leave in Barzaniq NW of Zakho has reported that three unidentified planes flew over the Turkish – Iraq frontier at midnight on

[345] This is the title for a mayor.

[346] This information is incorrect. Konieczny was not a medical officer, but merely trained as a paramedic.

[347] The following place names are not explained in detail as they can be easily found in standard reference works or on Google Maps.

[348] This is a river in the border region between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Today, there is a place of the same name.

[349] This place is now called Khabat (Eski Kellek is the old name) and is located on the Great Zab between Erbil and Mosul.

[350] "Levies" were auxiliary troops in the service of the Empire and usually consisted of ethnic groups that the British considered particularly well-armed ("Martial Races", see i.a. Heather Streets, Martial Races. The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857-1914, Manchester 2010, for the German empire until 1918 cf. Michelle Moyd, Violent Intermediaries. African Soldiers, Conquest and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, Ohio UP 2014) and which were usually deliberately made up of members of minority populations, e.g. Assyrians. No specific information about the troop directly related to this case could be found.

18 June coming from Turkey and that on 25 June at 02.00 hours three planes from Turkey flew very low over his house.

Dawson Shepherd, Squadron Leader, Defence Security Officer

<…>

APPENDIX A

The Khoybun.

The Khoybun Society was founded in Beirut in 1927 by the fusion of exiled political groups reprepresenting Kurdish and Armenian Nationalist Movements.[351] The Kurds, feeling that they had been double-crossed by the 'big four'[352] of immediately postwar international diplomacy, endeavoured in company with the Armenian Dashnaks[353] to form an independent Kurdistan, while the Armenian hoped to obtain for themselves those territories south of the Caucasus which were originally Armenian. The Khoybun sought the assistance of foreign countries and it seems that France gave financial support.[354] The Kurdish tribesmen themselves did not follow the leadership of the Khoybun politicians. Subsequently Kurdish revolts sprang up independently of the Khoybun which were put down by the Turks with considerable brutality.

The Khoybun has been dormant for many years. But many Khoybun politicians still cherish the dream of an independent Kurdistan. Most of the old Khoybun members are still alive and some of them are in close contact with the Axis, so that it might well occur to the Axis to revive Kurdish aspriations as a stab in the back to Turkey. The recent moves towards Arab Federation[355] are likely to raise Kurdish and Armenian nationalism again, as a means of self defence against Arab domination. Such a nationalist revival would naturally be accompanied by a resurrection of Khoybun activities.

<…>

[351] See also Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Lanham MD, 2nd edition, 2011, p. 160f.

[352] The official victorious powers of the First World War (USA, Great Britain, France, Italy). These, especially the first three, also dominated the peace negotiations in the suburbs of Paris.

[353] The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, also known as Dashnaktsutyun, advocated greater autonomy for the Armenian provinces during the Ottoman Empire, but not for an independent Armenia. After the Armenian genocide in 1915/16, they changed their policy and sought international support for an independent Armenia that would also include the Western Armenian territories in present-day eastern Turkey. They were also the ruling party of the Armenian Republic, which was independent from 1918 to 1921. For the connection with Kurds also above p. 23.

[354] On this point, further research is necessary.

[355] This refers to efforts to establish an international association of Arab states, which were promoted at that time by several politicians and political thinkers under various names. After the end of the war, this association of states was founded under the name Arab League, which, however, gained only limited political significance.

The Mammut mission from the perspective of British intelligence services

TNA KV 2/1735

MOST SECRET – OFFICER ONLY

Special consolidated report on MAMMUT expedition

Based on statements by Müller, Hoffmann and Konieczny.

A. PLANS

1. General. The area of activity and chief interest of the Unternehmen MAMMUT was the KURDISH region (North IRAK – West PERSIA). But MÜLLER, leader of the party, visualized an extension of activities given favourable cicrumstances and the right people – including the whole IRAQ, West PERSIA, South East TURKEY, in case that country entered the war on the side of the ALLIES and possibly SYRIA.
2. Purpose

   a. Espionage.

   (i) To obtain information with the help of an organization – either already existing (RAMZI's secret society – HEWA[356]) or still to be founded. For the founding of a society RAMZI was to recruit personnel from reliable student friends.

   (ii) To send certain people to places of interest for espionage.

   (iii) To make enquiries from native residents or travelling persons.

   <…>

   (iv) Type of information required:

   Movement of troops

   Transport of war materiel

   Location of camps

   Details about production, oil pipe lines, construction of roads, railways, aerodromes etc.

   b. Tying up of ALLIED Forces

   Through disturbances at various point situated as far as possible away from each other, and through inciting various tribes to active rebellion.

[356] The HEWA was a Kurdish party founded in 1939 by students at Baghdad University with the aim of advancing the Kurdish struggle for freedom. It also had a military wing, which included officers from the Iraqi army. The party was also involved in Mustafa Barzani's uprising in 1943, which led to the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in northern Persia (Komala Party). Wing disputes ultimately led to the party's dissolution in 1944. Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Lanham MD, 2nd edition, 2011, p. 260f. Ramzi did not play a leading role here.

c. Sabotage, disruption of military traffic and destruction of military objectives
(i) Lines of communication. Roads, railways, bridges.
(ii) Transport. Rolling stock and M.T. <Motor Transport>
(iii) Means of communication. W/T <Wireless Transmission>, telegraph and telephone, cables etc.
(iv) Industrial and oil sabotage. Minor sabotage in depots ammunition and supply dumps.

When the plan of the MAMMUT party was first proposed by TIGER[357] in November 42 the main objective– owing to the prevalent war situation – was to guard oil fields and protect other points of vital importance against possible destruction by ALLIED forces as a GERMAN penetration into IRAQ seemed possible.
In January 43, after a discussion with Major KUEBART of the German Generalstab Fremde Heere/Ost[358], Fremde Heere/West, Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt and Luftwaffenführungsstab, espionage became the main objective, with the other following in the sequence as outlined in detail above.

3. Point of Landing. 70 – 80 kilometres west of the largest bend in the River LITTLE ZAB. Originally the point of landing was intended between SAUOH KULAB and SAQQIZ[359], but when RAMZI was added to the expeditionary group the change to LITTLE ZAB was effected, as he preferred to go into surroundings more familiar to him.
4. Communications
(a) By W/T (Funkgerät). Two W/T sets have been brought by the four members of the MAMMUT party now in captivity. Two more sets were to be sent – either together with other supplies <…> or brought along by the second party, of which more later. TIGER's brother, Hans, was to receive and pass on W/T messages from the MAMMUT party. At the time of departure it is believed that he was a member of the Funkgruppe (W/T group) attached to an Abwehr Kommando at SIMFEROPOL. It is, however, not out of the question that Hans could be moved to some other place.
(b) By Secret Ink. All members of the party, with the exception of its leader, were trained in the use of secrect ink, both on paper and on cloth. This means of communication was intended chiefly for "internal use", i.e. transmission of messages from one member to another; should W/T communication with GERMANY become impossible, however, recourse might have been had to the use of secret ink.
(c) By courier. A courier – either a member of the party or a third person – would have been used should communication in any other from have become impracticable.
(NOTE. After their false landing and subsequent loss of equipment, this method of communication was to have been adopted, and was only prevented by their capture).
5. Authority for Plans. The plans were proposed by TIGER to the ABW II/OR (= Orient)[360] in November 42. In January 43 he obtained a backing from the Generalstab Fremde Heere/Ost (Major KUEBART). The plans were then sent through the usual channels (EISENBERG – PUTZ –

[357] British code name for Müller.

[358] Conjecture.

[359] Cities in western Persia.

[360] For this and subsequent uses of the term Abwehr II /Or<ient>, see introduction.

LAHOUSEN)[361]; the approval of the Luftwaffenführungsstab should have been – but was not – attached. The complete dossier was forwarded to Admiral CANARIS[362] the chief of the Abwehr who attached his signature and passed it on to the Wehrmachtsführungsstab for final approval. The dossier was returned in February 43 with KEITEL's[363] approval appended.

PREPARATION

6. Selection of Personnel
(a) Qualifications. The qualifications required appear to have been:
Linguistic (PERSIAN, KURDISCH and ARABIC)
Geographical (with a knowledge of KURDISH tribal areas and customs)
Technical (desert navigation, expert knowledge of oil wells and pipelines, medical, agricultural and engineering qualifications).

As far as can be gathered the following sources for selection of personnel appear to be given to ABW<EHR> for such Unternehmen <…>

Dolmetscherlehrabteilung (Interpreters' Training Unit, BERLIN)
Dolmetscherkompanie (Interpreters' Coy.) MEISSEN, HAMBURG, WIEN
Special training camp at Meseritz[364] where many units of Sonderverband BRANDENBURG[365] and allied units were prepared for ventures in AFRICA, M.E., RUSSIA, etc.
Occasionally members of the Sonderverband BRANDENBURG who are not required to the BRANDENBURG expeditions.

<…>

[361] Cf. the remarks in the Introduction.

[362] Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris was head of the Abwehr from 1939 to 1944. He belonged to the resistance circles. He was arrested after the assassination attempt on 20 July 1944 and executed on 9 April 1944 in the Flossenbürg concentration camp.

[363] Wilhelm Keitel was Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces from 1938 to 1945 and was executed for war crimes on 16 October 1946 in Nuremberg.

[364] = „Regenwurmlager Meseritz", see above, in the German files, p. 82.

[365] The training regiment, later Division z.b.V. 800 'Brandenburg', was a special unit of the Abwehr for operations behind the front lines and was to be staffed primarily with members of the relevant ethnic groups in the areas of operation. It was no coincidence that the staff and some of the units were stationed in Brandenburg/Havel, where the Abwehr's sabotage school (Quenzgut) was also located. Another location was the town of Baden near Vienna, which also had an airfield. Norbert Müller et al. (eds.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, pp. 56–58 with doc. no. 193 and Hans Bentzien, Division Brandenburg, Die Rangers von Admiral Canaris, Berlin, 2nd edition, 2004. See also introduction, pp. 59, 166 and 172.

7. Allocation of Duties and Splitting up into Groups

(a) Groups

Group 1

Leader	Gottfried Johannes MÜLLER
1st member	Fritz HOFFMANN (deputy leader, PERSIAN linguist)
2nd member	Georg KONIECZNI (medical advisor and PERSIAN linguist)
3rd member	RAMZI Rashid (a KURD; KURDISH, ARABIC and TURKISH linguist. Contact man).

The 1st group left without sabotage material and was to investigate possibilities; if circumstances had been favourable and the 1st group has been able to establish itself MÜLLER would have called for the 2nd group. OEHLER stated to MÜLLER in BERLIN that he would leave for IRAQ with the 2nd group failing receipt of a contradicting message from MÜLLER.

Group II

Leader	Dr. Karl Heinz OEHLER (Desert navigator)
1st member	Karl SCHMIDT (Little SCHMID) (Dentist, medical adviser, oil expert).
2nd member	Herbert SCHMIDT (Tall SCHMIDT) (PERSIAN linguist)
3rd member	Rudolf KELEITA (ARABIC linguist)
4th member	Probably a man named ALOISI[366], a KURD.

The other members, one a TURKISH linguist and the other an oil specialist (MAYER or SCHMELTZLE) were asked for, but could not be obtained.

The task of the 2nd group was to bring further equipment, W/T sets, sabotage material, further presents and all other necessities for the party.

Group III

A third group was envisaged should the other two groups have progressed satfactorily, and an extension of activities be possible. It would have been composed of the following members -

1. A doctor, specialist in tropical disease.
2. A woman gynaecologis (MÜLLER had thought, for this post, of one of his paramours, Maria EFFINGER):
3. A civil engineer (Specialist for canalization, bridging, etc. Probably Lt. MÜHLMANN, of

[366] Probably just a temporary code name for a Kurd who had not yet been recruited. Also, it is possible that the individual referred to as ALOISI was heard by the British investigator from Müller and recorded incorrectly. Maybe this person was an Arab affiliated with Rashid ʿAlī al-Gaylānī, bearing the name al-Ālūsī, derived from the town of al-Ālūs near Baghdad. Moreover, there exists a long-established and distinguished scholarly family that carries this surname. Maybe the name al-Ālūsī was unknowingly linked to Ramzi, insofar as the Iraqi consul in Turkey—who bore this surname—intervened on his behalf to secure a Turkish visa for Ramzi in 1942.

Sabotage School at QUENZ[367]).
4. A geologist
5. An agricultural expert
6. Other specialists as required

The chief purpose of the 3rd group was less the material and physical support of the other groups than GERMAN propgaganda work, with a long-range policy, by means of medical and other scientific work to a newly created independent nation, the KURDS.

IV. Members not in any of above groups
Hans MÜLLER, TIGER's brother, was to be W/T operator. <…>
Dr. MESSOW was to be the liaison officer between the MAMMUT Party and the ABW.

(b) TIGER's written instructions for later parties

Shortly before his departure, TIGER left the following instructions with Dr. MESSOW.

(i) During the first fortnight no messages from the 1st group need be expected;
(ii) Should no messages have arrived from the first group during the following six weeks, further supplies and W/T sets were to have been dropped at the place which had been ultimately chosen as landing point for the first group;
(iii) Should no messges have arrived for a further four weeks a <…, Zeile fehlt im Dokument>
(iv) Should no messages have arrived for a total period of 6 months, the Unternehmen was to have been dissolved and the remaining members employed by the ABW organization, possibly for other expeditions, or within ABW commandos, in order not to waste their special qualifications.

8. Training
   This comprised instruction in: Language and tribal customs (Professor[368] HADANK)
   W/T signals, etc, and ciphering (At BODENTAL, some members at KRUMME LANKE[369])
   General sabotage and sabotage of oil wells (At QUENZ, some members at NIENHAGEN[370])
   Map reading, shooting by stars and locating by sextant
   General physical and military training;
   including one practice parachute jump (WIENER NEUSTADT)
9. Equipment
   <…>

[367] The Abwehr sabotage school was located in Quenzgut in Brandenburg/Havel. The buildings still stand today. See pictures on p. 127f.

[368] Hadank was not habilitated (Habilitation: special dissertation, required to become professor in Germany).

[369] The Krumme Lanke is a lake in the Berlin district of Steglitz-Zehlendort, located on the edge of the Grunewald forest.

[370] See p. 157.

(f) Code Names
Names of animals for W/T communications

MÜLLER = PANTHER
MESSOW = MESSNER (Not an animal name)
MÜLLER Hans = SEEHUND
HOFFMANN = MAKI
KONIECZNI = UHU
RAMZI = BÄR

KURDISH names for internal use after arrival

MÜLLER = MOHAMMED AMIN
HOFFMANN = AULA
KONIECZNI = MUSTAPHA
RAMZI = RASHID

10. Contacts
(a) References given to TIGER – Persons his group was to approach
No. 1 Sheikh MAHMUT SULEIMAIYA. An acquaintance of TIGER from the time when he was in IRAQ (1936).
No. 2 Sheikh LATIF. Son of sheikh MAHMUT
No. 3 Sheikh Hadji Agha BASSAR. An acquaintance of TIGER from the time when he was in IRAQ (1936).
No. 4 A sheikh in a small village near SULEINAMIYA. Sheikh's name unknown.
Letters of introduction to Nos. 1 and 4 should have been procured for TIGER by Dr. CASKEL[371], but TIGER never received these letters.
No. 5 Rafihr HELMI[372] in SULEIMANIYA. Acquaintance of RAMZI's (Head of "HEWA", Secret Society, in SULEIMANIYA)
No. 6 A captain in the IRAQI Army, a relative of RAMZI's. Name not established
No. 7 Burshit Nur EDIN. A cousin of RAMZI's then in BENI SIHLAWA, now in KIRKUK.
Student friends of RAMZI'
No. 8 Amin HAIDARI, KIRKUK
No. 9 Fattah JABAR, ERBIL
No. 10 Ali SAHIB, BEYROUTH
No. 11 Hadr HAFAF, BEYROUTH
No. 12 Nureddin YUSSUF, BEYROUTH
(NOTE. As far as relatives and acquaintances of RAMZI are concerned, the only source for the name is RAMZI).
No. 13 A relative of KELAITA's who spoke KURDISH and lived in N.E. SYRIA. Adress was to be

[371] The spelling of Caskel in the English documents is 'Cascel'. This has been changed to the German spelling.

[372] Rafiq Hilmi (1898–1960), born in Kirkuk, was a Kurdish historian. In the HEWA party, he took a pro-British stance. From 1943 onwards, he served the Iraqi state in various administrative functions.

established by KELAITA's brother in BEYROUTH[373] and to be passed to the 1st group by W/T from ABW.
No. 14 Dr. KAMURAN in BEYROUTH[374] (TIGER has been warned of him by <…, Zeile nicht mehr im Dokument enthalten>
No. 15 Mohammed KHAN, SAQQIZ, Related to MUKRI, a KURD who lived in GERMANY. Mohammed KHAN's attitude as regards to the GERMANS was not known, however.

(b) Known for their pro-KURDISH sentiments were the following:
No. 16 Shakir FATIAL, SULEIMANIYA
No. 17 Sheikh JELAL; SAID NURI
(TIGER never contacted these two)

(c) Not be to contacted were the following:
No. 18 RAUBITSCHEK and family, BAGHDAD[375]. TIGER maintained connection with this family from 1936 – 1938
No. 19 FEINER, KIRKUK. TIGER never contacted him.

11. Method of transportation
By A/C and parachutes applied by the STAFFEL GARTENFELD.[376]

[373] Rudolf von Kelaita was involved because of his knowledge of Arabic. The Kelaitas were and still are to be found in Lebanon. After the war, a Rudolf von Kelaita was an electrical engineer and leader of a Christian community. A Francis Kelaita, who was born in Kirkuk in 1939 (father: Ambrosius Kelaita, mother: Almas, née Mansur), presented a dissertation on the economic significance of the mineral oil industry for industrialisation in Iraq (Bonn) in 1978. The Kelaitas also acted as buyers and researchers of Christian sources (Assyrians, Nestorians). See, for example, R.W. de Kelaita, On the road to Niniveh: A brief history of Assyrian Nationalism, Journal of the Assyrian Academic Society, 8.1994, pp. 6–30. See also J. Kelaita, Book of the Pearl, Mosul 1924. Apparently, the Kelaitas were an Assyrian sub-tribe that originally settled in the Hakkari province of Turkey, which lies on the border with Persia towards Lake Urmia (Qellaita in the village of Marbiso). Shabo Talay, Neo-Aramaic Texts in the Dialects of the Khabur Assyrians in Northeast Syria, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 413–415, p. 427 et seq. See also Julius Assfalg, Syrische Handschriften, Wiesbaden 1963, pp. 35–37 et seq. It could be that the tribal name was used as a surname and family name after the expulsion and persecution. The exact circumstances and any further connections to the Wehrmacht still need to be researched.

[374] Kamuran Ali Bedirchan (1895–1978) was a Kurdish politician and writer who was also a member of the Koybhun Society. He was a staunch opponent of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and spent time in Germany in the 1930s, where he met Karl Hadank, among others. See p. 13f. and pp. 21 - 23. After the war, he worked on behalf of the Barzanis and established contact between the Kurds and Israel. For the reasons for his unreliability for the German side, see below p. 136 and 141.

[375] Dr. Erich Raubitschek and his relatives were Jews and were persecuted by the National Socialist regime. Files on this can be found in: BArch, R 87/506 (Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property).

[376] The Gartenfeld Squadron (2./Versuchsverband Ob.d.L, from 1944 part of Kampfgeschwader 200) was a special unit of the Luftwaffe stationed in Rangsdorf near Berlin for long-range missions, dropping agents and sabotage teams, named after its commanding officer, Karl-Edmund Gartenfeld (1899–1955). Gartenfeld was a Knight's Cross recipient. Geoffrey J. Thomas and Barry Ketley, KG 200, The German Air Force's most secret unit of World War II, Mechanicsburg PA., 2003, p. 71f.

EXECUTION

12. Journey: From BERLIN by CONDOR A/C via SIMFEROPOL on 15, 16, 17 June, 1943. MESSOW and Hans MÜLLER remained at SIMPEROPOL. MESSOW was to return to BERLIN.
13. Arrival. The first group made a false landing roughly 200 kilometres west of their chosen landing point.
14. New plans.
    (a) After momentary reaction and thoughts of flight the party decided to make for the mountains in order conceal themselves and await developments.
    (b) TIGER was going to send KONIECZNI to TURKEY to find out the true situation as conflicting rumours of the TURKO-GERMAN war had been heard by the group. He was also to inform the ABW<EHR> of their plight and to prevent ABW from transmitting W/T messages to TIGER's group, as they would have probably been intercepted by the BRITISH after their discovery of the W/T set and traffic plan. The ABW was to have replaced the lost equipment and the group would have endeavoured to work according to plan.
15. Capture
    The three GERMANS were captured on 17 Juni, 1943[377]. RAMZI was captured on 18 Juni 43[378]. All member of the party were wearing KURDISH clothes at the time of their capture.

<…>

Edmund Tilley, Major

For Comd. CSDIC, GHQ, M.E.[379]

"Z" Section

C.S.D.I.C.

G.H.Q.

M.E.

Dated: 10th September, 1943

<…>

[377] The arrest took place on 29 June 1943, according to the report by the C.I.C.I. (4 July 1943, see above).

[378] Ramzi was then arrested on 30 June 1943.

[379] CSDIC = Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre. This was a special facility of the British Army and intelligence services for questioning and interrogating prisoners of war, deserters, etc. from the opposing side. GHQ M.E. = General Headquarters, Middle East, British High Command for the Middle East.

TNA, KV 2 / 1738

THE MAMMUT EXPEDITION

SABOTAGE CONSIDERATIONS

<handwritten comments in the document are not included>

GENERAL

The MAMMUT Expedition, named after an Iraqi, Sheikh MAHMUD, was an Abw<ehr> II undertaking in which four parachutists were dropped on 17.6.43 near Mosul, Iraq. The party consisted of three Germans, 'Major' Gottfried Johannes MÜLLER, Lieutenant George KONIECZNY, Lieutenant Friedirch Wilhelm HOFFMANN, and an Iraqi, Nafi Rashid RAMZI. Their mission was to commit espionage, to incite the Kurdish tribes to active rebellion and to arrange for the reception in August, 1943, of a second party MAMMUT II, who would bring sabotage equipment if conditions were favourable. Through a mistake of the part of the pilot of the aircraft the party dropped about 200 km away from the intended point and were unable to find part of their equipment, which included food, medicine, small arms, maps, presents for the natives, two W/T transmitters and a locating instrument for aircraft. This mistake made it necessary for the party to abandon their original mission and possibly as a result of this, they were captured twelve days later east of Erbil.

LIFE HISTORIES

Gottfried Johannes MÜLLER, <nickname> PANTHER.[380] MÜLLER, organiser and leader of the party, was a German national born on the 10th April, 1914 in Gschwend, Wutemberg[381] <sic!>, where his father was a small farmer. On leaving school in 1926 he became an apprentice in a small shop at Gschwend. Until he was called up for military service in October, 1936, he worked in various businesses, rising successively from store manager to accountant, correspondent to Salesman, and finally to business manager. In 1932 he joined the S.A. and become a member of the Nazi Party. Between October, 1936 and November, 1938 MÜLLER served his term of compulsory military service and on completion, settled in Vienna. After short periods of employment with two firms, he became a commercial traveler for Braun Brothers.

During these years, MÜLLER travelled both on behalf of his firms and on his own account, visiting Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and Syria, in addition to many European countries. In June, 1940, owing to the decline of trade activities in Europe, MÜLLER's prospects as a commercial traveler deteriorated. He there applied for his call-up papers. On the 5th June, 1940, he joined the 4th M.G. Coy./Inf. Ers. Regt. 134 near Vienna and shortly afterwards was sent to France. In France his Compay was stationed at Cambrai, Poitiers and finally withdrawn to Zittau in German. At the beginning of March, 1941, MÜLLER

[380] Also (probably later) „Tiger"

[381] It should read "Württemberg".

was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant, the rank he still holds. His use of the rank 'Major' was assumed for the expedition and appears in his faked pay-book.

Lieut. George KONIECZNY, <nickname> UHU. KONIECZNY, Persian interpreter and lector to the party, was born in Berlin on 24.12.18. His father was a civil servant, a naturalized German of Polish origin. KONIECZNY was a professional glass painter, an amateur portrait painter and interior decorator, and has always taken a great interest in snakes. After having school in august, 1929 he was apprenticed as a draughtsman at Vereinigte Werkstätten für Mosaik und Glasmalerei, Berlin. In august, 1934 KONIECZNY left this firm and spent the next year Persia living in a small village in Asebadjan <sic!>. He returned to Berlin in the Autumn of 1936. He had no paid employment but "studied the history of Art and Islam" and became associated with the many Orientals in Berlin. At the beginning of 1935 KONIECZNY volunteered for the Army in order to escape recruitment by the S.A. and in the Autumn of 1936 was called up to Cavalry Regiment No. 4. On his release from the Army in the Autumn of 1937 he returned to the Vereinigte Werkstaetten für Mosaik und Glasmalerei <Berlin> until the Autumn of 1939, when he again went to Persia. While in Persia he was for part of the time out of work and living on his Persian friends, and partly employed in a glass factory at Therean, experimenting with Persian cutting-stones. KONIECZNY, due to his knowledge of snakes, was asked by the German Serum Institute to collect Persian snakes so that they could fulfill an order from the Persian Army to produce snake serum for Persia. In April, 1940 his permit in Persia expired, but in spite of attempts to get this renewed, he was force to return to Germany. After a few months in Vereinigte Werkstaetten für Mosaik he was called up for the Army, and in June, 1941 sent to the Russian front, where he was wounded. After return to duty in September, 1941, he was posted to various units, finally being transferred in May, 1942 to the Dolmetscherlehrabteilung (Interpreters' Training Unit) on account of his knowledge of Persian. He knew HOFFMANN as they were the only two Persian students in the Company.

Friedrich Wilhelm HOFFMANN, <nickname> MAKI. HOFFMANN, deputy leader and Persian interpreter, was born on 8.6.12 in Güdingen near Saarbrücken. On leaving school at the age of sixteen, he joined BRAUN-BOWERY, an electrical engineering firm near Saarbrücken, where he specialised in machine tools for more than two years. He then went to the Polytechnical Institute in Saarbrücken for three years and obtained an engineering diplom. Until 1935, when he was called up for military service, HOFFMANN was technical inspector at BRAUN-BOWERY and was there Group-Lear in the Hitler Youth. On completing his military service in 1937 he went to Afghanistan as a teacher in a technical school. In December, 1941, as a member of the Technical Tearchers' Association, he was called up by the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions and returned to Germany. HOFFMANN was employed by this Ministry from January, 1942, until the end of May, 1942, during which time he paid one visit to the Eastern Front to inspect mechanical repair workshops. At the end of May, he was transferred to the 2nd Company of the Dolmetscherlehrabteilung. Later, he was changed to the 1st Company which consisted of fully-trained soldiers, and was allotted to the Persian section. In September, 1942, he was transferred to the 3rd Company, and in October was sent to the Gebirgsbattalion 54 in Mittenwald, Upper Bavaria (54th Mountain Pioneer Battalion). He was preparing to go the front in the Caucasus, when he received orders to return to the 3rd Company Dolmetscherlehrabteilung, Berlin.

Nafi Rashid RAMZI, <nickname> BÄR. RAMZI, who was to act as contact man and interpreter in Kurdish, Arabic and Turkish, was born in 1917. He is an Erbili of good family. He has already come to notice as a Kurdish national whose behaviour in Turkey was suspicious.

RECRUITMENT

MÜLLER. MÜLLER was the only member of the party who had previously worked for the Abwehr. He was first recruited in July, 1941, by Josef HAGLEITNER of AST[382] Vienna. At that time HAGLEITNER was proposing to organize an expedition to Eastern Turkey or Kurdistan, and was responsible for obtaining the services of MÜLLER with whom he had previously travelled in these countries. MÜLLER was seconded from his Unit and trained in W/T and secret ink in Vienna. After visiting Budapest, Sofia and Paris on behalf of the Abwehr, MÜLLER, using the cover name BARTOS, accompanied HAGLEITNER to Istanbul, the Kurdistan project having been abandoned. By February, 1942, the Turkish scheme had failed and MÜLLER was recalled from Istanbul; at the end of April he returned to his Unit. During the successful German campaign in the summer of 1942, it seemed possible that the German armies would break through the Caucasus and penetrate into Iraq and Iran. MÜLLER thought that this was an opportune moment to consider a mission to Kurdistan. He outlined a scheme in which he and one or two others would contact his former Kurdish friend Sheikh MAHMUD and induce him to help in seizing and protecting the oilfields in Kirkuk from allied destruction (a familiar Abw. II function), holding them until the arrival of airborn German troops. In October, 1942 this scheme was submitted to Lt.-Colonel PUTZ, head of Abw. II /O.R. and as a result, MÜLLER was transferred to the Sonderverband Brandenburg[383], from where he was seconded to Abw. II/O.R. to organize the MAMMUT expedition.

KONIECZNY. About the middle of March, 1943, KONIECZNY was ordered to report on Oblt. ZYRIACKS (?)[384] in the OKW building in Tirpitzufer. ZYRIACKS sent KONIECZNY direct to Sonderführer WAGNER on the third floor of the same building, who took full particulars of his antecedents and previous history, particularly in regard to his knowledge of Persia. He was given a table in the Adjoining office and told to read through a German translation of a British report on Persia. After several days, KONIECZNY was told that he was destined to take part in a mission to Persia. In May, 1943, that is shortly before the party left, KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN were registered with Sonderverband Brandenburg[385], being issued with faked pay-bookds at the General Feldzeugmeisterkaserne Brandenburg.

[382] = Abwehrstelle (intellegence bureau). These were regional Abwehr centres, mainly in the Reich and in occupied countries (where they were also called 'Abwehraußenstellen' or 'Abwehr external branch offices').

[383] See FN 108 and p. 115.

[384] First Lieutenant Zieriack belonged to the staff group of Abwehr II.

[385] = Sonderverband / Division Brandenburg.

HOFFMANN. HOFFMANN, having been recalled to Berlin at the beginning of December, 1942, was ordered on the 20th January, 1943 to report to Müller at the OKW Tirpitzufer. After a discussion with MÜLLER, he was told that his name was under consideration for an operation in the Middle East and in February permanently transferred from his Unit and attached to MÜLLER, being nominally a member of the Sonderverband Brandenburg.

RAMZI. In November, 1942, RAMZI went from Iraq to Istanbul to complete his studies. On arrival he discovered that the standard he had reached at the American University Beirut was not sufficient to admit him to Robert College Istanbul. This news reached an Iraqi in Istanbul, who was a German agent and whose job was to contact all Iraqis arriving in Istanbul. This agent suggested to RAMZI that he should continue his studies in a German college, and promised to fix the matter up with the German Consul.

RAMZI was taken to see the German consul who provided him with a Bulgarian visa and a letter of introduction to an Abwehr official in Sofia. Buring January, February and March, 1943, MÜLLER had been making vain efforts to find a suitable Kurd, without whom the expedition would have been impossible. As soon as the news of RAMZI's desire to go to Germany reached Abw. II Berlin, orders were sent that he must be despatched at once and not kept by AST-Istanbul for recruitment of further agents, as they wished. RAMZI had no idea why he had been sent to Germany and when first approached would have nothing to do with the undertaking. Later he was persuaded to accompany the party and help in the formation of a free Kurdistan.

TRAINING

As the members of the MAMMUT undertaking joined the Abwehr at different times, their traning differed in length and thoroughness. Except for RAMZI, serious training for the expedition started on about 1st March, 1943, and followed roughly the programme given below:

1st – 15th March, 1943: W/T course at Signals Company of z.b.V. 800 at Krummelanke <sic!>

16th – 27th March, 1943: Instruction in languages and W/T at 13/15 Matthäikirchplatz, Berlin

22nd – 27th March, 1943: Course in diagnosis and treatment of tropical diseseas at the Academy of Medicine, Berlin.

28th March – 3rd April, 1943: Sabotage course at Quenz.

6th – 15th April, 1943: Course in W/T, language and parachute technique at Bodental, Unterbergen.

17th April, 1943: Practice parachute jumps at Wiener Neustadt.

22nd April – 7th May, 1943: Lectures on sabotage and Kurdistan, W/T practice and mountaineering at Bodental.

15th May, 1943: One day's sabotage training at Quenz.

17th May, 1943: Visit to Gartenfeld Staffel, Berlin Rangsdorf.

11th Juni, 1943: Generalstab Fremde Heere / West at Zossen for instruction in military espionage.

15th Juni, 1943: Left[386] Rangsdorf by plane for Simferopol.

During the time the members of the MAMMUT party were staying in Berlin, they were billeted at 59 Augsburgstrasse[387], known as the "BUNKER". This flat has been known as an accommodation address for Abw. II agents since January, 1940.

The training for the undertaking, which was spread over a period of about three months, comprised the following subjects, in addition to sabotage training:

Geography, economics, communications, ethnology, dialects and the tribal customs of Kurdistan.

W/T signals and ciphering.

Map reading.

General physical and military training, including one parachute jump.

<…> – specialized sabotage training at Quenz.

Shooting with German and English weapons.

Lectures on Kurdistan were given by Dr. HADANK, Dr. GASCHL AND BY MÜLLER who had visited the country in 1936. In addition the group underwent a course on tropical diseases at the Tropeninstitut der Militärärztlichen Akademie (Tropical Institute of the Military Medical Academy).

SABOTAG TRAINING

Apart from that of MÜLLER, the sabotage training was short and not extensive. MÜLLER did a twelve days' training course from 10.12.42 to 22.12.42 and KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN a six days' course from 28.3.43 to 3.4.43, both at the Sabotage School, Quenz. Several lectures on targets and Kleinsabotage (petty sabotage) were also given to the MAMMUT party at Bodental, between 22.4.43 and 7.5.43. RAMZI only attended a day's sabotage demonstration at Quenz. All these courses, even MÜLLER's were shorter than the normal Quenz course which usually lasts three weeks. HOFFMANN was the only member of the party whose previous training was of assistance to him as a saboteuer, being an engineer who had specialized in machine tools; in <…, corrupted> he had attended a demolition course for sappers and in November, 1942 took part in demolition work with the Gebirgsbattalion 54.

[386] Conjecture.

[387] This should probably read 'Augsburger Straße'.

HOFFMANN and KONIECZNY, together with a number of individuals who were destined to become members of MAMMUT II, attend a week's sabotage course at Quenz at the end of March, 1943. Here the party, in addition to sabotage received language lessons from Dr. HADANK; lectures on Iraq from Dr. MESSOW; shooting practice with German and English weapons; and W/T practice. <…> This course, which was shorter than the normal one, quitted any instruction in the manufacture of explosives, incendiary mixtures or home-made delays. MÜLLER, in addition to the lectures and practical instruction as given to the MAMMUT party, received ten or twelve hours laboratory instruction in home-made equipment. This was considered as a mere introduction to the subject, as it was doubted whether the party would be able to obtain the chemicals and other equipment necessary for making home-made devices.

LECTURES

The MAMMUT party received lectures on explosives and incendiary equipment from Dr. WAHL, at which German and British made sabotage equipment was handed round for inspection. MÜLLER draw several copies of an English sabotage instruction book containing photographs and diagrams of British sabotage material, which was used both for training agents and in the manufacture of equipment.*) He also believed that he saw one copy translated into German. At Tegel Laboratory[388], MÜLLER saw no less than twenty parachute boxes full of British sabotage equipment. Members of Abw. II/T, such as MARGUERRE and WAHL[389], said that one of the reasons for the extensive use of English sabotage equipment was the lack of material and man-power in Germany, which made it impossible to produce anything of equal quality. Practically the only material available was there of English origin.

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*) This cannot be identified by S.O.E.[390]

Following pages: Buildings of the former Sabotage School, Quenzsee, Brandenburg/Havel, taken 2015 (© Bernd Lemke)

[388] Abwehr II (sabotage and subversion) had a special, top-secret laboratory in Berlin-Tegel for processing and storing explosives and other materials and chemical substances. See also a section in TNA KV 2 / 1735, 13th Interim Report on Müller ("TIGER"), AGT, 22 August 1943, which is not reproduced here. The laboratory belonged to the Abwehr II / T<echnik> sub-department. See also the respective remarks in the Introduction.

[389] Both referred to in the files of Abwehr II. Norbert Müller u.a. (Hrsg.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, S. 493f. Both documented in the files of Abwehr II. Norbert Müller et al. (eds.), Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Koblenz 2007, p. 493f.

[390] = Special Operations Executive, British special unit for subversion and sabotage.

For legal reasons original historical pictures cannot be reprinted here. See link:

https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php?thread/26136-kampf-und-abwehrschule-quenzsee/

Lectures were also given by MESSOW on roads and bridges in Iraq and on sabotage to specific targets, together with a lantern lecture on sabotaging bridges by MÜHLMANN[391]. This was illustrated by pictures of French and Czech sabotage. Some of the lectures by MESSOW and MÜHLMANN were given at Bodental in May, 1943, and not a Quenz.

MÜLLER, who attended a fuller training course, received lectures from the following people:

Major Doktor KÜNE[392] on:

How to build up a secret organization and how to behave during interrogation in case of capture. KÜNE said that good saboteurs must have physical strength and manual dexterity. Trained locksmiths, technicians, professional burglars and specialist qualified to deal with any specific objective for sabotage, were recommended. Agents were to be given thorough training in ju-jitsu according to instructions based on Russian guerilla methods.

How to approach sabotage targets.

"Kleinsabotage", that is sabotage without the use of explosive or incendiary materials. This lecture included an account of Russian partisan activities and was mainly for the benefit of a party of saboteurs destined for Russia. The gist of these lectures was repeated to member of the MAMMUT party by MÜLLER.

Hauptmann-Doktor WAHL on sabotage and explosive or incendiary materials. This included lectures on British and German sabotage equipment as given to KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN, and in addition, lectures on the following subjects:

Electrical delay mechanism

Detonating and safety fuse.

Detonators, detonating, caps and igniters.

<…>

TARGETS

MÜLLER said that little detailed instruction has been given about vital targets for sabotage in the Middle East. The Trans-Iranian railway and the Persian and Iraqi oil fields were obvious targets, but even in this case there seems to have been no detailed examination of the vulnerable points and it had been left to the agents themselves to choose targets.

The objective of the party as conceived in October, 1942, was to guard oil fields and protect other points of vital importance against possible destruction by Allied forces during the threat of German penetration into Iraq. At this time, it seemed possible that the Germans might cross the Causcasus and invade Persia and Iraq. This vital area, between the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq and Persia, was

[391] Also a member of Abwehr II/T.

[392] For Küne, see below p. 135.

inhabited by Kurdish tribes and the object of MAMMUT I was to obtain the collaboration of these tribes, suborning them with the promise of a free Kurdistan. In January, 1943, due to the changed war situation, the plan of protecting the oil fields was abandoned and the main objectives became sabotage to communications systems, factorica and oil installations. Finally, just before the departure of the party, the sabotage mission was entirely dropped and no sabotage equipment was taken. Before they left, it had been decided that their sabotage equipment should come either with the second part of the undertaking MAMMUT II, or be sent separately by aircraft. The objects of the undertaking as finally conceived were:

Espionage

Tying up all Allied forces by creating disturbances at various points, including sabotage and incitement of the tribes to active rebellion. Although the area of activity of the MAMMUT undertaking was the Kurdistan region, it was visualized that the party would extend their activities, given favourable circumstances, to the whole of Iraq, West Persia, South East Turkey, if this country should enter the war, and possibly Syria. The following targets were specially mentioned.

Roads	W/T stations
Railways	Telegraph, telephone and electric cables
Bridges	
Locomotives	Industrial installations
Rolling Stock	Oil Installations
Mechanised transport	Military Depots
Aircraft	Ammunition Dumps

“INSURGIERUNG” <sic!> FUNCTIONS

The chief object of the MAMMUT I expedition was Insurgierung (Fifth Column work amongst the Kurdish tribes). They were to approach Kurdish chiefs on the Iraqi-Persian frontier and to offer German protection for a free Kurdistan and German assistance in the development of social servides. They were to incite the Kurds to regbel against the Allies and the Turks, if this country should enter the war against Turkey. They hoped in this way to cause disturbances and if possible, active rebellion, in order to tie down Allied troops in the area; and also to suborn individuals to commit sabotage and espionage.

The subversive and propaganda work on behalf of a free Kurdistan was to be carried a step further by the activities of a third group, MAMMUT III, which would have been composed of a doctor, a specialist in tropical diseases, a woman gynaecologist, a civil engineer, a geologist and an agricultural expert. They were to encourage social servides amongst Kurds.

In order to further the Insurgierung work, contact was to have been made by MÜLLER with certain Kurdish Sheikhs and other persons believed to be pro-Nazi in sympathy. Sums of money and presents, including gold cigarette cases, gold fountain pens and propelling pencils, wrist-watches and small arms, were taken for distribution amongst friendly Kurds.

ACTION IN THE MIDEAST

If the operation had gone according to plan, the party were to have gone into hiding in the mountains while they decided on their next moves. No orders were given to announce impending sabotage acts to Berlin by W/T, but successes were to be reported.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communication with Germany was to be carried out by means of the two W/T sets brought with the party. Hans MÜLLER, the brother of Gottfried Johannes MÜLLER, was to act as an intermediary at Simferopol, to pass on the MAMMUT messages to Berlin. For internal use between the members of the party, secret ink was to be used. If W/T communication failed, a courier, either a member of the party or a third person recruited in the country, would have been sent to Istanbul.

JOUREY TO MIDEAST

On the 15th June, 1943, the members of MAMMUT I, accompanied by Hans MÜLLER and Dr. MESSOW, left Rangsdorf aerodrome Berlin, arriving at Simferopol on the same night. Here they left behind Hans MÜLLER, who was to be responsible for maintaining W/T communication with the party and Dr. MESSOW, who was to act as liaison between the MAMMUT party and Abw. II in Berlin. The following evening the four members of the MAMMUT party left Simferopol by plane belonging to Staffel Gartenfeld, previously known as being responsible for the transport of Abwehr and S<icherheits> D<Dienst>[393] agents. When the pilot thought the plane was over the right spot, the boxes of equipment were thrown out, followed by the four parachustists. The intended point of landing was 70 – 80 kilometres west of the largest bend in the river Little Zab. This was chosen as the area was familiar to RAMZI. Within a short time of landing, the party realized that they had been dropped in the wrong place and were actually about 200 kilometres west of the intended point.

Being unable to find their boxes of food and equipment, and realizing that they had been dropped in the wrong places, they abandoned their original plan. MÜLLER then decided to take the party into the mountains where they should conceal themselves, and send KONIECZNY to Turkey to find out the true situation as conflicting rumours of a Turco-German war had been heard by the group. KONIECZNY was also to inform the Abwehr of what had happened and to prevent the transmission of W/T message to the group, as they would probably have been intercepted by the British who were presumed to have captured the W/T set and traffic plan. The Abwehr was then to have replaced the lost equipment and the group would have endeavoured to work according to work according to the original plan. During

[393] The SD (Sicherheitsdienst) was originally the surveillance and post-service organisation of the NSDAP, which during the Second World War became increasingly active in the field of foreign espionage.

their journal towards the mountain, however, the group made themselves conspicuous and were captured on 29.6.43.

ABWEHR PERSONNEL CONNECTED WITH THE UNDERTAKING

ADMIRAL CANARIS – CHIEF OF THE ABWEHR. Such expeditions as MAMMUT had to have the authorization of the Wehrmachtsführungsstab. In this case, the plans, after being approved by EISENBERG of Abwehr II / OR, received the recommendation of Generalstab Fremde Heere/Ost and were then passed through PUTZ and von LAHOUSEN , at that time head of Abw. II, to Admiral CANARIS, who signed it and passed it to the Wehrmachtführungsstab for final approval. The plans returned in February, 1943, with von KEITEL's signature apprended.

OBERST VON LAHOUSEN – CHIEF OF ABWEHR II. Address: Tirpitzufer 78/80. Part of Abwehr II evacuated to Zossen in May, 1943. LAHOUSEN was seen twice by MÜLLER, in November, 1942 when he was first introduced to the Abwehr and in June, 1943 when he left for Iraq. LAHOUSEN has now been replaced by von FREITAG LOVRINGHOVEN.

OBERST STOLTZE – SECOND IN COMMAND OF ABWEHR II: STOLTZE is responsible for the planning of expeditions to Russia, and also[394] for administrative work, such as granting leave or authorizing journeys.[395]

OBERLEUTNANT ZYRIACKS (?)[396]. In charge of personal matters concerning OR, attachments and postings. KONIECZNY was ordered to report to ZYRIACKS when he first joind the Abwehr. ZSYRIACKS has been evacuated to Zossen.

ABWEHR II / OR

Address: Tirpitzufer 72-76; 3rd Floor, with certain sections at Zossen.

II/OR is believed by MÜLLER to stand for 'Orient', and was responsible for organising the MAMMUT expedition. When MÜLLER joined the Abwehr, he was given a room in this section at Tirpitufer.

[394] Conjecture.

[395] Colonel Erwin Stolze was Lahousen's deputy in Abwehr II and headed "Group A" (Eastern Territories and Russia) in 1943. Stolze was arrested by the Russians in May 1945, court-martialled and executed in 1952. Andreas Weigelt, Case Group Overview and Index, in: Andreas Weigelt et al. (eds.), Death Sentences of Soviet Military Tribunals against Germans (1944–1947), A Historical-Biographical Study, Göttingen 2017, pp. 285–287.

[396] See above p. 123.

OBERSTLEUTNANT PUTZ – HEAD OF GRUPPE II / OR. It was to PUTZ that MÜLLER submitted his plans for the MAMMUT undertaking in October, 1942. He arranged for MÜLLER to be attached to OKW Berlin, and was present at Rangsdorf at the time of the departure of the party on 16.5.43.[397]

DOKTOR EISENBERG <nicknames> EISENHAUSER – EISEN – Responsible for ABWEHR II matters in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Palestine.

SONDERFÜHRER SCHUMACHER - Assistant to Dr. EISENBERG. He helped with preparations fort he MAMMUT expedition.

SONDERFÜHRER DOKTOR WAGNER <nickname> DOKTOR WENDEL – Responsible for ABWEHR II work in Iran and Afghanistan. WAGNER is in close contact with Brandenburg Camp at Meseritz and gave MÜLLER advice on Units from which he might draw suitable men for the undertaking. Believed to have left Abwehr II in May, 1943.[398]

[397] On Putz, see *i.a.* p. 5 and p. 157.

[398] For Wagner, see p. 7 and FN 300.

Former Aerodrome Rangsdorf. Source: Wiki Commons 2018, Robert Radebold

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https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flugplatz_Rangsdorf_Vogelschau.jpg?uselang=de#Lizenz

Former Aerodrome Rangsdorf, Tower and Hangars 2012, Source Wiki Commons, Mediaschmied

Licence: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airfield_Rangsdorf_with_Tower.jpg?uselang=de

ABWEHR II/T (TECHNIK)

This department deals with the equipment and training of members of Abwehr expeditions, and has its main office on the ground floor of Matthäikirchplatz 13/15. It also runs the sabotage school at Quenz, and has a laboratory at Tegel where sabotage equipment is made and stored. It owns a clothing and equipment (not sabotage equipment or weapons) store in Kolonnenstrasse which issues equipment for Abwehr II expeditions.

OBERST MARGUERRE HEAD OF II/T

MAJOR-DOKTOR KUENE. Formerly in Abwehr III in Russia, transferred to Abw. II to take over the management of Quenz Sabotage School. In December, 1942, was responsible for MÜLLER's sabotage course and in March, 1943, was replaced by Dr. WAHL.

HAUPTMANN DOKTOR WAHL <nicknames> WELLER – WAGNER. A specialist in explosive and incendiaries, was responsible fort he MAMMUT party's sabotage traning at Quenz in 1943.

LEUTNANT MÜHLMANN <nickname> EUGEN MÜLLER. A specialist in sabotage. Responsible for lectures and sabotage training given tot he MAMMUT party in March, 1943.

OBERSTLEUTNANT BLUMHAUS or BLUMBERG or some similar name. Head of the Tegel Laborartory, and seen once by MÜLLER.

Wilhelm WILLIK. In charge of training material for demonstrations and experiments. Works at Tegel and Quenz.

Interrogation Johannes Gottfried Müller

TNA KV 2/1735

13th INTERIM REPORT ON MÜLLER ("TIGER") AGT[399]

1. PREAMBLE

On being informed that his colleagues had arrived[400] Müller appeared to be somewhat discomfited, and asked for an interview with I<nterrogation> O<fficer> At the very beginning of this interview Müller said that he would like to tell the last truths before interrogation of the other commenced.

2. RAMZI

Müller explained that RAMZI was a member of the KHOYBUN Secret Society and knew Dr. KAMURAN[401] of BEYROUTH intimately, in addition to many other leaders of the Society. RAMZI also knew a man, whose name Müller cannot remember, from SULAIMANYA, a member of the KHOYBUN Society whom he, RAMZI, wanted to contact on arrival in IRAQ.

On being asked why he had not mentioned this man an contact in IRAQ, Müller had no real explanation to offer, but stated that Dr. CASKEL had warned him about Dr. KAMURAN, who was supposed to be either working for the BRITISH or in any case that way inclined. This Dr. KAMURAN appeared to be RAMZI's hero and RAMZI was very anxious for the party to make contact with members of the KHOYBUN Society. From this he was diplomatically dissuaded, but it is probable that the man in SULAMANYA would have been contacted nevertheless. RAMZI further wished to contact a captain in the IRAQI Army, who was some sort of relative of his (RAMZI's).

It appears that RAMZI's main task was to be a middle man between the members of the MAMMUT Party and various KURDISH personalities. RAMZI's whole attitude to the question was one of desire for full collaboration, and his chief aim was the liberation of the KURDISH people[402].

According to Müller, RAMZI had been interested in such ideas for a long time, and these ideas were no doubt inspired during his stay in BEYROUTH by Dr. KAMURAN. RAMZI was approached with a view to founding a new parallel society to the KHOYBUN with similar aims but possibly with more reliable personnel. He was to recruit chiefly student friends, etc. for this purpose. However, as regards this

[399] AGT = Agent. For the sake of readability, the abbreviation AGT is replaced in the text below with the name of the agent, in this case Müller, in small print.

[400] After their arrest, the members of the Mammut company were first taken to Baghdad, where they were probably also interrogated.

[401] See above p. 13f.

[402] Conjecture.

project RAMZI showed a curious reluctance, anyway in the beginning, and would have much preferred to work with the KHOYBUN Society.

When asked what news Müller had received from POLLUX[403] about RAMZI before his arrival, he listed the following:

KURD secondary school education in BAGHDAD.

Able to leave IRAQ through influential relatives.

Member of an illegal organization.

Suitable for MAMMUT party.

From the foregoing it can possibly be assumed that RAMZI went to TURKEY fully prepared to enter into all sorts of schemes, and that the GERMAN approach was by no means the surprise he has so far represented it to be.[404]

3. LECTURE ON WHISPERING PROPAGANDA

During Müller's training period in QUENZ in Dec 42 a lecture was given to a class (consisting of eight members in all by a Lt.Col. of the HEERESGRUPPE/NORD about successful whispering campaings in RUSSIA. The gist of it was that play was made on the inherent RUSSIAN love of mystery and their inborn religious and superstitious foolings. A saint was invented who was supposed to move in circles of the "green" front (RUSSIAN deserters and refugees)[405] <…> Some success and managed to undermine the atheist theories propagated by the BOLSHEVISTS. The lecturer also mentioned that whispering campaigns had had some successes in CZECHO-SLOVAKIA before the GERMAN occupation of that country.

<…>

C.E. Robson, Lieut.

For Comd., C.S.D.I.C., G.H.Q., M.E. 22nd August, 1943

[403] CASTOR and POLLUX were radio and communications stations in the German consulate in Ankara (Castor) and Istanbul (Pollux). TNA KV 2 / 1735, 11th Interim Report on Müller ("Tiger") Agent, Major Edmund Tiller, 20 April 1943, p. 2. According to Müller's statement, the real name of Castor's operator began with "Sch".

[404] This question was of great importance for Ramzi's future fate. Ramzi knew, even more than the other members of the "Mammut" organisation, that his life was at stake. He therefore tried to give the impression that he was only a follower who had been drawn into the whole affair by adverse circumstances.

[405] This is an allusion to the "Green Army" in the revolutionary turmoil of 1917–22. This consisted mainly of armed peasants, but also deserters who had been dispossessed. However, there was no clear political affiliation.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

1st detailled interrogation report on MÜLLER, AGT <Juli – Oktober 1943>

<…>

This particularly guileless fabrication proved a great help in forcing Müller to admit that he was a Lieut<enant>. Only and had been "promoted Major for the purposes of the expedition"; that he had only been give vague information from Dr. MESSOW about his promotion, and that he neither possessed the E.K.I. (Iron Cross, 1st class) nor the Infanterie Sturm Abzeichen (Infantry Assaul badge) as stated in the identity book. His quick "promotion" from Lieut<enant> to Major might have been in order to impress the KURDS by sending out to them an officer of field rank with personal orders from the FÜHRER himself to incite them to a battle for freedom and independence.

Pay:

On being faced with conflicting evidence given by KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN during interrogation, Müller finally admitted that he and his companions, with the execption of RAMZI, had received additional monthly pay.[406] Apparently Müller had seen, at the Paymaster's Office of ABW II/OR, an agreement whereby personnel going on expeditions were to be granted an additional amount of RM 485[407] monthly, payable in GERMANY up to the date of death, capture or any other date to be determined by OKW. The members of expeditions would likewise be entitled to draw a similar amount, at the official rate of exchange, from the foreign currency which had been given to the Expedition. Apart from this, ABW was to take out a life insurance policy for each member, in favour of any person designated by the member himself. (Insurance amoung: RM 40000).

When Müller realised that KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN had spoken of a monthly amount of RM 375,- - (12,50 RM per day), he, Müller, added that he had only seen in the Paymaster's Office the draft of the general order regarding pay and that the amount of RM 435,- might have subsequently been altered to RM 375,- in the final edition.

Apart from the regular pay of a Lieut<enant> and the additional monthly amount as mentioned above, Müller once received the sum of RM 500,- from the KEITEL Funds of needy Officers in order to pay the debts incurred by his trouble in VIENNA[408].

RAMZI was paid at a daily rate of RM 30,- and was offered an amount of RM 30 000 ,- which he reufsed to take but wanted to have donated to poor KURDISH students. As to the daily rate of pay, RAMZI

[406] Müller, who was obviously still in good spirits even after his capture and tried to win over the guards in Baghdad in the adventurous manner of Karl May, initially believed he could succeed with a web of lies. He had probably not reckoned with the rationalised British interrogation methods. He was then confronted with the statements of the other members of the organisation, leaving him with no room for manoeuvre.

[407] Probably a typo. It should read: 435.

[408]. The specific reasons for these problems could not be determined.

decided to pay the residue which he did not spend to the Red Cross, but Müller does not know whether RAMZI actually did do.

Müller had learnt from the paymaster of ABW II/OR that it was not out of question to pay foreign V-men in foreign currency locally, e.g. at the Consulate at TEHERAN. In this case, however, a life insurance would not be taken out.

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The KURDISH V-man Ramzi

Müller heard <… > that he could not start his business without finding a KURD for the expedition. In January 1943, Dr. EISENBERG[409] contacted POLLUX <...> from Ast ISTANBUL to find a suitable KURDISH V-man for his expedition. MÜLLER <..., conjecture: tried himself> to find a suitable KURD. In December 1942/January 1943, he approached Dr. WAGNER[410] and Dr. CASEKL, both of whom specialised in specific languages and tribes, and submitted a report on KURDISTAN to ABW II/OR<IENT>. He instructed MÜLLER to write to Ast ISTANBUL and ASt. PARIS. ASt Paris replied that most of the Kurdish refugees living in Paris were unsuitable for such an expedition due to their advanced age.

<…>

POLLUX did not reply to these letters until March 1943. In the meantime, MÜLLER searched the ABW II/OR files to find informants and contacts. In January 1943, he found a letter from POLLUX to Dr. EISENBERG dated January 1942 concerning an offer from a colonel in the Iraqi police named Achat KHAN. This colonel had recently been interned in TURKEY after leaving IRAQ in the wake of Rashid ALI's[411] revolt. <...> MÜLLER inquired about this man with POLLUX, but learned that contact with him had been broken off because ABW had not responded to POLLUX's letter. <...>

MÜLLER also found a letter addressed to Dr. EISENBERG from POLLUX at ABW II/OR. In this letter, POLLUX informed Dr. EISENBERG about an offer from a KURD named Omar..., from KIRKUK, who wanted to work for the GERMANS. MÜLLER gathered from the letter that Omar worked for Ast ISTANBUL <...> and was therefore not interested in recruiting Omar as an informant for the Mammoth Expedition. However, he asked ASt. Istanbul for a photograph of Omar so that MÜLLER could recognise him in IRAQ if necessary. <...>

(During previous interrogations, MÜLLER had stated that he had decided against Omar after receiving his photograph, which showed an elderly man sitting in bed with a policeman in his room!).

[409] For Eisenberg, see the above remarks in the Introduction.

[410] For Wagner, see p. 7 and FN 300.

[411] Rashid al-Gailani, nationalist Prime Minister of Iraq in 1941 (uprising against the Empire). See also FN 413.

Dr. WAGNER introduced MÜLLER MUKRI[412] and his friend (name unknown) <...> in January 1943. Both men were KURDS and at that time Cernets (officer cadets) in training at the MESERITZ camp. <...> MÜLLER invited MURKI to KITZBÜHEL, where he wanted to persuade him to take part in the operation. MUKRI refused. He was pro-Persian and did not favour the independence of KURDISTAN. He also explained that he had received a letter from SWITZERLAND informing him that his father had sent him money to SWITZERLAND; his father obviously wanted him to study at the technical university there. MUKRI limited himself to giving MÜLLER a letter of recommendation for Mohammed KHAN, SAQQIZ, a relative of his. <...>

At the beginning of March 1943, shortly after MÜLLER had returned from KITZBÜHEL, POLLUX informed EISENBERG that three 'KURDS': ALOISI, KARADI and a third man, whose name MÜLLER had forgotten, had arrived in ISTANBUL. There they had been approached by the ITALIANS and had left ISTANBUL for ROME before POLLUX could recruit them as V-men. Dr. EISENBERG immediately called ASt. ROM and instructed him to approach the three 'KURDS'.

Later, MÜLLER heard that ALOISI had fallen ill.

GAILANI <...> was asked by Dr. EISENBERG for his opinion on these 'KURDS'. GAILANI described KARADI as an IRAQI, not a KURD, and called him a 'bad man, but very suitable for such an expedition.' [413]

A few days later, in March 1943, POLLUX informed EISENBERG that a KURD named RAMZI had arrived in ISTANBUL; apparently he wanted to travel to GERMANY, and POLLUX made contact with him. Dr. EISENBERG immediately instructed POLLUX to send RAMZI to GERMANY, but POLLUX asked ABW to keep the man with him for a few months, as he wanted to recruit new informants with RAMZI's help. The ABW, in turn, ordered that RAMZI be sent immediately to Dr. WOLF <...>, an informant at Ast SOFIA. Around 20 April 43, Dr. WOLF contacted ABW II /OR and MÜLLER by telephone and strongly recommended RAMZI for the task. Dr. WOLF sent RAMZI to VIENNA, where he was contacted by ASt VIENNA. MÜLLER and his group were in BODENTAL at the time. MÜLLER, assuming that Dr. WOLF had already briefed RAMZI on the nature of the work he was to do, instructed ASt WIEN to send him to BODENTAL. RAMZI arrived in BODENTAL on 28 April 1943, accompanied by O/Lieutenant ALTMANN.

HOFFMANN and KONIECZNY spoke with RAMZI in Persian. MÜLLER spoke with RAMZI in English. Shortly after RAMZI's arrival in BODENTAL, HOFFMANN informed MÜLLER that RAMZI had originally only intended to broadcast to the Kurdish people from Berlin. MÜLLER realised that neither POLLUX nor Dr. WOLF could have informed RAMZI of his role. Two interviews were then arranged, attended by MÜLLER, RAMZI, HOFFMANN, KONIECZBY and Dr. MESSOW. MÜLLER informed RAMZI that he had been commissioned by the 'FÜHRER' himself to establish an independent KURDISTAN. He explained that the group RAMZI had just joined would soon leave GERMANY for KURDISTAN to work for the

[412] 'Mukri' is likely to be identical to the person mentioned below on p. 165, 'Monatcher Ali'.

[413] Rashid al-Gailani, leader of the uprising against the British in 1941, was in exile in Germany at the time. With regard to the identity of Karādī cf. Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen Mammut (Diss.), p. 140, fn 489, (additional discussion in the translation of the dissertation into Arabic, fn 3 on p. 216). It is not possible to determine with certainty whether Jasim Hasan Karādī or Kraidī (Jasim Husen Kredi) is identical with the Karadi mentioned here. Regarding the personality of Jasim Hasan al-Karādī and his fight alongside the al-Qawuqjī group in Palestine, cf. Leila Parsons, The Commander, The Commander, Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence, 1914-1948, New York 2016, ch. 3, and Matthew Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine, The British Army, the Colonial State, and the Arab Revolt, 1936–1939, CUP 2019, App. A.

emerging KURDISH state. RAMZI would have excellent opportunities to express his patriotic ideas by joining the group.

In this context, MÜLLER <...> voluntarily admitted that he had deliberately deceived RAMZI about the so-called 'order from the FÜHRER' that he had mentioned in order to impress him. He did this because MÜLLER desperately needed RAMZI for his expedition.

During the first interview, RAMZI insisted that his task was limited exclusively to the originally agreed activity of broadcasting radio programmes, but during the second interview he had agreed to join the group.

According to MÜLLER, RAMZI was not very enthusiastic about the expedition and the role he was to play in it.

MÜLLER nevertheless stated that RAMZI enjoyed the idea of serving patriotic KURDISH interests. When asked whether RAMZI had joined the group because he felt pressured and feared having to remain in GERMANY, he simply replied, 'No one can see into the heart of an Oriental.'

According to MÜLLER, RAMZI, unlike MUKRI, was a 'national KURD' and preferred an independent KURDISH state. His leader was Dr. KAMURAN[414] from BEIRUT <...>. MÜLLER had been warned about this man by Dr. CASKEL, who suspected Dr. KAMURAN of being a BRITISH agent.

MÜLLER tried to alleviate the difficulty of the situation by flattering RAMZI and explaining to him that he would have been at least as good a leader of his people as DR. KAMURAN. MÜLLER encouraged RAMZI to set up a new national KURDISH organisation among his student friends. Nevertheless, MÜLLER had the impression that RAMZI never lost his affection for Dr. KAMURAN, whom he regarded as the 'leader of KURDISTAN.' However, RAMZI reluctantly agreed to approach his fellow students in KURDISTAN and, with their help, found a new national party. On 14 June 1943, RAMZI's new position alongside the Germans (as founder of this new organisation) was celebrated with a flag ceremony at the OKW. A KURDISH national flag had been made by a BERLIN company based on a design by KONIECZNY, and as they stood in front of the hoisted flag, the members of the Mammut Group swore mutual loyalty and comradeship. MÜLLER and RAMZI gave speeches in which MÜLLER repeated the deliberate lie about the orders received from the FÜHRER, which were said to be related to plans for the liberation of Kurdistan. He expressed his appreciation for RAMZI's support and cooperation, while RAMZI, for his part, swore allegiance and expressed his gratitude to the GERMANS. Despite all this, MÜLLER never placed his complete trust in RAMZI. He gave strict instructions never to leave RAMZI alone, either in BERLIN or anywhere else. In particular, KONIECZNY and later HOFFMANN were instructed to accompany him as guards. MÜLLER's instructions even included distracting RAMZI from the effects of the R.A.F. bombings. When the group left (8–11 May 1943), MÜLLER took RAMZI with him to GSCHWEND.

The lack of trust that MÜLLER showed RAMZI also prompted him to exclude RAMZI from the preparations for the mission as far as possible and to withhold from him the names of the GERMAN agencies involved in it.

[414] On these exile networks more research is needed.

During Dr. CASKEL's lecture for the group (sometime between 12 and May 1943), MÜLLER sent RAMZI to the radio tower in BERLIN, accompanied by Karl SCHMIDT[415]. On MÜLLER's instructions, RAMZI visited Dr. CASKEL, who was introduced to him as Professor BAUER, at a later date. After the meeting, Dr. CASKEL congratulated MÜLLER on recruiting RAMZI as an informant.

RAMZI did not accompany the group on their visit to the General Staff Foreign Armies/West (11 June 1943).

Sometime in May 1943, RAMZI met Professor GILLERT from BERLIN, who invited him to dinner. This invitation had been arranged by MÜLLER, who wanted to impress RAMZI with the 'charm of EUROPEAN life,' as he, MÜLLER, later put it during his interrogation. Professor GILLERT did not, of course, reveal his actual occupation as a specialist in the care of gas victims.[416] KONIECZNY had also been invited and had been instructed beforehand to introduce RAMZI to the professor as a simple practising general practitioner. <...>

RAMZI's actual work in connection with the MAMMUT expedition did not begin until the group left for IRAQ. While he was in GERMANY, he showed little interest in the plans and preparations. His only contribution to the group's efforts was to advise on the search for landing zones for the people jumping out and the containers, and to help MÜLLER's fiancée make KURDISH traditional clothing. As far as MÜLLER knows, RAMZI was unable to give the ABW officer the names of any of his personal friends or other patriotic KURDS. MÜLLER adds that Dr. CASKEL asked RAMZI about four men during his visit, and RAMZI informed him that two of these men were dead. The essence of the conversation was later passed on to MÜLLER and he was given the names, which were subsequently forgotten.

(Note from the interrogating officer: During the interrogation, MÜLLER vehemently denied wanting to protect RAMZI with his statements.[417] When it was suggested that such an attitude would not have been surprising from a GERMAN officer and leader, his denial became even more vehement and he expressed that he felt hurt by this accusation! <…>

[415] A member of the second Mammut Group, which was never deployed. See p. 71.

[416] This is likely to have been the physician Prof. Dr Ernst Gillert (also a specialist in the effects of chemical warfare agents and their treatment, as well as aviation hygiene). (TU Berlin: https://cp.tu-berlin.de/person/1816). According to the Berlin address book, Gillert lived in Lichterfelde (Ritterstr. 68 or, possibly later, in Drakestr. 10, http://ubsrvgoobi2.ub.tu-berlin.de/viewer/fulltext/2465/60/).

[417] This is a key point in Ramzi's fate. The British suspected all members of the Mammut Group of trying to protect Ramzi by making statements that downplayed his role as an innocent follower.

Interrogation Georg Heinrich Adalbert Konieczny

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

1st D.I.[418] Report on HARDY, AGT[419].

Name: KONIECZNY, Georg Heinrich, Adalbert (or Ludwig?)

Alias: for W/T purposes – UHU

For internal communication in IRAK – MUSTAFA

CSDIC Code Name: HARDY.

Unit: Sonder-Verband BRANDENBURG – ABWEHR II

Place & Date of birth: BERLIN-WILMERSDORF, 24 Dec 12.

Nationality: GERMAN (father of Polish extraction).

Languages: German, Persian, English, French.

Place & Date of Capture: Near ERBIL (IRAK) on 28 Jun. 43[420].

Place & Date of Interrogation: CSDIC, GHQ, M.E., 26 Aug. 43 – 26 Oct. 43.

<…>

Konieczny is the son of a germanized descendant of POLISH family from the province of POSEN. He was born in BERLIN, understands only a few words of POLISH, but has always been in touch with the POLISH branch of his family which he visited for the last time in May 43.

His mother comes from a Hugenot family and became catholic when she married. Konieczny was brought up in the catholic faith, but, when 15 years old, suddenly developed a strong interest in ISLAM. This was caused, as Konieczny put it, by an ardent religious longing, which bewildered him during his adolescence, and which was encouraged by the erection of the BERLIN MOSQUE on the FEHRBELLINER PLATZ, 10 minutes walk from his house. This inclination became known at school, but hat home he kept it a secret, so that according to Konieczny, his father did not notice that his son had turned from the R<oman> C<atholic> church. It was then, that Konieczny started mixing with the many ORIENTALS

[418] Abbreviation unclear. Presumably stands for 'Defence Intelligence'.

[419] AGT = Agent. In the following, the abbreviation is also replaced by the real name, like in Müller's case.

[420] The arrest took place after the C.I.C.I. report (4 July 1943, see above) on 29 June 1943.

of various extractions who lived in BERLIN and came in touch with many persons playing an important part in German political centres interested in the ORIENT.

In 1938 his enthusiasm for ISLAM cooled off and he returned to the Catholic Church, but eliminating confession. As a matter of fact he had never officially left the Roman Catholic Church or been converted MUSLIM.

When the war broke out he was at TEHRAN. He claims at once to have approached the POLISH consul, told him that he did not want to fight against Polish relatives and asked whether he could join the Polish Army. The consul answered that he had to refer the matter to WARSAW. Owing to Military developments, the matter was later dropped.

Konieczny left school 3 years before Matric. His education therefore was not completed but he tried to complete it on his own, later on. One has the impression that, as a result, his knowledge is extended rather than deep, except perhaps concerning ISLAMIC art for which he always had a special interest, and he seems to be conversant with the names and works of GERMAN experts.

Konieczny is a glass painter by profession, and an amateur portrait painter, interior decorator and flag designer. He is also very interested in snakes. On the flight to IRAK he carried some snakes in order to watch their reaction at a height of 6000/7000 m. After landing he let the snakes free.

Politically he claims to be strongly anti-Nazi. This does not seem untrue[421], not only because he is half-Polish, but because he is a quiet, intellectual <…, corrupted>. On the other hand he is proud of having been awarded the German Infantry Assault badge which, he feels, confirms his courage. When asked for the reason why he volunteered for the MAMMUT expediton, he stated that he wanted to get out of GERMANY and saw his only chance in joining such an UNTERNEHMEN, after his unsuccessful endeavours to get a visa for IRAN in 1940.

These explanations make clear the following points:

(i) Konieczny has considerable knowledge of ORIENTAL circles in BERLIN especially of those interested in politics. The information he provides[422] often covers more than 10 years. As a portraitist he has been given a good memory for faces.

(ii) One wondered at first whether this gifted, half-educated half-German, might tell us only the half-truth. But his information always proved entirely reliable.

<…>

[421] Conjecture.

[422] Conjecture.

This report will mainly deal with information from Konieczny with respect to[423] the Oriental set-up in BERLIN. This part of his statements seems to be an important contribution made by Konieczny to the information obtained from the MAMMUT party. As a whole, is has, however, to be noted, that many other details provided by him[424] were of valuable help in checking facts stated by his companions TIGER[425], FREMMAN[426], MILLIS.[427] During his stay here, he also gave invaluable help to the interrogation[428] in overcoming the state of mental derangement in which his companion HOFFMANN was; and in putting him in a frame of mind in which he was able to answer questions.[429]

<…>

LIFE HISTOY & MOVEMENTS

24 Dec. 12	Born BERLIN Wilmersdorf
1919 – 1926	HINDENBURG Oberrealschule, BERLIN Wilmersdorf.
1926 – 1929.	GOETHE Schule, Reform-Realgymnasium, BERLIN Wilmersdorf. Left school 3 yrs. before Matric (Mittlere Reife).

Bis Aug. 34 Apprenctice & Draughtsman at Vereinigte Werkstätten für Mosaik und Glasmalerei, BERLIN-Treptow. Konieczny was denounced by Norbert WEISSER[430] to the GESTAPO.

Bis Apr. 35. Journey to PERSIA.

Stayed at MILLA HADJI, a village in ASERBADJAN[431], just off the road from TÄBRIZ to TEHERAN <…>. This village belongs to a Persian, BEHOUDI[432], with whom Konieczny was on very good terms. BEHOUDI was in BERLIN until 1932. <…> When he left BERLIN for PERSIA, he invited Konieczny to meet him there.

In BERLIN till Autumn 36. He would not accept any work, but studied History of Art, and Islam. At that time, Konieczny became provisional chairman of the Islamic Community in BERLIN. He did not receive any pay, but lived with his parents on the income of his father who was an inspector for the social

[423] Conjecture.

[424] Conjecture.

[425] Code name used by the British interrogation organisation for Müller.

[426] Code name for Hoffmann.

[427] This code name is only used here and is likely to refer to Ramzi.

[428] Conjecture.

[429] This whole paragraph contains the key passage illustrating the methodical approach of the British interrogators.

[430] See below in the document.

[431] This does not refer to the state of Azerbaijan, but to the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan.

[432] No further details could be found about this person.

welfare branch of the municipality. Konieczny was asked by the S<turm> A<bteilung> to join their organisation. He refused to do this, and in order to escape the pressure of party and SA, he volunteered for the Army at the beginning of 1936. But he had to wait for 6 m<on>ths before he could enlist.

Until Autumn 37 German Army. Cavalry Regt., No. 6 at SCHWEDT / ODER. He then went to DARMSTADT with his Regt., and 2 weeks later, by was discharged as L<ance>/C<orpora>l[433].

<…>

(b) Polish Tartars[434]

Konieczny, being half Polish, and converted Moslem, was especiall interested in Moslem matters in POLAND: In 1936, he was approached ab a <…, corrupted> who was responsible for [435] the building of a Mosque in WARSAW, to make some plans for the internal decoration of the Mosque, which were finally accepted. During the war in Summer 1942, he asked RAHMAN[436] whether Polish Tartars could not be won[437] for the German Islamic Policy. RAHMAN answered that he did not know anything about it. In Autumn 1942, he asked RAHMAN again. It was then that RAHMAN told him that they had negotiated with the Polish Tartars, but with no results. The Tartars had declared that they felt as Polish and that they wanted to share the fate of their Christian countrymen.[438] <…>"

(c) Miscellaneous.

Mohamed Hassan HOFFMANN[439]. A German who was converted Moslem. He worked with Muhammad Abd an-Nafi Salabi[440] who was the editor of the "Islam Echo" and the "Islamische Gegenwart" <…>. According to information that Konieczny got from RAHMAN, HOFFMANN is

[433] Lowest non-commissioned officer rank or highest enlisted rank („Gefreiter", rank above the privates).

[434] Bullet point (a) is not included in the files.

[435] Conjecture.

[436] Probably Habibur Rahman (1901 - ?), indian Muslim and leading figure in the intriguing game of the muslim organizations in Berlin at the time. Gerdien Jonker, In search of religious modernity, S. 18 – 46. There, some hints on Konieczny.

[437] Conjecture.

[438] The Polish Tatars (also known as Belarusian, Lithuanian or Lipka Tatars) settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th century and still live in the border triangle between Poland, Lithuania and Belarus. Although Muslim by faith, they have traditionally been loyal to their Christian country and even provided troops for Poland in the First World War.

[439] For more information on the German Muslim Mohamed Hassan Walter Hoffmann and his journalistic activities, see Gerhard Höpp, Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg 1915 -1945. Geschichtlicher Abriß und Bibliographie. Arbeitshefte 4, Berlin 1994, p. 39f. URL: http://d-nb.info/1070262374/34.

[440] Conjecture. On Salabi and the two subsequent journals, see ibid., pp. 37–39.

now working with the MUFTI[441]. He also was in touch with KEMALEDIN GAJAL[442] <…>. Worked for RAHMAN but he had a row with him about money.

Yayha Bey HASSAN. <…> Originally an Austrian Jew, converted <…, corrupted>. Konieczny met him in the Egyptian Students' Mission. He was representating Egyptian Newspapers in 1937/38. No details of his relations to Germany or[443] Political centres known to Konieczny. <…>

WEISSER, Norbert Abdullah <…>[444]. Born in AUSTRIA in 1914[445]. In <…, corrupted> he denounced Konieczny to the Gestapo. Went to EGYPT in 1935 (sent by the German Ministry of Propaganda) and studied at the AZHAR University[446] <…, corrupted> . He behaved very

badly, and returned to HAMBURG or BERLIN. At the <…, corrupted> 1942, Konieczny saw him with MADJILIO / HADJALIC.[447]
<…>

[441] Mohammed Amin al-Husseini (1893–1974), the "Grand Mufti of Jerusalem," was one of the most influential Islamic clerics and politicians. He agitated primarily against the Empire in Palestine and fled from Iraq to Germany in 1941. He worked closely with the National Socialist regime and propagated a pronounced hatred of Jews. Among others, he also influenced Yasser Arafat, who was a distant relative of his. See Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, passim.

[442] This person remains unknown.

[443] Conjecture.

[444] Norbert Abdullah Weisser (1913–1981) was a convert who studied Arabic languages, literature and journalism. He was expelled from the NSDAP in 1933 and, after being expelled from Egypt, was sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He then worked in various positions, including for the Foreign Office. After the war, he served as an imam and chairman of an Islamic association, among other things. Rudolf Agstner, Handbuch des Österreichischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, Vol. 1, Vienna 2015, p. 354.

[445] 1913.

[446] Al-Azhar University in Cairo is one of the oldest and most important Islamic educational institutions in the world.

[447] Could not be identified more precisely. Maybe Mehmed Hadzic, leading islamic Scholar in Bosnia. David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany, pp. 193, 202f. and 236.

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

Third report on the interrogation of Konieczny, Georg, by Major M.N. Forrest at Baghdad on 18, 19 & 21 Jul 43.

<…>

1. Further particulars of other members of Mammut party.

(a) Commissions.
K<onieczny> states that the majority of party were not commissioned when they joined Müller but that their commission were confirmed during the period of their training.

(b) Müller
K. thinks that in peace time Müller had some sort of business in the export trade in S.W. Germany. He believes that Müller mentioned this to him.
He considers Müller to be exceedingly boastful and arrogant. He states that by the end of his training he had learnt not to trust Müller and quotes the following examples of the latter's arrogance and deceit. During the first Unterbergen visit the students complained to Müller that they could not tolerate the presence of his mistress Susanne <…, corrupted>. Müller called them all together and told them that the woman we the widow of his greatest friend who had been killed at the front and who had asked Müller to take care of his wife if anything should happen to him. Later K. was told in Berlin by Fräulein Wieland from Hamburg, a family friend of the Müller's, that <…, corrupted> was the widow of some officer whom Müller had never known and that after the death of her husband she had behaved disgracefully, writing long letters to any numer of officers amongst whom was Müller who had eventually 'adopted' her.

(c) Hoffmann.
Müller once told K. that Hoffmann's sole duty on the expedition was to act as bodyguard to him (Müller).

(d) Ramzi
At the end of the first Unterbergen visit or at the beginning of the second Unterbergen visit, Müller announced that a Vertrauensmann[448] (accredited agent), a Kurd was coming from Istanbul to join the party.
K<onieczni> does not know whether Ramzi had undertaken any work for the German S.S. before he joined Mammut, but it is quite certain that Müller referred to him as Vertrauensmann before he came to Unterbergen.
Ramzi never spoke to K about his desire to continue his university training in Berlin or elsewhere, but when he first joined the party he continuously spoke of the wireless broadcasts in Kurdish which he hoped to make from Germany.
When he arrived Ramzi showed no outspoken sympathy for Germany and no very bitter hatred for England or the Allies. He seemed to have no idea at first what was wanted of him and continued for some time at Unterbergen to talk of his wireless broadcasts. Müller then

[448] Correct Verbindungsmann. Liaison Person.

made him a speech that Germany wanted to help all small countries threatened by England and Ramzi seemed to accept this. K. does not know when the nature of his real work was disclosed to Ramzi but states that by the end of the second Unterbergen visit Ramzi seemed quite prepared to accompany Müller on his mission.

<…>

In Berlin K introduced Ramzi to two gentemen at Müller's request:

(a) Dr. Koske or Caske[449],

Georg Wilhelm Strasse, Halensee

A half Jew, authority on Persian dialects, often quoted by Dr. Hadank in his lectures as unsound.[450]

One morning Kaske visited Müller in his office and wanted to see Ramzi who was out. Müller therefore ordered K. to take Ramzi to Kaske's house that evening at 5 p.m. K. left Ramzi with Kaske and does not know what they discussed. He thinks that Kaske wished to obtain some details about Persian dialects.

(b) Prof. Gillert (?)[451]

House on bus route "M" probably in Lichterfeld West or Zehlendorf West or Dahlem.

Müller asked K to take Ramzi to this man at 8 p.m. one evening. He took Ramzi and the professor showed them some baby cine propaganda films on the Hitler Jugend, Russian campaign and other war fronts. The professor did not ask Ramzi any particular questions about Iraq or Persia.

K cannot remember that he took Rami to see any other person and has no recollection orf the name Boyer or Bauer etc. in this connection.

2. Training.

(a) Oehlers tribal map.

K. remembers that at the second Unterbergen visit and later in Berlin, Oehler prepared a map showing the Kurdish tribes in Iraq and Persia. He cannot remember any particulars about this map but says that Oehler obtain the information from their lecture books, Hadank and Müller.[452]

(b) Visit to Wuehnsdorf <sic!> or Zossen[453]

One day during their last stay in Berlin, Müller announced that the party would go that evening to receive instruction from a military department, whose name K has now forgotten. The following party left that evening by train to Rangsdorf where they changed train and

[449] This refers to Werner Caskel.

[450] Here, Hadank's National Socialist and anti-Semitic attitude described in the introduction comes to light. Apart from the factual deficiencies, Hadank's ideological attitude contributed to the incorrect and clichéd appreciation of the whole situation and the people in the region and therefore to failure of the mission.

[451] For Gillert see above p. 142 with FN 416.

[452] This statement is probably not correct. The specialist in tribal matters was Werner Caskel, from whom Oehler, who was primarily a desert navigator, probably obtained the necessary information. See also the list of tribes in the printed German edition of this book.

[453] This refers to Wünsdorf (district of Zossen) in the south of Berlin. This was the location of the OKH, and later also parts of the Army High Command (Oberkommndo der Wehrmacht OKW).

later were taken by car for about 15 minutes. K believes that they went to Wuehnsdorf or Zossen:
Major Müller
'Dr.' Messow
Hoffmann
Koneiczny
Oehler
Having passed through two barriers they were taken to a room where they found a large map of Mediterranean and M.E. laid out on a table.

Here they were received by an officer either Oberstleutnand or Major <…> and whose name K cannot remember. This officer addressed himself to Müller and showed him and the party the dispositions of the British, Indian, American, Polish and Czech troops in North Africa, Egypt, Persia, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. These were shown on the map by German military signs.
<…>
He states that the main concentrations were shown in South Iraq, Palestine and Syria and that the officer stated that Allied troops were being moved from North Africa to Palestine, Syria and Iraq.
The object of this lecture was not explained to the party but the officer and Müller conferred together and K heard the former speak angrily to Müller ‚Beantworten Sie meine Frage'. ("answer my question")[454].
<…>
(c) Second visit to Quenz (Brandenburg).
During the second visit to Unterbergen Müller announced to the party that he intended to show Ramzi some explosives and to give the whole party more shooting practices.
<…> the following party went to Quenz by train, tram or on foot:

Major Müller
Hans Müller
Oehler
Hoffmann
Ramzi
Konieczny
Kelaita
Karl Schmidt
Herbert Schmidt
Dr. Messow?
They all had shooting practive in
German rifle

[454] This conflict was probably mainly about the purpose of the operation. Due to the war situation and probably also Hitler's strategic objectives, the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres OKH) obviously did not think much of large-scale plans for an uprising with the Kurds and was primarily interested in espionage. This conflicted with Müller's ambitions.

Pistols
L.M.G.[455] Modelle 34
Sten Gun

Hauptmann Wahl and his assistant (with queer speech) the carried out the following demonstrations:
(i) 200 gramme pack
exploded in ground
exploded when tied to 25 cm wooden stake.
(ii) Plactic as before on double T iron
(iii) 3 200 gramme packs joined by Knallzündschnur
(iv)
(v) <…> some other demonstration was made with a railway line.
No new material was shown as far as K can remember, and the main reason for the expedition was apparently in order to impress Ramzi.
K's attention was then drawn to his statement that Müller had said that he was forbidden to undertake sabotage <…>
<…>
Sabotage.
K can remember no lectures on sabotage other than those during his first visit to Quenz and no other training than that given at Quenz during his two visists.

<…>

3. Preparations for departure.
   K states that Müller gave him a poison tablet at Simferopol to take if in serious danger. Müller made no long speech as was usual. K says that he had no intention of using the tablet and does not know where he put it.
4. Object of mission

   K<onieczny> states that, having thought very deeply since his arrest, he believes that the main object of Müller's first Mammut party must have been to establish German connections with the Kurds on the frontier area and thus prepare for much larger operations in the future, the nature of which would be determined to some extent by Müller. He states that these are his own deductions and that he was never told by Müller the exact objects of the mission, which he feels were not even clear in Müller's mind (Vorkommando).
   K emphasises that Müller's lecture to Ramzi in Berlin on his first visit to the Führer and on the „Free Kurdistan" movement which he hoped to found was pure propganda. Müller had of course never seen the Führer and his ideas about the future of Kurdistan were always changing and always vague.
   K states that to the best of his knowledge Müller was not expecting any „reception committee" on arrival and certainly no signals from the ground.
   K can offer no explanation connected with Mammut for the aircraft that have flown over the

[455] = Light machine gun.

area since his arrival. The only aeroplane which Müller was expecting was to arrive with the second Mammut party after two months. He can only assume that those aircraft are connected with the undertakings to Russia and Iraq which he has described[456], or with other undertakings about which he has not heard. He thinks that Müller may know something definite about them, but is certain that Müller told him nothing.
K is certain that he never heard Kelaita mention any relations in Iraq and does not think that Müller knew of any.[457] He is certain that Kelaita mentioned that he had relations in Syria.
K knows of no connection between Mammut and Syria and does not think that Müller had any list of persons in Syria with whom he could get in touch.
K does not know how Müller proposed to leave this area after he had fulfilled his mission.

<…>

Remarks

When given paper K will draw maps of OKW, HQ and Abw Abt II, <…, corrupted> department.

K has given list of political member of Dolmetscher Wissenschaftliche Abteilung but has not yet been questioned about them and about the department.

K appears to be telling the truth but it is strange that a man of his obvious intelligence and wit made so little effort to discover more details about the dangerous expedition on which he was about to embark. He states that this was du to the fact that he was throughout his traning subject to military discipline and was disgusted with Müller's arrogant and yet haphazard methods.

K realises that although he has spoken freely he may still be condemned to death. He seems to betray Müller in order to save his own life.

<…>

[456] No information is available about these statements by Konieczny.

[457] For more information on Kelaita and his relatives, see FN 373 above.

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION HERFORD BAOR 15

6 May, 1950

To: Captain C.W. CAIN

Box 500

Parliament Street B.O.

LONDON S.W.1

SUBJECT: KONIECZNY, George Heinrich Adalbert, born 24.12.12 in BERLIN

1. Subject's history is as follows:

33 – Aug. 34	Painter, Vereinigte Werkstätten für Mosaik und Glasmalerei, Berlin Treptow.
Aug. 34 – Jul. 35	Study trip to Persia
Jul. 35 – Sept. 36	Unemployed in Berlin
Oct. 36 – Sep. 37	Military Service
Sep. 37 – Aug. 39	Advertising manager with above mentioned Werkstätten
Aug. 39 – May. 40	Visited Persia
May. 40 – Oct. 40	Unemployed in Berlin
Aug. 40 – Sep. 41	Conscripted to army, served in Russia
Oct. 41 – Mar. 43	Teaching Persian at Feldgendarmerie Ersatz-Abteilung, Stuttgart, and Dolmetscher-Lehr-Abteilung, Berlin; Lance-Corporal (Gefreiter)
Mar. 43	Transferred to Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg (Abwehr Amt II) with rank of Lieutenant.
17.6.43	Parachuted into Irak
29.6.43	Arrested and interned at Baghdad
23.6.47	Returned to Germany <…>
Nov. 47	Released from internment.
Since Dec. 47	Commission agent and representative in Germany, Pakistan Chamber of Commerce

2. In internment in Germany he convinced his interrogators that snakes and reptiles were his real interest of life; that his trip Persia in 1934 was at the invitation of friends, that on his visit in 1939 he collected some 250 snakes at the behest of the Anhaltisches Seruminstitut Dessau; and that he intended to work in the Zoological Institute in Hamburg on his release. He gave the impression that he did not take his espionage seriously, and stated that he volunteered for this mission in order to get out of Germany. How accurate these statements are is not known; nor is the result of his interrogation in the Middle East known here.
3. The espionage group of which subject was a member was briefed to obtain and transmit by W.T. to Berlin via a relay at SIMFEROPOL, general military intelligence, but especially information on new read and railway construction supply routes from Basra to Russia, the condition of these routes, and the volume of traffic.
4. Subject has now applied for a permit to visit Pakistan for 2 months from 10th May, 1950. His destination is Pakistan Chamber of Commerce, Lahore. He supported his application with a latter from the High Commissioner for Pakistan, London, dated 5th April, 1950.
5. Information on subject available here is insufficient to warrant the withholding of an exit permit, and security clearance has therefore been given for subject. It is thought, however, that you may wish to advise the Pakistan Government of the above faccts or of other information available to you through SIME[458].

E.V. WIGGINS for Major-General, Chief, Intelligence Division

[458] For SIME, see FN 611 below.

Interrogation Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

REPORT ON PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF LEUTNANT FRIEDRICH WILHELM HOFFMANN from 1700 hrs 12 Jul 43 till 2100 hrs <…, corrupted[459]> Jul 43 by Lieut H.J. KLARE attached GSI (a) PAIFORCE[460]:

Note 1: This report was prepared at the time of the interrogation in German and cannot therefore be taken as its final form.

Note 2: It takes the form of a narrative in chronological order as told by HOFFMANN. No attempt has been made to break the natural flow of the narrative by dividing it into fixed headings, but below is the sequence of events with the appropriate age number for easy reference.

<…>

Statement of the German prisoner Fritz HOFFMANN

15.7.43

"To the British Officer whom it my concern.

Below I want like to give you a short explanation how I have arrived at my present views towards HITLER. I hope for your psychological understanding, so that you can see your way to believe my words and then I be ready to help get rid of him to the best of my ability and knowledge.

I was born in GÜDINGEN-SAARBRÜCKEN on the 8 June 1912. After concluding the usual terms at elementary and secondary schools I worked for the firm Messr. Braun-Boveri, then I took a diploma at the Polytechnic at SAARBRÜCKEN, and from 1931 to 1935 I was Instructor at the above named firm.

From August 1935 to September 1937 I was a Gruppenleiter (Group Leader), we call it Bannführer in the Hitler Youth. During this time I was a party member and follower of HITLER's and knew intimately

[459] The date was probably also 12 July.

[460] = General Staff Intelligence Persia and Iraq Force (PAIFORCE), part of the Persian and Iraq Command (PAIC). This command was established in 1942 specifically for Iraq and Persia to relieve the Middle East Command and the India Command, which were responsible for the defence of North Africa and Burma, respectively. PAIFORCE was responsible for transport of war material and all kinds of goods to the Soviet Union. See Paiforce : the official story of the Persia and Iraq Command 1941-1946, War Office, London 1948 and Robert Palmer, Persia and Iraq Command (History and Personnel), 2020, http://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/, cf. further https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/search/results#/?query=1060022077&type=list. The US counterpart for the PAIC was the Persian Gulf Command. Cf. Ashley Jackson, Persian Gulf Command, A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq, New Haven London 2018, espc. Ch. 14.

Reichsjugendführer AXMANN[461], Gauleiter<…>, LAUTERBACHER. <…> (who received the Iron Cross when we were together) and several other <…> personalities and their intimate <…>.[462]

From the beginning of 1937 I have tried to get back to my civilian occupation. In May 1937 I received word from my friend, Diplom Ing. PFLAUMER[463] (Siemens), that a teacher for the Technical School in AFGHANISTAN was looked for. I submitted my diploma to the Afghan legation in BERLIN and was accepted. In August 1937 I wanted to leave but had much a row with the Party that I could only leave in October. Shortly before my departure I married.

I was teacher and instructor on machine tools in AFGHANISTAN up to October <…> 1941. In the free world of the outside world I realised for the first time how much the personal liberty of the individuel really <…, corrupted>. I was in no way engaged with Party activities there, which fact you can check. Six months before the Ortsgruppenleiter <…, corrupted> fled to GERMANY, he ordered me to arrange W.T. lessons for the boys and girls of the German school. I did this up to the time of his flight.

In AFGHANISTAN I was introduced for the first time to the idea of "Antroposophism" as taught by Rudolf STEINER. I am his follower and so is my wife. This philosophy is forbidden in GERMANY and so are all his books. I would be most grateful if you could get me the English edition of "THEOSOPHY" by RUDOLF STEINER.

The time after my return in 1941 to GERMANY was absolutely terrible. I had not thought it possible that a people could be so enslaved in four years and so blackmailed; nobody trusts his fellow. In the evening the Blockwart (Bulldog) snoops about and listens at the keyholes whether anybody listens to foreign news. Thus, mistrust and doubt are sown in the most intimate family circles.

In this first time after my return I thought about the possibility of a flight to <…, corrupted> with my family. This broke down however because of passport difficulties, and I discussed this point with my comrade, KONIECZNY; I think it was as early in December 1942 by the barrack gate.

Out of this conviction I speak to you the truth about our expedition and wish to help you in every way to prepare a quicker end for the tyrant HITLER if only you can find your way to trust me. Please do not look on me as a traitor but as a man ready to fight for the freedom of the individual to the best of his ability

I declare that I have made the above statement of my own free will and under no pressure whatever.

BAGHDAD: 14.7.43

<…>

About 20 January <1943>I was ordered to report to Lieut. MÜLLER, address OKW – TIRPITZ UFER 72 – 82, on the third floor.[464] This was in the morning. I entered MÜLLER's office and we talked everyday

[461] Name partially deduced. This is likely to be Artur Axmann, who did not become Reich Youth Leader until 1940, succeeding Baldur von Schirach.

[462] The names listed were either corrupted or could not clearly be allocated.

[463] Name difficult to read. No further information.

[464] The report of the interrogation seems to be a literal transscription of Hoffmanns testimony.

affairs. He wanted to gain an impression of me. After a while he told me that he had considered me for an action in the Middle East. This was all and I was sent back to my company.

I was ordered – after a few days – to become permanently attached to Lieut MÜLLER, Abwehrabteilung 2 (OR), from about 1 February. I found a private address at KURFÜRSTENDAMM 228 - this was a private hotel. Lieut. MÜLLER'S immediate superior officer at Abwehrabteilung 2 (OR) was Hauptmann Dr. EISENBERG.

<Further personalities:>

Sonderführer Dr. WAGNER

(Note: Sonderführer is a man who holds officers rank but is not able to lead men into battle. He is usually a specialist and there are various ranks <…>)

<…>

Appeared to be a specialist in Middle East – in his office there was a map of AFGHANISTAN, PERSIA, IRAQ and INDIA. He seemed to be interested especially in PERSIA. He is now called up as Schütze (private soldier) and has been replaced by an elderly captain whose name I don't know.

Oberleutnant FIGULLA – air force representative used to arrange air-transport for expeditions of a similar nature as ours.[465]

<…>

Oberstleutnant PUTZ was Chief of Abteilung 2 (OR). I met him only at a radio transmission in his office where we all had to attend. This happened in February 43 before KONIECZNY had joined the department.

<…>

Lt. Dr. MESSOW was liaison officer to Abwehr 2 and used to assist MÜLLER by going to various outside offices for him. I met him in the beginning of March.

<…>

After a few days MÜLLER told me that he and I would be going to HANNOVER to the oilfields there. We travelled up together and inspected the oilfields of NIENHAGEN near ZELLE[466]. On the way MÜLLER told me that it might be possible that a group would be formed for the purpose of disabling oil pipelines or alternatively protecting the pipe-line should the German offensive in RUSSIA be strong enough to

[465] For First Lieutenant Figulla, see FN 297.

[466] Oil was discovered in Nienhagen in 1889. It is still being extracted there today.

penetrate in the South (an offensive in the South was evidently planned) and the Allies wanted to destroy the pipe-lines themselves. <…>.

The inspection of oilfields and installations lasted about four days, then we returend to BERLIN and continued on to KITZBÜHEL. This was about 10 February. We went with MÜLLER'S fiancée who joined us on the way. He told me that after a few days a Persian would turn up at KITZBÜHEL and that it would be my job to talk with him and to interpret. From KITZBÜHEL we went to the <…, corrupted> (three hours climbing from

KITZBÜHEL – Easterly direction[467] – this was the day after arrival and waited for the PERSIAN. We spent our time making ourselves physically fit and traning, climbing and skiing. The PERSIAN turned up about 20 February. His name was MONATCHER ALI[468] and he spoke German very well. MÜLLER asked him political and military information and also about his connections in the SAQQIZ area. The PERSIAN was rather close and did not seem to think that GERMANY would win the war. He did, however, give us a letter of introduction to his relatives in SAQQIZ.

We returned to BERLIN together at the end of February. MÜLLER'S fiancée left before we reached BERLIN. We arrived back at BERLIN and two or three days later K<ONIECZNY> arrived. When we arrived in BERLIN Dr. MESSOW and MÜLLER'S brother were present.

I was then ordered to attend a R/T[469] course with MÜLLER'S brother. This was in BERLIN at the beginning of March. This was a Feldeinheit – a Funkabteilung with just a Feldpostnummer. We were being trained by an NCO. We were taught the morse alphabet and the course lasted fourteen days when it was interrupted because in the meantime Herbert SCHMIDT, KELLER (KELAITA) and Dr. OEHLER had arrived.

About 15 March all of us (HOFFMANN, Herbert SCHMIDT, KELLER (KELAITA), KONI, HANS MÜLLER and Dr. OEHLER) moved to a large room in the Mathei Kirch Platz (number forgotten) where we received training everyday from 8 – 1630 hrs with two hours break, in the following subjects:

R/T

Kurdish – by Dr. HADANK

Lectures on the tribal, political and economic situation

Partly by Dr. HADANK, Partly by Dr. MESSOW

Once MÜLLER (Godfried) also spoke.

This course lasted about three or four weeks and at the end of it we attended a short course (afternoons only) at the Militärärztliche Akademie in BERLIN-MOABIT for about one week. This dealt

[467] This is the Bichl Alm, located east of Kitzbühel. See p. 165.

[468] Monatcher Ali is likely to be the person „Mukri" in the German files, see p. 165.

[469] = Radio-Transmitter. The term also means radio device.

chiefly with tropical diseases and snake bites etc. In the last few days of this course we were joined by SCHMIDT – KLEIN.

At about 15 April we went to UNTERBERGEN. The party consisted of HOFFMANN, KONIECZNY, Dr. OEHLER, Gross SCHMIDT, Klein SCHMIDT; KELLER (KELAITA), Hans MÜLLER, Dr. HADANK and the NCO who taught us R/T at the Funkabteilung. MÜLLER left before us and met his fiancée. We went from BERLIN to KLAGENFURT via VIENNA. UNTERBERGERN is a little village about twenty miles SE of KLAGENFURT, not far from FERLACH near the Yugoslaw border. We proceeded to a little hut near UNTERBERGEN where MÜLLER (Gottfried) and his fiancée awaited us.

The hut was divided into two storeys, the upper being occupied by MÜLLER and his fiancée. The lower was occupied by the rest of the party who slept in double-tier beds in a fair sized room. There was also a small kitchen. Dr. HADANK was the only one who stayed outside at a small hotel nearby.

The training consisted of

Morning:

R/T – One hour – morse code

One hour a little later signalling with a station in BERLIN

Kurdish

Homework – Some mornings for one hour to learn what we had been taught.

Afternoon:

Climbing with full equipment 1400 hrs – 1600 hrs or 1700 hrs.

Occasionally we took the W/T out of the hut and contacted BERLIN from various points in the mountains to give us practice. We did not often succeed in getting contact!

During this period our commissions (HOFFMANN, KONIECZNY, KELLER (KELAITA), Gross SCHMIDT, Klein SCHMIDT and Dr. OEHLER) and MÜLLER's promotion to Major came through.

After about a week the NCO left for BERLIN

Leut. Dr. Heinz (?) OEHLER

<…>

Gefreit<er> Hans MÜLLER (MÜLLER's brother)

<…> Was in RUSSIA

Leut KELAITA – known as KELLER

<…>

Civil occupation student, electro-mechanics

Speaks Syrian, Arabic very well, also English and French. Long stay in SYRIA possibly born there.[470]

Leut Herbert SCHMIDT (known as Gross SCHMIDT)

<…>

This man was in TEHRAN for two years 1939 – 41 and was employed by SIEMENS as an accoutant. His views on HITLER coincides with mine.

Leut Karl SCHMIDT (known as Klein SCHMIDT)

<…>

Civil occupation – dental mechanic

After leaving UNTERBERGEN the party made for WIEN and went through a parachute course lasting two or three days. We all made one practice jump. Then we went back to BERLIN via VIENNA. This was about the beginning of May. In my opinion there may have been trouble about MÜLLER carting his female about with him but he seemed to be able to persuade his superiors of the moral necessity and support he got from the presence of his fiancée for we returned to UNTERBERGEN after two or three days complete with MÜLLER's bit of stuff.

At UNTERBERGEN we continued with similar training and whilst we were there RAMZI turned up and was introduced to us by MÜLLER as a young Kurdish nobleman and we were told to be on our best behaviour towards him. A few days after RAMZI's arrival Major SCHOEN and Oberleutnant MÜHLMANN turned up to give us a lecture.

<…>

The lecture lasted a day and to his dictation we annnotated the cards. The following points were stressed by him:

All newly built roads and railways in IRAQ. He told us that IRAQ would shortly be of special military interest to us.

(a) The possibility of a Turko-German war in the near future and the part IRAQ would have to play. In this connection he stated that the Bulgarian Army was ready to attack TURKEY.

[470] For Kelaita, see FN 373.

(b) The break-through of the German Army in the Southern sector of the Russian front.

All other points of strategical and tactical importance and he mentioned:

(c) The strong possibility and hope of an early invasion in IRAQ.

Five or six days after the lecture we went on leave and I went to ST INGBERT to my wife and stayed there about three days. Then I returned to BERLIN and the start was planned directly after our return from leave but something seems to have cropped up and to kill time we went to HOMBURG[471] where we were met with "Tante Liesel"[472] who was an old friend of Major MÜLLER. This woman kept a laundry and her daughter LIZSELOTTE <sic!> and a girl from the laundry called GERTRUDE made friends with the boys. We stayed there for about three days and went to a small hut which belonged to TANTE LIESEL and which was about fifteen kilometres from HOMBURG. Mrs. KLEIN-SCHMIDT was also present. RAMZI and I stayed at HULSAU[473] and KONIECZNY returned to BERLIN. We stayed there till roughly 10 June.

Incidentally in this neighbourhood (i.e. near FRITZLAR not far from CASSEL) the RAF scored a big success some days previously by completely destroying the dam there and the powerhouse behind. The German figures quoted were 400 drowned but local estimation was far higher.

As mentioned before we left on or about 12 June for BERLIN where we first of all settled our personal affairs, then we all went to the depot in KOLONNENSTRASSE 26 (BERLIN) and packed out rucksacks. At the same time some airmen packed the boxes for us. This lasted three or four days of which one day was spent in RANGSDORF with Hauptmann GARTENFELD[474].

We all went to RANGSDORF to look at the aeroplanes. There were two Kondors, and one Ju 290; also one captured Russian transport plane. An officer of the Luftwaffe whose name I don't know told us (in general) that the Ju 290 was earmarked to go to PERSIA, to the QUASHQAI tribe[475] – (he did not tell me what to do or carry but later on I understood from MÜLLER it was to take ammunition). The crew were all ready to start and only waiting for the word "Go" which was to come from the FUEHRER himself.

This Ju 290 is an enormous 2[476]-engined plane of roughly the same span as the 4-engined Kordors and capable, in my estimation, of transporting fort – fifty men easily. The actual body of the plane is far bigger than that of a Kondor. It has a special platform which can be lowered at a slope at the same time pressing the tail of the plane up, and thus enabling a small tank to roll on to it and into the lace. Then the platform is drawn up again.

[471] This probably refers to Homberg (Efze) near Bad Hersfeld in Hessen.

[472] No further information could be identified.

[473] Likely Hülsa near Homberg.

[474] For the Gartenfeld squadron, see FN 376.

[475] For the missions "Franz" and "Anton" to Persia, see FN 301.

[476] The Junkers Ju 290 had four engines.

I was told that this Ju 290 is the only one of its kind in existance and specially constructed for this job. It differs vastly from all other Ju 290s.

Major MÜLLER, KONIECZNY, Dr. MESSOW and myself then went into conference with Hauptmann GARTENFELD and the Luftwaffe officer previously mentioned who was the pilot of the Ju 290.

<…>

He told us how extremely difficult it was to land parachutes in the mountains – he had had experience e of it in the CAUCASUS. Several landing points – all on the IRAQI-PERSIAN frontier were discussed with the help of a large map but as far as I know no definite point was then fixed. He advised MÜLLER to confer with his pilot about the exact spot. This concluded the conference.

During these last few days a young woman – an acquaintance of MÜLLER's – arrived at the OKW, Abwehrabteilung 2. She was a medical student from MUNICH and came to be trained. As far as I know she was to follow us later on as medical expert and, I think, was sent to the Tropen Institut, HAMBURG.[477]

She did not know what it was all about but when told agreed to the suggestions of our famous "Abwehr 2".

Our preparations were complete by 12 June 43. Whit-Sunday and Monday we were on leave. On the morning of 15 June ab about 8 o'clock we all met at OKW and proceeded by car to RANGSDORF. We were met at the aerodrome by Oberstleutnant PUTZ, Dr. MESSOW, GROSS and KLEIN SCHMIDT, OEHLER and KELAITA. We (MÜLLER and his brother, KONI, RAMZI, MESSOW and I) left at 11 o'clock.

During the last ten minutes an officer of the Luftwaffe brought MÜLLER an instrument to attract aircraft. It works like things you hang it on a tree, wind it up, withdraw the aerial and any aircraft passing within 100 km can hear this instrument and find it.

We arrived at the aerodrome of SIMFEROPOL at 1800 hours. I felT rather sick during the journey. We had dinner at the Officers' Mess (including RAMZI and Hans MÜLLER). Hans MÜLLER stayed with us until we left the next evening at 1830 hrs. MESSOW went back to BERLIN, I think, and Hans MÜLLER to an address I don't know in SIMFEROPOL to work the W/T which we should contact.

The journey was very bumpy and I was terribly sick. We had to be given oxygen.

Ten minutes before the order to jump the pilot buzzed his buzzer and everyone got ready. After the second buzz the crew threw out the boxes and we followed – MÜLLER, the KONI, RAMZI and lastly myself.

I landed all right in spite of the terrific wind. After a while I found MÜLLER and KONI. Then we found RAMZI. We discovered we had landed in the wrong spot. We looked for the boxes for about one hour

[477] This is likely to have been the person from Freiburg/Br. mentioned above in the German files.

but could not find them. We then took of our pistolss and donned Kurdish dress. We started to walk and arrived at a river at dawn.

<…>

We donned Kurdish dress and at first thought of a quick flight. We tramped on and on through waste land until sunrise when we arrived at a river. RAMZI asked a man in a field where we where and was told: Near TEL ?[478], and that the Turkish frontier was not very far across the river. I suggested that we stay there until nightfall, swim the river and endeavour to gain the Turkish border. MÜLLER, however, wanted to reach the place in the mountains where he wanted to be dropped originally and did not want to flee over the Turkish border. So we took the road to MOSUL. We went past a village and an Arab asked us who we were and what we wanted.

At about five o'clock we stopped a bus and got on the roof. This took us into MOSUL.

As we got off the bus a policeman spoke to RAMZI and asked him about us. He then conducted us to a coffee shop near the police station. We had some tea with him and once the policeman spoke to MÜLLER. This shook MÜLLER considerably as, of course, he could not understand, so in desparation he pointed to his mouth and made out he was dumb for the first time in his life. After another cup of tea with us the policeman sloped off, his duty well done. We had some more tea in another tea place in the garden.

At this stage our policeman must have thought that something was fishy by now, reappeared and sat down at a respectable distance. So we left the coffee shop and turned into ERBIL road, the policeman bobbing up again faithfully and shattering away to RAMZI. RAMZI bought some cakes on the roadside but not for the policeman. Finally we go rid of him but saw some more on the road, decided we had had enough police for one evening and got back to the same garden. It was now dark, thank God.

We spent the night on the roof oy yet another coffee house. In the morning RAMZI tried to get a car but this would not work and we went off on foot in the direction of ERBIL stopping at several Arab tents on the way for some water.

At about 1600 hrs we saw a village and some water at the village well. We then entered the house where a man brought us round some bread and milk. We stayed on till 0100 hrs 19 June.

We managed to get three mules and a Arab guided us to a village which we reached at 0900 hrs. From there we walked to another village nearby and had something to eat and drink from an old Arab woman whose husband got us three donkeys which took us to the river GREAT ZAB.

We crossed the river in a boat and continued walking towards ERBIL and, after having slept by the roadside at night arrived at noon of the 20 June at a large hill. We stopped at an old house and RAMZI and myself went into the village which, I think, belongs to RAMZI'S father. MÜLLER and KONI followed.

[478] Probably Til Kef north of Erbil.

At a house in this village we were given food and drink and it was there that MÜLLER asked me for my pistol. We stayed until nightfall and continued on three mules to ERBIL where we went to the house belonging to RAMZI's father which we entered through a hole in the wall and went into the garden. Later we ate and stayed unil 2200 hrs, then we wlaked to a village where we arrived at dawn, 21 June.

We stayed there for the day and in the evening went to a small house near a cave where we slept. Next morning we went down to a small oasis and rested there all day long. A servant from ERBIL brought us some Kurdish clothes. This was on 22 June and that night we slept on the roof of the little house.

The proprietor of this house took us to a cave in the morning (23 June). We stayed in this cave till the 28 June.

That evening we went cross to the house, and RAMZI to ERBIL, to find out the truth about some rumours of war between TURKEY and GERMANY. We stayed in the house till the morning of 29 June.

At about noon the proprietor of the house told us that the police were near and we left the house and hid in a small valley where we were eventually caught.

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

REPORT ON FURTHER INTERROGATION OF HOFFMANN, FRIEDRICH WILHELM, from 21 July 1943 till 1 August 1943 at BAGHDAD by Lieut H.J. KLARE attached GSI (a) GHQ PAIFORCE

<…>

The results of the preliminary interrogation of KONIECZNY and RAMZI are borne in mind and points of difference will be indicated as will such of HOFFMANN's statements as do not agree with statements made during his first interrogation.

<…>

Degree of friendship between HOFFMANN and KONIECZNY at the Dolmetschlehrabteilung. Appreciation of K<onieczny>'s character by HOFFMANN[479].

"I quickly got to know K at the Dolmetscherlehrabteilung as we were the only two Persian students in the second company and studied and worked together a lot. Soon I began to like him and considered him a good friend.

In my opinion K is a most intelligent and highly sensitive personality. He learns far more quickly than I do and proved to be the guiding spirit in all our activities. He is a pronounced misoginist and a

[479] Again, the following is probably a literal transcription of the speech.

Mohammedan. He is certainly not a Nazi by conviction but rather by circumstance. He has a profound regard for the Arabs and Persians."

The meeting with MONATCHER ALI

When we returned to BERLIN after our visit to NIENHAGEN Mueller told us that we were to meet a young Persian somewhere in the mountains and that I would by my job to interpret. Should the meeting bear the success he hoped it would then I was to learn to be a good wireless operator and we would be going to PERSIA with him – my job would be to keep in touch with GERMANY. At that time Mueller was under the impression that Monatcher Ali was a Kurd and actually came from SAQQIZ and it was somewhere in the SAQQIZ region that Mueller wanted to go at that time.

It was about then, too, that Mueller first told me of SHEIKH MAHMUD and his son ABDUL LATIF. He told me that he knew these two intimately, especially the father. Later on during our preparations he told us more about Mahmud and on the whole I have the impression that the whole expedition was as it were centred on the old man. By the way, the expedition was named after him, i.e. MAHMUD became MAMMUT.

To continue, we went to KITZBUEHEL and thence to the BICHL ALM, and Monatcher Ali duly turned up. The first surprise was that he spoke most excellent German which really made my presence superfluous. The second surprise was that he spoke no Kurdish at all. He comes, I think, form TEHRAN and his grandfather was supposed to have been a Minister of Finance at the old Shah's court. Though he still has relatives in SAQQIZ whence his family orginated he has more or less lost touch with that part of his family and considers himself a Persian, not a Kurd. He has been in GERMANY for four years and is studying science. He has already taken one diploma rather brilliantly. He seems extremely intelligent, of a firm character and strong will, and though he is only twenty two he gives the impression of one older than his years. Throughout, he refused to be dominated by Müller's perosnality and in spite of all the latter's antics to impress him he steadfastly refused to be impressed. Privately he told me later that if ever he did want to go to PERSIA – which he didn't – he would certainly not go with a man who would do nothing but show off the whole time.

After we got to know each other a little Müller led off by asking Monatcher Ali what he though about conditions in PERSIA now and what was her attitude towards GERMANY. Ali countered by saying that PERSIA had believed promises[480] and had counted on GERMANY's help but considered let down. Throughout Alis was most reserved and much to Mueller's disappointment refused to part with any kind of interesting information. Later on Müller asked him what his attitude would be if he was asked to go to PERSIA with us, in order to get in touch with the Kurds and promote Kurdo-German friendship. Müller also told him that in GERMANY one was very interested what conditions were really like in PERISA. Ali blankly refused, and told im that he was not interested in any such scheme.

The only thing which Müller got out of Ali was a letter of introduction to his relatives in SAQQIZ but Ali told me just before he left us that they would probably be very astonished to hear from him and he was not at all sure whether it would do us very much good.

[480] The last three words are conjecture.

R/Toc[481] Course in BERLIN

The course to which Hans Mueller and I were detailed to go was held at BERLIN-KRUMME LANKE in a restaurant which had been commandeered by, I believe, the Sonderverband BRANDENBURG. Hans Mueller and I were certainly the only Abwehr 2 people there and we were being trained in a separate room by an N.C.O. who later accompanied us to UNTERBERGEN. <…> this was quite an ordinary Feldeinheit, a Signal Unit open to all and sundry and many soldiers who had been badly wounded at the front and had been at a hospital in BERLIN were being trained in Signal work there because they were probably unfit to do an Infantryman's job. If this training unit had been used by the Sonderverband to train special people like ourselves before I certainly don't know anything about it.

Our training consisted simply of learning the Morse Alphabet. All we had there was a practice instrument not connected with anything on which we were busily tapping away the various letters. Hans Müller had had some previous training and soon reached a speed of about 30 or 40 but I had not even got right through the alphabet when the course was interrupted because Herbert Schmidt, Dr. Oehler, and Keller[482] had arrived and we were driven[483] off to do some training together at the Mathei Kirch Platz[484]."

News of RAMZI's arrival. Another Kurd?

"When we in UNTERBERGEN for the first time Müller told us one day: 'I have news from SOFIA that a Kurdish Vertrauensmann[485] (agent) is shortly coming to join us from Istanbul'.

I don't know how Müller got this information or who his informant was. He told us very little about such things but I did notice that he had such more mail than any of the rest of us that that some of the letters were obviously official.

One day in BERLIN after our second visit to UNTERBERGEN Müller said to the company in general and a propos nothing at all (he was always jumping from subject to subject) that another Kurd was expected to come up from Istanbul shortly. His name sounded something like ALOSE[486].

[481] "Radio/Telegraph Operators".

[482] = Kelaita.

[483] Conjecture.

[484] See above, p. 124 and p. 135.

[485] Term reproduced here as in original file.

[486] For Aloisi cf. p. 116 with FN 366. In the last instance, it remains unclear which person -if any- was connected to this name.

Visit of MESSOW, MUEHLMANN and SCHOEN to UNTERBERGEN 2

Messow arrived first, a few days after we left BERLIN. He brought an English military manual of some sort (I cannot remember it's title)[487] giving details of roads and bridges in IRAQ. For a day or two Messow just rested and nothing of importance was said or done. Then Oberleutnant Muehlmann arrived.

When we were at QUENZ Mueller said to Muehlmann on one occasion 'If ever you feel like a rest in the mountains, let me know as we are just going up there. We'll find an offical excue right enough.' Later it must have been arranged that Muehlmann was to attend Messow's and Schoen's lectures as the official sabotage expert. This in spite of the fact that sabotage was being 'soft-pedalled' since Müller's visit to the Fuehrer Hauptquartier.[488] But Müller was always doing things like that and very often 'wangled' things for his friends or his fiances. Müller and Muehlmann had known each other before. In this connection I should like to mention that it was Müller's habit to go rushing found to as many people and official places as he could in order to attract the maximum amount of attention to himself and the important work he was doing. The whole expedition was, I believe, Müller's idea, and he had been going round for weeks and months trying to interest authorities in his scheme. He was nothing if not plausible and as it is just possible that many people in high places know little about ARAB or KURD affairs and he obiously made himself out to be a tremendous expert the whole thing was given its blessing and the lead entrusted to a man so little fit to.

Major SCHOEN arrived two nights before the lecture. He stayed one night at a hotel at UNTERBERGEN, did nothing for one whole day with us, stayed the night at a little inn near our hut where Messow and Muehlmann were also staying, and gave his lecture the following morning. The conversation during this time was very general, but I do remember two remarks which were made. One was: 'Believe me, we shall watch your future progress with interest' and the other one 'If the present tension between GERMANY and TURKEY continues you will soon be able to join up with the German Army in IRAQ'.[489]

On the day Schoen gave his lecture Messow started the ball rolling by giving us a lecture on roads and bridges in IRAQ. From his dictation we entered all roads and bridges that had not been shown on the maps before. His lecture lasted perhaps forty minutes. Then Schoen and Muehlmann arrived and Muehlmann took us up the thread by giving us a very short lecture (less than half an hour) on bridges and how they could be destroyed, which type of bridge was easiest to destroy (those built in a high arch) and showed us some photographs of brdges to demonstrate. Some of the bridges shown were, I think, in PERSIA.

At the end of this lecture Müller told me to find out what the position was with regard to our shot-gun. We were having a shot-gun specially constructed at the village of FERLACH nearby which is famous

[487] In all likelyhood Military Report of 1935/36. Cf. Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien aus der Sicht deutscher Kriegsteilnehmer und Orientreisender 1918 bis 1945, Frankfurt/M. 2012, pp. 308 – 318.

[488] Müller never has been in the Führerhauptquartier.

[489] Müller and his supporters probably harboured the unrealistic hope that Turkey would enter the war against Germany, forcing the Wehrmacht to march south. Another question is to what extent Müller himself believed in this unrealistic option or to what extent he was manipulated by Abwehr II and others. In any case, his writings, even after 1945, show that he firmly believed in great successes.

for its shot-guns[490], and were having rather a lot of trouble about fixing the telescope on to the shot-gun. In any case, Müller was most impatient and wanted the matter attended to immediately. He had sent me down to FERLACH about this two or three days before. So off I went to telephone to FERLACH and as this is a most complicated procedure it took me a good hour and a quarter to complete the telephone call and when I returned I found that the lecture war all over and the others had commenced to have lunch. I asked them later what it was all about but can give no more information on the subject than I have already give for I do not remember any more, and of course I had only been told the vague outlines of the lecture."

(When tackled why <…> HOFFMANN hadn't said so before he told the interrogator with many hums and haws that he had really forgotten and that it was very difficult to remember, etc. He was left some paper with strict instructions to remember more and the interrogator hopes to add another note in his next report).

Visit to ZOSSEN. The "holy of holies"[491]

"We arrived about 1400 hour at ZOSSEN station and got into a car which was standing ready waiting for us. The party consisted of Major Müller, Dr. Messow, Dr. Oehler, Konieczny, and myself. The drive lasted about 10 – 15 minutes up to the maingates which are shown in my sketch[492]. Our passes and papers were very thoroughly examined by the guard and a little later we came to a second guard where everything was re-examined. We walked there for, some time and then were shown to a house on which was written very plainly on the entrance door '2A'. We were shown into the office of an Oberstleutnant STABWASSEN. Müller introduced us and the Colonel[493] explained that he had asked us to come here to give us an idea of the organisation of the British Army and later on in the evening we would be shown to his various specialists.

In the course of the conversation (the Colonel, Müller, and Messow spoke) he said he would be glad to see German soldiers in that part of the Middle East at last, pointing the while to a large map of IRAQ and PERSIA. He told us that his knowledge about the enemy order of battle down there was not particularly good and especially from IRAQ his news were very unreliable. He said it was certain the there were units there chiefly to mark time or to recuperate (interrogators note: My God!)[494] and that some of the units there had had very severe losses in AFRICA.

[490] For the tradition of high class gun production see DIE ZEIT (Österreichausgabe) 35/2025 (14th Aug 2025): „Stadt der Waffen".

[491] The Army High Command (OKH) and parts of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) were located in Zossen.

[492] This drawing is not reproduced here. For information on the Zossen location (OKH), see the websites http://www.buecherstadt.com/de/bunker/ and http://www.untergrund-brandenburg.de/Sub_Sites/1_und_2_Weltkrieg/Maybach_I_bei_Zossen/Maybach_I_bei_Zossen.php.

[493] It is unclear who is meant here.

[494] This statement by the interrogating officer indicates how poorly prepared the entire operation was, particularly in terms of knowledge of the military situation. In 1942, the British had established their own large military unit (PAIFORCE) in Persia and Iraq with its own command (Persia and Iraq Command), which was equipped with several divisions and brigades, primarily for the protection of oil facilities. The British units were

<…>

After this lecture we went to have dinner. <…>

We went next some trees and in the distance I could see many more houses at once when we came to a clearing I saw Ack-Ack towers[495] which surround the whole place some miles away so I judge the whole place to be very large indeed. I heard during the course of conversation that this holy of holies to which even Generals are sometimes refused admission went under the code name of ZEPPELIN.[496]

<…> After dinner we went back to 2A. By this time it was very dark. A Lieutenant whose name I have forgotten gave us a lecture about British divisional signs marked, as with as, on lorries and HQ buildings. I remember very little about this lecture as I was beginning to get tired, and very less about the next short lecture by another lieutenant on the same subject with the aid of a book.

The lecture was interrupted and we were told to report to a Lieut.Col, the American Army Expert. We were taken to the next but one building on which was inscribed "4A".

This was about 22.30 hrs and a very young Lieut.Col. <…> with a dynamic personality, awaited us in the office. <…>

He began by saying that his information from PERSIA and IRAQ was most unreliable. From IRAQ news kept on coming in that American troops had arrived there but in his opinion this could only be technical personnel whose task it would be, for example, to put together the planes for RUSSIA and possibly fly them across. He thought it more than unlikely that the British would let the Americans into IRAQ as well, after they had "thrown their weight about" (Interrogator's Note: literal translation of the Col.'s actual words)[497] to such purpose in PERSIA.

He was interrupted by a telephone call and whilst he was out of the room I saw a huge map on the whole giving the order of battle of the American Army and on a table a map of the Mediterranean. The day before PANTELLARIA[498] had fallen and near the island was a looped line with arrows and times of the day which I took to be movements of ships.

Afther his return the Colonel spoke about divisional signs and told us that every American soldier has his divisional sign on his sleeve. It was, he said, however doubtful whether he actually belonged that division as these signs – according to their AFRICA experiences – were frequently inter-exchanged to

put on the march after the Wehrmacht began its retreat towards Europe. However, Indian units remained stationed and ready for action.

[495] Ack Ack = anti-aircraft guns.

[496] This facility housed the most important telecommunications centre for the Wehrmacht until 1945. Location within the OKH: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bunker_W%C3%BCnsdorf_Zeppelin#/media/File:Zeppelin16.jpg.

[497] The rank does not match the one initially stated. In fact, the meaning of this paragraph is not entirely clear.

[498] Pantellaria is a small island between Sicily and Tunisia.

create confusion. Müller asked him whether he could have a table of these divisional signs and was told that one was in print now and if possible he would be furnished with a proof.

A sergeant then gave us the booklets of the American Army. This concluded our talk and we went back to 2A where the Lieutenant was still waiting for us with a booklet of British divisional signs. The booklet was shown round and Müller asked whether we could have a copy but was told – after Col. STABWASSEN had been asked – that such things were not to leave the office.

This concluded our visit and after saying good-by to Col. Stabwasser we were taken to ZOSSEN station and returned to BERLIN. We actually left ZOSSEN at about 23.30 hrs."

<…>

How could I help ENGLAND?

With reference to my reasons which determine my present attitude towards HITLER and which I have already stated in my letter of the 14th July[499] I should like to propose a plan from which you will be able to see how serious my intention is to help in the effort to destroy National Socialism.

During my 4 years stay in AFGHANISTAN I became very well acquainted with a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in KABUL called SIKKI SAITOH. He knew me only as a good German. Another Secretary at the Japanes Embassy whom I have met is called KAZUBE. He has a Scotch wife and his little boy went to the Kindergarten in which my wife taught. He was a frequent visitor at my house. I was also on friendly terms with a Dr. WATANABE, Medical Advisor to the Japanese Embassy.

I know, of course, the German Ambassador, PILGER[500], extremely well and also his second-in-command, SCHMITT, and in the Spring of 1941 was asked by them whether I was prepared to code and decode Embassy telegrams <…>. I declined and told them that I was too busy teaching at my school, but the real reason was that I was not prepared to sacrifice my free time.

I also know some clerks at the Embassy called WITZEL[501], SEEGER, ZUGENBUCHLER[502]. The two last named arrived shortly before the British occupation of PERSIA. I used to play cards with them and they

[499] See above p. 155. However, the letter there is dated 15 July 1943.

[500] Hans Carl Adolph Pilger (1888–1953) was German ambassador in Kabul between 1937 and 1945. Among others, he received the Indian nationalist Subhash Chandra Bose.

[501] This was First Lieutenant Dietrich Witzel, a member of the Brandenburg Lehrregiment. In April 1940, he travelled to Kabul as a courier for the Foreign Office, together with two radio operators, to contact and support the Indian underground movement against the British (including Indian nationalists and the Fakir of Ipi) – a plan that had been hatched by various German ‚prophets' of insurrection since the First World War. See also Bernd Lemke, Globaler Krieg: Colmar von der Goltz's plans for insurrection and conquest in the Middle East and India, in: Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch (eds.), The First World War and Jihad, The Germans and the Revolution in the Orient, Munich 2014, pp. 39–61. Witzel had to leave Afghanistan in September 1943 under pressure from the British.

[502] Correct spelling Zugenbühler. Zugenbühler was one of Witzels radio operators. On Witzels activities, see Jan Kuhlmann, Subhas Chandra Bose and the India Policy of the Axis Powers, Berlin, 2nd edition, 2015, especially chapter 7.10 and pp. 144f.

always acted very mysteriously and secretively. I don't know what their special jobs are; SEEGER is just a glorified typist. <…> .

Here, then, is my proposition.

1. I should have to be taken to a camp in INDIA or PERSIA whence I could escape and reach the Afghan frontier.
2. I would then report to the nearest Afghan sentry and would eventually be interned in KABUL.
3. The German Ambassador would then visit me and I would apply through him to the Afghan Government for permission, against parole, to be allowed to play tennis or bridge two days a week with my friends. The Afghan Premier would then presumably ask the British Ambassador for his attitude, and an agreement would have to be given apparently very unwillingly as otherwise the Afghans would smell a rat and would immediately tip off the German and Japanese Ambassadors.
4. My story to the German Ambassador would have to be most carefully rehearsed as he would report my arrival to GERMANY. But when he hears that I am a member of Abwehr 2 he will certainly trust me and I shall be able to gain his full confidence.
5. Similarly my story to the Japanese will have to be fired.
6. Absolute secrecy towards the Iraqis as they will be informed of my arrival through their Embassy in KABUL.
7. Absolute secrecy also within the British Embassy in KABUL as I am not certain whether KAZUDE's Scotch wife is not playing a double role.
8. Enquiries about myself in KABUL would have to be made very discreetly as otherwise people will think it funny when I suddenly turn up there.
9. Way and means by which I can communicate with British representatives to pass on the information.
10. As I am new to such acitivities I should like to have a short training by you.

If such a plan is put into effect I can guarantee success. The only thing I would ask of you is a British passport and the opportunity to have my dauther educated in ENGLAND.

Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann

AN APPRECIATION OF HOFFMANN'S CHARACTER

1. He pays great attention to health and physical fitness. Was an outstanding athlete at school and is now a powerfully built man. Prominent some years ago as Bannführer in the Hitler Youth which position was obviously not attained in a day. Charged with supervision of P<hysical>T<raining> of all German children in Afghanistan.

2. Appears to have a stable, even phlegmatic, termperament and steady nerves. Unlikely to break in physical circumstances. Takes a long time to make up his mind. Good powers of concentration.

3. Not unintelligent. Shows ability to carry an argument to its conclusion.

4. Tenacious. Background lower middleclass but has struggled through a fairly good education to a much better position than his father.

5. Extremely slow reaction. He was give a standard test, i.e. a word was called out to him and he was given a minute in which to call out anything with which he associated this word. The words were “Officer” – result 3 words; “Landscape” – result 6 words; “Salt – result 2 words. This is extremely slow.

6. Though he has an even temperament and might possibly keep his head in a crisis he is liable to be lot down very badly by his emotions which sway him considerably. First and foremost he is a typical German sentimentalist and has broken down and dissolved into tears more than once if play on his emotions was made. When reminded, for example, that loyalty to his convictions and his dear wife cound for more than commands by imcompetent superiors who had let him down so badly and got him this awful predicament, he began to sob.

7. In company with his fellow countrymen he loves to be dominated by some-one or something. His wife obviously exercises a controlling influence in his life, and he “follows” the phylosophical <sic!> escapados of Rudolf Steiner with burning enthusiasm.

8. Has shown no signs of very great physical or moral courage. Not only does he talk because he is frightened but also, whilst quite prepared to split on everybody else, does he show an unbecoming shyness when anything comes to light which incriminates him baldy and has to be firmly persuaded to open up a little more.

9. Finally, he does not seem to have an overdevelopped sense of responsibility. His constand re-iterations of the reasons which persuaded him to talk are as much to convince himself that he is not really abusing the confidence placed in him by his commanders as to persuade the interrogator of his bona finde change of heart and his great love for England.

Note: According to Hague conventions any man who declares himself an escaped Prisoner of War cannot be interned by a neutral country but must be repatriated.

Interrogation Ramzi Nafi Raschid

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

RAMZI, son of NAFI' HAJI RASHID AGHA

Aged 26 years

Khanaqah Monallari,[503] ARBIL

States that he was a student at the American University Beirut but wished to enter the Agricultural College, ANKARA. He was refused admission but through the influence of the Iraqi Consul Istanbul (Muwaffiq el Alusi[504]) he was adopted as a student in the ROBERT COLLEGE, Mechanical Engineering Section. The Principal of the College however demanded production of his former <…, corrupted> attainment and those have been produced were considered to be inadequate and he was discharged from the college in February, 1942.

Q. 1. What did you do after being dismissed from the Robert College?

A.1.I remained in ISTANBUL where I came into contact with one QASSIM, an Iraqi whose father's name I do not know. This man lives in Istanbul and belongs to the INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THE GERMAN CONSULATE IN ISTANBUL. I believe he was at one time <…, corrupted> in the Military Works Section of the Ministry of Defence in Baghdad. We became friends and he used to invite me to his home for food. He seemed to know that I had been dismissed from the College but asked me for the reason. I told him and he then advised me to approach the GERMAN CONSUL that, he said, is happy to assist any Iraqi. I considered what he had advised and eventually I did as suggested and approached the German Consulate.

Q.2. When where, and how did you first come into contact with the German "1", who introduced you? Give details of conversation, inducements offered, threats, etc.

A. 2. I was introduced by QASSIM[505] in March, 1942. He took me to a house situated in GALATA TUNEL QUARTER. The building was a PERSIAN and we entered a room in the SECOND STOREY. Here I met only one man, a GERMAN CALLED "ROBERT"[506] who speaks Turkish fluently. Robert opened the conversation by expressing his sympathy with me for having been discharged from the College. <…, corrupted> he would assist me financially but that first <…> to see my passport in order to satisfy the

[503] Old Quarter of Arbil that still exists today.

[504] Yehoshua Porat, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945, Milton Park New York 1986, states on p. 42 that al Alusi was consul in Beirut. It is possible that he held both positions at different times.

[505] Qassim was one of Rashid al-Gailani's followers who went into exile in Istanbul after the failed coup in 1941, where he was recruited as an agent by the Abwehr.

[506] This name is difficult to decipher. "Robert" has nothing to do with Robert College, founded in Istanbul in 1863.

security regulations.[507] He took my passport away but told me that <…> return it through <…> with the result of the check.[508] We left the Persian house <…>. After three days Qassim instructed me to go to the GERMAN CONSULATE and enquire for ROBERT who would inform me as of the results in regard to his promised assistance. I went to the Consulate and saw ROBERT who told me that the German authorities had agreed to assist me but that they wanted to know what kind of assistance I required. I replied that I wanted to study Cultural or Social Science in any German University. He then asked me to go to SOFIA and enter a Bulgarian College. <…> I agreed to his proposal <…>. I left Istanbul on the evening of 13th March, 1943 and arrived in SOFIA the next morning (14/1/43). At the Railway Station Military Officers were inspecting passports and <…> took me to DOCTOR WOLF[509] who was waiting in a motor-car. He took me to his office <…>. He is a doctor in Engineering Science. After a little time in his office he took me to a military office and there I obtained a permit for accommodation in a hotel in Sofia. I do not know the name of the hotel. Doctor Wolf asked me to meet him at 4 PM that day in the CAFE SOFIA. I obtained a guide and went to the Cafe where the Doctor joined us. <…> I explained to him my case and what <…, corrupted> in Istanbuld had promised. He said that there were two months only of the scholastic terms remaining and that it would be better if I went to BERLIN to study <…> there. To this I agreed and he took me to a photographer where three photographs of me were taken. <…> For three days I met him daily in Café Sofia and on the third day he handed me a GERMAN PASSPORT with instructions to show it to the officer controlling passports when I reached BELGRADE; the Office would be in the station and would recommend me to take the train via VIENNA. The Doctor also informed me that in VIENNA I would be met by another man who would facilitate my journey to BERLIN. In the train a man called „APPLEIT“ came asking for me. I introduced myself and he told me that he was ready to assist me in any way that I require. He asked me to join him in the adjoining compartement in the morning. This I did and told him of my desire to enter a school. He asked me if I had been a soldier in Iraq; I told him that I had not been a soldier but I had done a <…, corrupted> with the KURDISH when I was a student.[510] When we reached BELGRADE he assisted me with my baggage to the entrance of the station. I deposited my trunks in the store room and then accompanied „APPLEIT“ to a large room where there were German soldiers eating. We ate with them and then stayed outside the dining room waiting. We waited for four hours and he („APPLEIT“) asked the train controlling officer to help me en route. The latter took my passport and marked it and returned it to me. „Appleit“ then left me and said he would go to BERLIN by another route. I took another train at 4.30 PM for VIENNA. It was a German troop train and was transporting German troops. The train controlling officer told me that he would come and see me when the train arrived at Vienna. We reached VIENNA the nex morning and the train control Officer came to me (I do not know his name). He told me to get down from the train and go to the station and wait and left me. I waited for some time when a youth approached me and asked me if I was RAMZI; I replied that I was. This youth wore civil clothes and told me that he had been waiting for me. He took my luggage (two trunks and some school books). <…> He told me <…> I would reach a town called KLAGENFURT where I would meet a

[507] Conjecture.

[508] Conjecture.

[509] See the reference in the German Mammut-file, above p. 90 (where it is spelled Wolff). Wolf belonged to the Sofia War Organisation (KO). The KOs were the organizational framework for the Abwehrstellen (intelligence bureaus) in the Reich in allied or neutral countries. See the remarks in the introduction.

[510] It is unclear what is meant here. It may have been student associations or militias.

German Officer <…> who would facilitate my journey further. When I arrived at Klagenfurt and produced my passport to the Station Control Officers the Officer <…> arrived. He asked me if I was Ramzi and <…> took me to a nearby village where we passed the night. In the morning he told me that we ere going to a place where there would be eight military officers with whom we would became acquainted. He told me that these officers where in need of a man of my qualifications to teach them KURDISH. He also said that we <…> shall go to Berlin afterwards. We walked together then for about three hours and then reached a wooden cottage built among rocks. There we found MAJOR MÜLLER, LIEUTENANT HOFFMANN and LIEUTENANT KONIECZNY who are now under arrest in Baghdad <…>.

Müller told me that they were in need of me to assist them in their study of Kurdistan and that as they would have to depend upon me and as I would share of what they were doing they wanted to see for themselves that I was dependable. I told him that as I was with them and in his hands of returning to Istanbul they could rely upon me. They believed me. <…> one officer who had come from BERLIN lectured the officers assembled in the cabin; the object was Iraq, Iran and Turkey. <…> Four days later MÜLLER told me that they had three days leave and that he would be pleased if I would spend the time at his home. I agreed and went with him. The other officers went to their homes alone. Major MÜLLER's home is at a place some four hours from the town of STUTTGART by train. We reached the station at about 10 AM and walked for about an hour until we arrived at a village. When we reached the house, Major Müller introduced me to his father and mother and grandfather. I stayed with them for three night during which period they were very hospitable. I used to walk in the vicinity of the village with Major Müller. While I was staying there Major Müller asked me to show him how to cut and make an outfit of KURDISH CLOTHES. He gave me some cloth with some photographs of Kurds of Sulaimania Lewa. Among those photographs was one of SHEIKH MAHMUD. I showed him how to cut Kurdish clothing (garments) and from the instruction his wife made a suit for me for that as may be necessary <…> Major Müller told me. After the three days I and Major Müller and his wife went to BERLIN by train. WE went to a „Military Department". <…> We went to a room where I found waiting the others who had been with us in the cabin in the mountains. I was given a document which declared that I was an Interpreter in Kurdish, Arabic and Turkish. My name was shown as ABDULLAH TOWFIK.[511] <…> We remained in Berlin for about ten days and then had another leave <…>. Three days after returning to BERLIN Major Müller asked me whether I would agree to go with him to RUSSIA and then to IRAQ in an aeroplane. I only agreed to this after discussing the matter with HOFFMANN; I asked him whether I could refuse to go and he said "No". One day Major Müller, Hoffmann, Konieszny, and I took off in a plane; it had two pilots; there was a parachute instructor and and three other specialists in machine-guns.[512] At 7.0. PM that day we reached the CRIMEA PENINSULA and there passed the night. The parachute instructor gave me verbal (theoretical) instruction in parachute jumping and landing. Major Müller then told me that our destination was the IRAQI-PERSIAN frontier which we would reach in the evening and that the object of the expedition was to create a KURDISH REBELLION AGAINST IRAQ AND TURKEY. The parachute instructor was named "PAULUS" and while in the Crimea he and Major Müller had shown me how to wear the parachute <…, corrupted>. They had four boxes to which were attached parachutes and it was decided that we should land on the Iraqi-Persian frontier. After receiving the instruction I agreed to join them and to descend with them. We took off in the plane from the Crimea in the evening for Iraq. We flew at a great height and we had oxygen

[511] The Abwehr had initially given Ramzi the code name Abdullah Towfik.

[512] = gunners.

masks on our faces. After five hours flying we were ordered to descent (jump). I did so and found myself on the ground. Thereafter I realized that we had landed somewhere near TEL KEIF. At dawn I saw Major Müller, Hoffmann, Konieczny coming towards me. They were wearing their military uniforms. I was wearing Kurdish clothes. They told me that they had descend at the place intended. I refused to remain with them as long as they were in military uniform but they told me that they had Kurdish clothing and proceeded to change into it from their uniform which they left lying on the earth.

Q. Were you given any special instruction as to what you should say in the event of being arrested on landing?

A. When we were in the Crimea Major Müller gave me a tablet and told me that it was poison which killed immediately and if I was captured I should shwallow it; he gave similar tablets to both Hoffmann and Koncieczny. I put my tablet in my parachute overalls pocket which at the time I was wearing over my Kurdish clothes. When I landed I took off the parachute overalls; the tablet is still in the pocket, or probably it is; I do not know.

<…>

Q. Did any person who left Berlin with you in the plane remain behind in the Crimea?

A. We were 12 in the plane as far as I know; 2 Pilots, 1 W/T man, 1 Machine gunner on top, 2 Machine gunners under-neath, Paulus, and we four in the middle of the plane (Note: eleven only acounted for). And I do not remember any more or whether any remained behind in the Crimea or not but Müller told me that his brother is to be the one would recieve wireless communications from us in Iraq and that he would be in the Crimea; perhaps he it is whou remained but I do not know.

He here volunteered: „Major Müller told me before we left for Iraq that he had personally seen HITLER from whom he had personally received orders for the expedition to Iraq and there fore had gathered around him Hoffmann, Konieczny, Dr. Oehler and the others for the purpose of complying with Hitler's direct orders."[513]

Q. After landing by parachute and meeting with each other who directed you to ARBIL?

A. No one was with us; we were asking the way from cultivators and peasantry for directions until we reached a paved <…> road which appeared to have been the Dohuk road. Here we got into a bus which was heading for Mosul. I cannot remember its number or the driver. When we arrived near Mosul we got down from the bus and walked the remainder of the distance which was about 10 minutes. We arrived at a coffee-shop near the Mosul bridge where we rested and ate Kubba[514] and drank tea. It was evening and I enquired from a local night-watchman whether it was possible to find a hotel near where we were. He said that it was not possible. Therefore we arranged to sleep on the roof of the coffee

[513] As can be seen from the statements of other prisoners, Müller had never met Hitler personally nor had he received a direct order from him to carry out Operation „Mammut".

[514] Traditional Iraqi dish consisting of dumplings filled with minced meat.

shop for which we paid 50 fils each. In the morning we had breakfast and tea in the same coffee shop and started for ARBIL. On the way I enquired from passers-by for the road to the GUWAIR FERRY and we walked along the Guwair road for four hours. We became exhausted and slept the night in the open. In the morning we continued and reached a village near GUWAIR. Here we obtained bread and libbon[515] from a woman which we ate in her home. We asked her husband to provide us with doneys for the remainder of the journey. This he did and I paid him Fils 750 for hire. We reached GUWAIR at about 4.30 P.M and stayed on the river bank. In about half an hour we wished to cross by the ferry-boat which was standing near-by. The ferry-man asked me who I was and I told him that I was Ramzi Nafi' Agha but that I did not know who my companions were; I pair him SIX DINARS; he had wanted to hand us over to the Police as being deserters from the army; I told him that my companions were Pizhdaris[516] and he then allowed us to cross over. There was another man with the ferry-boat and he put us on to the road for Arbil and walked with us for some little way (20 minutes). I do not know his name; I paid him two dinars and he left us. The ferry owner would not believe my statement as to my own identity; he would not believe that the son of Nafi' Agha would be walking along in the dust and discomfort, long-haired and dirty, and with curious companions. About one and a half hours after leaving GUWAIR we reached a river; we rested until the moon rose. We then continued our way towards Arbil. We crossed a bridge over a river and there there slept for about half an hour or an hour. We continued and at about dawn we arrived at a garden; we found an old man there and I asked for food. He gave us bread and cucumber for which I paid him Fils 100. Just before sun-rise we started out again crossing yet another bridge over a small stream.

In another 2 hours we reached Jebel Rhenamik <?> , the neighbourhood of my fathers' village, called TARJAN[517]. Here we sat down in the shade. I left Müller and Konieczny and taking HOFFMANN with me went to our village where I asked[518] for our servant OTHMANN.[519] When we arrived I warned him against telling anyone of my presence and then sent him to bring Müller and Konieczny. He brought them and we went into a house lying aside from the village; the house belongs to my father and he usually puts up in it when he visits the village. The key of this house is usually kept by OTHMANOK.[520] It contains the necessary furniture. Othman prepared food for us and at noon we ate and then slept. The village contains over a hundred houses but, except Othman no one saw us. Just before dusk I ordered Othman to produce three mules (our own property) and two men. He complied with my order. One of the men was my grandfather's servant OTHMANOK <…, corrupted> , but I do not know the name of the other. We went thus to a point near the Minaret[521] outside Arbil whence one man and

[515] A kind of yoghurt mixed with water (Ayran).

[516] The Pizhdars are a Kurdish tribe in northern Iraq, living on the border with Iran. The capital of this region is called Rania. The agents of the Mammut operation were supposed to be parachuted into Rania, but due to a navigation error on board the transport aircraft, they landed about 200 km too far west of the city.

[517] Tarjan is located southwest of Arbil. Tarjan is a village that belonged to Ramzi's grandfather. This place is still owned by his family today. Jebel Rhenamik is a village near Tarjan.

[518] Conjecture.

[519] A servant of Ramzis' father.

[520] It is the same servant, Othman (Othmanok), with the latter representing a diminutive form of his name.

[521] The minaret is still one of Erbil's landmarks today.

the animals returned to Tarjan. Othmanok remained with us. We continued our way and entered a house about 10 minutes walk from the EAST side of the town. This house is the property of my uncle ATTAULLAH AGHA and we were hidden in a room. We also had food, but I did not see my father or my Uncle as we had entered the house secretly. That evening we left on foot for PANRATAGA[522] <…, corrupted> village which belongs to my uncle NUR AD DIN AGHA <?> . Othomanok was with us: we reached it at midnight and entered a garden belonging to my uncle NUR AD DIN AGHA <?> and I sent OTHMANOK to call my Uncle's servant MAHMUD <?> . Mahmud came and I warned him not to tell anyone of my presence, not even my uncle, and that he should give us food. He did this and after eating we slept in a room in the garden where we passed the whole day. In the evening we left for BIOKA[523] village and I took Mahmud with me. BIOKA is about 3 hours distant from BENASLAWA.[524] We reached BIOKA, and I sent Mahmud to fetch the Mukhtar QADIR KEMKAL,[525] who came and <…, corrupted> and provided accommodation for the night in his own house which is the only house in the village. I told the Mukhtar that the group[526] had to be hidden and that he had to help us.[527] He told us to use a cave <…, corrupted> . I asked him to bring the others[528] to the cave <…, corrupted> to the cave.

When he returned told me that he had put them in the „hide-out" all right. Six days passed[529], and he provided us in the house and himself took meals to the Germans in the cave. Two days after arrival I followed the Germans to the cave. They requested me to arrange to send Konieczny to Turkey either alone, or to send them all together. I advised them remain hidden until the arrival of the second party (Klein Schmidt, Grosse Schmidt, Kleiter and Doctor Oehler). I assured them that they could remain hidden for months without being observed by anyone. Afterwards I heard from a village shepherd that war had broken out between Turkey and Germany. Then I heard from a passer-by that four Germans had been landed in Iraq by parachute and that one was named RAMZO and that the Government is

[522] Conjecture. The name refers to a village located to the northeast of Erbil called Binsilawa, which was among the properties of Nwarddin Agha, son of Rashid Agha, who was an uncle of Ramzi.

[523] The place belonged to Ramzi's uncle. See also the geographical information above. On February 19, 2026, Rosbeiani and Saman Agha, Ramzi Nafi's nephew, located the place where the members of Operation Mammut were arrested after a smuggler who had arranged to transport them to Turkey had betrayed them. The discovery of these locations was facilitated by Hussein Mawloud Hussein Mantak, a resident of the village of Bioka-i Gawra, whose father had worked for Noureddine Agha, Ramzi's uncle and owner of the villages of Banslawa, Bioka, and others. The three Germans were apprehended in their hideout in the village of Bioka, located east of Erbil, approximately 27 kilometers from the city. Ramzi's hideout, situated in a water reservoir, was also identified. See the photographic appendix. For exact location of Bioka-i Gawra see https://www.google.com/maps/place/36°11'51.0%22N+44°13'29.7%22E/@36.197498,44.2223321,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d36.197498!4d44.224907?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI2MDIyMi4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.

[524] Some kilometers south-east of Arbil. This village, too, belonged to Ramzi's uncle.

[525] Mayor or Representative of the Village.

[526] Conjecture.

[527] Conjecture.

[528] Conjecture.

[529] Conjecture.

looking for them[530]. I then thought it would be advisable to inform my parents to arrange something with the Government about these Germans, but I could not myself inform the Goverment. A caravan of tabacco smugglers passed by and they sat with us (me and the Germans). One of them was greatly attracted by the German made Kurdish suits which the Germans were wearing. I told him that he could have them if he would go in to ARBIL and buy other suits for which I would pay him. He agreed and I gave him eight dinars to purchased 3 SIRWALS, 2 Kurdish quilted coats, 4 pairs of Klashen, four arakchins with cloth for head-dresses, cloth for three Kurdisch waist bandages, three yashmaghis.[531] In two days he returned with the clothing and after changing he was presented with the German suits. I also gave him three more dinars. He asked me who the Germans were and I told him that they were Persians. He left us and went away. On the fifth day of our hiding I left the Germans at night and headed for Arbil. In about 5 hours I met a caravan and was told that the police and the British military Staff at Arbil had searched my Uncle Attaullah's qasr[532]. This alarmed and confused me and I determineed to escape alone and by myself. I got back on the read leading to BENASLAWA village[533] intending to make my way to the hills to the eastern side of the village. But I lost my my way and was compelled to return to the village; I reached it at about 4.0 P.M and went to my uncle Nur ad Dins's gardens where I had rested for a while in the shade of the trees. I then came out and a second time headed for the hills. Near the smaller Benaslawa village[534] I observed a body of police coming towards me from over the mountain. I changed my direction and walked towards the south so that the police would not see me. I reached a place among the hills and was out of their sight. There I headed for the main Ennaslawa village and when I reached it I met a small boy. I enquired from him whether there were any police in the village and he said that there were not. I remained in the garden for about an hour when the same small boy, I do not know his name, returned and told me that the police were in the village; he said 4 constables. I therefore left the garden and headed east looking for a place to hide. After walking for about an hour I came to a stream at the edges of which there was some bushwood. I concealed myself in this bushwood. I heart the sound of the police horses passing within 10 metres of where I lay hidden but they did not see me. I paassed the night in this place and in the morning returend to Ennaslawa village. I again met the same small boy in the garden. He told me that a large body of Police and soldiers had come to the village and had searched every house and place in it and also that they had arrested three Germans who had told the police that Ramzi had been with them. He told me that my uncle Nur ed Din was with the police assisting in the search and that he had given orders to all the villagers to assist the police and to catch me and hand me over to the police if they saw me. I went then to the smaller Ennaslawa village and hid in the garden. I asked the gardener about the Mukhtar. The Mukhtar came and told me that the police had arrested all my family; that my uncle Nur ad Din was there and

[530] This information is not correct. Die British found out about the names only after the capture.

[531] This list of items consists of traditional Kurdish garments that form part of the national costume. Sirwals are trousers, Kilash shoes, Arakshin a felt cap. The hip bandage is a traditional loincloth. A Yashmag is a turban that can be wrapped or wound around the cap.

[532] = (arab.) house or palace. Obviously the house of Ramzis uncle. Ramzi's family owned two castles in Erbil. Attaulah qasr is the one located to the east.

[533] For this location: https://www.google.com/maps/place/36°09'25.9%22N+44°11'46.6%22E/@36.157188,44.1258569,12z/data=!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d36.157188!4d44.196281?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI2MDIyMi4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.

[534] East of Benaslawa (= „Little Benaslawa").

had ordered them to get hold of me. I asked the mukhtar to hide me, to help me to hide myself, or to send to somewhere, but he told me that my uncle had ordered him to hand me over to the police. He advised me to take shelter in a small hut in the garden and said that he would come back in a short while. I went in the hut. In about ten minutes the mukhtar returned accompanied by my uncle Nur ad Din Agha who asked me to surrender myself to the Government. I agreed to do so and he therefore took me to an automobile that was waiting at a point about a kilometre from the village where there were two police men waiting and ready. My uncle handed me over to the police and I was taken to Arbil Police Station. I did not know then what had happened to the Germans.

Q. From your statement it is clear that you (voluntarily) accompanied Major Müller and the other two Germans and descended (in Iraq) by parachute with them. This shows that you must have known the exact reason why they had come to Iraq and you also must have known the Kurdish tribal leaders with whom they were to have to into contact for purposes of collaboration. You have not mentioned hithero what passed between you on this subject while you were in Berlin nor have you given the names of these persons who would have put you up. Keeping all this secret indicates that you intended to take them to one of the Arbil villages of your father and uncle and to maintain and keep them under your protection while they do their spying and revolutionary work through you, as in fact you have said. You must therefore confess the whole truth and render service to your country by saving it from the enemy.

A. The reason why I led the Germans to Arbil and hide them in my father's villages was in order to conceal them and to keep their presence in Iraq unknown until I could make my way and take refuge in Turkey where I would have informed the TURKISH GOVERNMENT of what had happened to me and Major Müller and his party. Through the Turkish authorities I would have taken refuge with the Iraqi Consulate there and so I believed I would lighten the burden of my responsibility. I repeat again that it was Major Müllers intention to land in IRAN[535]. While we were talking on this subject the names of Sheikh Mahmud and Sewar Agha[536] Agha were mentioned because Müller had been in Iraq in 1937[537] and had met some of the tribal leaders of whom he had a list of names; he therefore was not in need of my information about these<…, corrupted> as he already knew them.

Q. When you decided to disclose their presence, why did you not inform the Iraqi Goverment which was much closer than the Turkish government?

A. <…, corrupted> I planned[538] to inform them but[539] our landing had become known, we were „watched" and I was afraid.

[535] Ramzi is trying to portray the whole operation as a mistake. He maintained the real target had been Persia.

[536] Name partially deduced. It could be someone from the Pizhdar tribe whom Müller met there during his trip in the 1930s: Suar Agha (Kurdish spelling), who is said to have been the chief of the Bilbas tribes, cf. Goran, Mohamad and Khoschnaw, Neriman (eds.) Ramzi Nafi', Rolaiyeki hawleri Fidakari Sarbaxoiyi Kurdistan, Erbil 2008, p. 18.

[537] Müller had been in Iraq 1935/36.

[538] Conjecture.

[539] Conjecture.

Q. How many times have you travelled to TURKEY?

A. Only once, and that was in November, 1942 for the purpose of study.

Q. Mention any Turkish subject whom you know to be working for the Axis, or against the Allies.

A. I do not know of any.

Q. Where were you in July, 1942?

A. I was in Arbil.

Q. Have you not been to Istanbul in July, 1942 and thence returned to Iraq?

A. No. I was not in Istanbul but in BEIRUT. During October, 1941 I joined the American University, Beirut. I remained there until February, 1942 when I returned to Iraq, Arbil. I returned to Beirut in March and again returned home to Arbil in May, 1942 for the summer holidays. During the vacation I came to Baghdad and met a representative of the A.U.B.[540] in the Maude Hotel who informed me that I was not accepted for further study at the A.U.B. I thereafter thought about entering the Turkish Agricultural College in Ankara and I obtained a letter from the Turkish Consulate, and a visa and left on the 15th November, 1942 via Tel Kotchuk.[541] I arrived in Ankara on 17/11/1942; that was my first visit in Turkey.

Q. With whom did you associate in Arbil, Bagdad, Koj[542] etc. during your last visit to Iraq from Beirut in 1942?

A. In Arbil I have not friends and associated only with my relations. In Baghdad I associated with Abdul Kasliq el Droumga[543] to whom I wrote from Istanbul as I already have stated; I also was with Amin el Haideri[544] (Amin ibn Subeghtullah el Haideri) a student in the Law College, a Kirkukli; Buyiz ibn Amin el Bisdayi[545], Arbil student in the Law College and who was living in Al Khali Hotel. Said bin <…, corrupted> Othman, of Arbil, Law College, Subhi al Ahwari <…, corrupted> Govt. Press[546] whose deceased sister was my father's wife and from whom my father has 3 sons and 3 daughters all of whom are in Arbil. I passed most of my live with Abdul Khaliq al <…, corrupted> ; I stayed in the Dijlah Hotel. In Kirkuk I associated with Amin el <…, corrupted> brothers, Abdul Qadir, teacher in the Secondary School and Kamil <…, corrupted> Director of Tapu.[547]

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[540] = American University Beirut.

[541] Telkocker, also known as Al-Yaarubiya in the north-western part of Syria.

[542] Probably the town Koi Sanjaq east of Arbil.

[543] The names in the following that are not specified in the footnotes are partially deduced.

[544] Originated from one of the upper class families of Arbil and became supreme judge of the court in Mossul in the 1970s.

[545] Bayez ibn-Amin Dizeyei was a lawyer.

[546] Conjecture.

[547] Turkish word for land registration office, a type of land registry office for determining taxes levied on land. For the background cf. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, A Study

<…>

Q. A number of tin-pins with the Kurdish emblem were found with the boxes; they had the sign of the sun in the middle. Why were these <…, corrupted> by the party?

A. <…, corrupted> Major Müller did not tell me he had put them[548] in the mission boxes <…, corrupted>.

Q. From what you gathered, to which of the clan chiefs was the flag to have been presented?

A. Major Müller did not tell me.

Q. We understood that there is an organisation in Iraq working against Iraq and the Allies for the Axis and you are one of the members. If you were not how could you have dared to go to Berlin and do all this for the Germans for no reasons especially as you are not in need of money and are related to a rich family?

A. I know nothing of the existence of any organisation working against Iraq and the Allies and have never been a member of one of any other party. I am personally responsible for my own self while the reason for my going to SOFIA was, as I stated, for the sole purpose of study. QASSIM[549] is the man who cheated me and who brought me to this. I know that I had fallen into a net from which I could not see how I could escape and prove my sincerety (<…, corrupted>). I therefore have accepted matters and have put my case in the hands of the Great God who had destined me for this fate.[550]

<…>

Q. Did you meet Dr. Mahmud Shukri Sogban[551] when where and under what circumstances.

A. I met him in ISTANBUL. Hussein bin Ridha el Askari[552] whom I know and I went once to Dr. Sogban's house in Bay Oglou[553] where we had coffee. Hussein al Askari introduced me as Ramzi Nafi' of Arbil

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of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers, Princeton 1978, espec. BOOK ONE.

[548] Conjecture.

[549] See above FN 505.

[550] For this reason, Cecil Hourani considered Ramzi to be a fatalist in his report (see p. 203f.).

[551] Dr. Mahmud Shukri Sogban (1881-1960) was a Kurdish nationalist of Turkish origin, a doctor by profession, who lived in Iraq and was a member of the Khoybun Party and author of several books. In later years, he moved to Turkey, from where he actively fought against Kurdish nationalists in Iraq with the help of Turkish nationalists.

[552] A well-known name. However, no detailed information concerning the historical person are available.

[553] Western district of Istanbul (European side), now known for its multicultural character. Taksim Square is also located there.

and we chatted in Turkish on commercial matters. We talked on this subject and other matters for about half an hour but there was no discussions of a political nature.

Q. You have stated that you were in contact with QASSIM? What was this man doing in Istanbul?

A. He told me that he was under medical treatment but I saw that he was in touch with the German Consulate and it was he who bluffed me into approaching that consulate.

Q. We have reason to believe that you met Dr. Najdat Suliman, Hamud el Wattar, Mohammed Aly Massoon, Naji Shawkat and others. Where and how did you become acquainted with them?[554]

A. I have never met them; I do not even know their faces.

Q. What do you know of the Iraqi internees who travelled from Denzelli [555]to Izmiar and thence to Europe?

Q. I do not know Denzelli, nor do I know Izmir; I do not know of any of the internees having so travelled.

Q. What Iraqis were having parachute training?

A. I do not know of any.

Q. The mukhtar of BIOKA village QADRI KENKAL[556] denies that you were in the village with the Germans, or that he had seen you there. What do you say to this?

A. The servant <…, corrupted> of my uncle Nur ed din Agha was in my company when we went to BIOKA village and put up with QADRI KENKAL; I do not see how he can deny having seen me.

Q. We understand that ABDUL KHALIQ AL DABAGH with whom you had been communicating is your nephew; why did you not mention this relationship?

A. Yes, he is my nephew.

[554] The individuals mentioned in this paragraph are all Iraqi nationalists who went into exile in Istanbul after Rashid al-Gailani's coup in 1941. Naji Shawkat had been Prime Minister under Feisal I in 1932-33 and had conducted intensive negotiations with the German Reich and its ambassador in Istanbul, Franz von Papen, in 1940. See Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, London 2017 (1st ed. 1966), chap. V–VIII. For further information on the details of the relationship between the aforementioned Arab nationalists who participated in the May 1941 movement in Iraq and their contacts with Franz von Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara, see Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen „Mammut“, pp. 53 f. Istanbul at that time was a hotspot of Intelligence, Spying and Intrigue. Thousands of exiles came into town. The secret services of the US and Great Britain were most active there and more powerful than the German Abwehr etc. Ernst Schmidl, Hitlers Spion, Österreichs Stimme, Die zwei Leben des Wilhelm Hendricks-Hamburger (1917 – 2011), Innsbruck Wien Bozen 2020, pp. 48 – 86.

[555] Denizli is a Turkish provincial capital in western Asia Minor, the second largest city in the Turkish Aegean region after Izmir.

[556] Correct spelling rather Kakel.

Q. We understand you and Muhammad Aly el Debani[557] travelled together to SOFIA; why did you not mention this?

A. I travelled to SOFIA alone; I saw this man (Muhammad Aly el Debani) in Istanbul in the Agha Café about a month before I left. I do not know whether he travelled to Sofia before or after me.

Q. Have you ever been concerned in a political case before?

A. Neither in a political nor any other case.

<…>

Q. Who were the Germans in Turkey with whom you were in contact?[558]

A. In Turkey I was in contact with Mr. ROBERT in the pension in the Galata Tunel Quarter.[559] I do not remember the name of the pension. My contact with this man was through QASSIM <…>. He usually is to be found in the Agha Cafe in Bey Oglou. <…> Through QASSIM I became acquainted with another German named VERMAN, I have already mentioned him and all the other Germans whom I met on the way to Berlin. I remember no others.

<…>

Q. Who directs espionage operations in Turkey.

A. I know only ROBERT, VERMAN and the old woman working in the consulate and who gave me the letter to the Bulgarian Consulate.

Q. Give the names of any Iraqis whome you know to be working for the Germans in Turkey.

A. I know QASSIM, ABDUL ALDA DA'DU <…> had the opticians shop in Rashid Street, Baghdad.[560] I came to know him at the Agha Cafe. One day he asked me how I managed to meet my expenses in Istanbul. I told him that I received money from my parents which was sufficient for my means. He then suggested that he shold introduce me to the German Consulate in Istanbul where I would be fixed with a monthly salary in returen for which I would give them information regarding Iraq which I would gather during the holidays. This I refused to consider and left him. I also seq one LOUIS BAKOS[561], a student in the Robert College, in ROBERT's room in the GERMAN CONSULATE when I approached

[557] Arabic Nationalist and follower of Gailani.

[558] The following passages are in a upper section in the original files. For a better understanding they are reproduced here below the questions and answers concerning the contacts of Ramzi in the region.

[559] The two individuals mentioned here (Hubert and Verman) could not be identified. These are likely pseudonyms.

[560] Qassem and Abdul al-Dahud were both owner of this opticians shop. His real name is correctly written as ʿAbd al-Aḥad Dāwūd.

[561] Louis Bakos was a Northern Iraqi Christ, and an agent of the Abwehr and a fellow student at the Robert-College in Beirut.

Robert. I wanted to enter his room but was prevented because Louis Bakos was in the room before me. I had frequently seen him in the company of another Iraqi student named RANODIT[562] although I never have spoen to the latter. They collect information in Iraq while on holiday and pass it to the Germans when they return. Abdul Agha Da'du[563] told me this when he suggest that i might do likewise.

<…>

In Sofia I met the son of the former Regent, Sherrif Sharraf[564]; I met with Doctor WOLF and he invited me out at a restaurant, but Sherrif Sharraf paid the bill.

In Sofia, also with Doctor WOLF, in his office, I found a SYRIAN of Damascus. I do not know his name.

Sherrif Sharraf asked me many questions about Iraq and which were the Iraqis like him (i.e. Raschid Aly <…, in part corrupted>). I also met another Iraqi in Sofia; <…> I have been told that he was the Minister of Munition in Rashid Aly Gailani's cabinet. I did not see any other Iraqi anywhere either on way or in Berlin itself.

<…>

Q. Give the names of any Germans, Italians, Hungarians or other with whom you have been in contact in TURKEY and ones you know that worked for the Axis.

A. I have already given the name of Robert, Vernes, and the old lady at the consulate. I know no other Germans, Italians, Hungarians or other nationalities in Turkey <…>.

Doctor WOLF who met me at Sofia <…> took me to his room and later we had food in a restaurant near the Cafe Sofia; he paid the bill. The next day we met again in the Cafe Sofia and there I was introduced by Doctor Wolf to the Minister of Education in Rashid Aly's cabinet.[565] He offered to put my in his house and to help me in any way I might nedd. I thanked him but declined his offer. He left me then and I did not see him again.

[562] Name deduced. No further information.

[563] Name deduced.

[564] Sharif Sharraf (1881-1955) was a nobleman from Saudi Arabia who fought alongside the future Iraqi royal family against the Ottomans during World War I. After the future King Faisal was driven out of Syria by the French, he also lived in Iraq from 1925 onwards. During the Gailani coup, the previous guardian of the young king (Faisal II), who was still a minor, was deposed and Sharif Sharraf was appointed as the new guardian. After the failed coup, he fled first to Iran, then to Turkey, and finally to Sofia.

[565] Muhamad Hasan Salman.

The sone of the SHARRIF SHARRAF came later and again I was introduced by Dr.Wolf. We had dinner together but I did not visit his house. I passed the night in the hotel alone on the order given to the accommoadtion by Dr. Wolf.

<…>

During our conversations Dr. WOLF asked me about the Kurds and their condition in Iraq. I said that I considered their condition to be better now then under Rashid Aly's government. He asked me also about Sheikh MAHMUD and of his REVOLT AGAINST THE BRITISH. I told him that he was misinformed and that his revolt had been against the government of Rashid Aly and not against the British.[566]

He then mentioned in a very sarcastic manner that the Turkish Consul would soon be leaving Sofia and added that the Turkish government had refused to allow German assistance to Rashid Aly to pass through Turkey.

He returned to questioning me about SHEIKH MAHMUD and I then told him that I had heard that the British Ambassador, Sir Kinnahan Cornwallis, with Jamil Radfai'[567] hat interviewed Sheikh Mahmud who had agreed to raise rebellion against Rashid Aly and done so. On this WOLF replied that I was wrong because Sheikh Mahmud had nothing against Rashid Aly.

He asked me about the Kurds in Turkey and in Persia. I told him that in Turkey they are oppressed and have no love for the Turks; the same applies to the Kurds in Persia.

He asked me how the people of Iraq looked upon Rashid Aly and I replied that some liked him and some did not; he later took me to the Bulgarian statue of liberty and said Look at that: see <…> liberated the Bulgars from the Turks."[568]

[566] When the Gailani coup began in 1941, Sheikh Mahmud attempted to reach Sulaimaniyya on May 20. There he gathered sympathizers to spark a new uprising. But although many of his followers, especially those of the Hiwa Party, advised him against fighting the British, he nevertheless sent demands to them. In these demands, he called for the police, administration, and judiciary in South Kurdistan to be under their own control and no longer under the control of the central government in Baghdad. Neither the British nor the Iraqis, not even the coup leaders, could accept this demand. Instead, it was agreed that he could choose his place of residence in Kurdistan, go to the mosque in Suleimaniyya every Friday, and allow one of his sons to continue his studies in Baghdad. Mahmud then adopted a more moderate line and did not support the coup leaders in Baghdad when their defeat began to loom. Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen „Mammut", p. 150f.

[567] Jamil Radfai was an Iraqi politician and monarchist. From 1933 to 1943, he served as Prime Minister of Iraq a total of six times.

[568] This is probably the monument to Russian Tsar Alexander II, who almost completely expelled the Ottoman Empire from Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. This was probably intended to suggest that even small nations can successfully rise up against an empire – with the help of another empire, of course. The monument was erected at the beginning of the 20th century and still stands today.

<…> <FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION>

Professor HADANK, aged about 65[569], lean, average height, wears civil clothes. White moustache, Professor[570] of Eastern Languages, i.e. Persian, Turkish, and Kurdish. Speaks ENGLISH and FRENCH. He lived in a cottage some 15 minutes distant from the hut <Alpenhütte>. He was teaching KURDISH to the party mentioned above. Also sometimes he gave lecture on the Kurds, their habits and customs. He did not know how to use a W/T set. He lectured daily from aboug 1100 to 12.30 h. He complained about the elevation and said that the doctors had said that he was not to go higher than 400 metres whereas this place was, he said, over 900 metres. He used to ask me to translate English phrases into KURDISH. The books he was teaching the party from included "Kurmanji Grammar"[571] by T. B. Soane, "Road in Kurdistan" by Mr. Hamilton on the Rowanduz road, and "Two Years in Kurdistan" by Capt. Hay, Political Officer ARBIL LIWA over twenty years ago.

Some 8 or 10 days after my arrival at KLAGENFURT an Officer arrived from Berlin. <…> He was introduced to him; my name, Ramzi, was mentioned to him. After lunch, he and Major Müller went out for a walk together. On his return, Major Müller told me that he had something privat to talk to me about. He took me on one side and said: 'So long as you are with me and are in close touch with us you should give us your word of honour that you will be loyal to us'. I replied 'I am completely in your hands and under your control and have no hope of getting back to my own country where I could betry you, even if I wished' and added 'You people brought me here and at any rat you shold not doubt or suspect me.'. We shook hands on this. The German officer from Berlin and Lieutenant KONIECZNY were present at this interview which took place while we were walking up and down outside the hut. Afterwards we dined and went to bed for the night. The officer from Berlin slept in the hut that night. Next morning all assembled for a lecture by the German officer from Berlin: he lectured in the German referring as he spoke to a large map of Iraq, Iran and Turkey. He else used smaller maps of the various parts of northern Iraq, Arbil, Rowanduz, Mosul, Kirkuk etc. There were similar maps of areas in Persia. The whole party took special interest in the mountainous areas of NORTHERN IRAQ and marked on their maps routes leading to Rowanduz, Arbil, Piran[572], Koi Sanjak, Penjwin. They marked the bridges on the roads and made particular note of aeroplanes landing grounds and the roads leading to and through ROWANDUZ. They also marked all air basis in Iraq, water resources etc. and particularly automobile routes and railways in Northern Iraq. Dr. OEHLER made then markings himself. The (?) marked in on their maps the roads from Kirkuk to Rowanduz through Arbil, to Koi Sanjak; Khaniqin, Sulaimania. I remember that in ISTANBUL, "Robert" had asked me whether the railway from ARBIL to KIRKUK had been built or not. Major Müller also questioned me about the ARBIL – KIRKUK road and the bridges etc. on it. In the cabin there was discussion of the BITWIN area[573], Koi Sanjak. Almost every tribe in northern Iraq and in Iran also I heard mentioned. Major Müller mentioned the name of SHEIKH

[569] Hadank was born 1889, so he was 54 years old in 1943.

[570] Hadank was no professor.

[571] Kurmanji is one of the Kurdish main languages.

[572] This place name refers to the Pirmam, also known as Sulayman Salahaddin Resort, located near Erbil.

[573] Bitwin is synonym to Pizhdar.

MAHMUD in Berlin. Lieutenant HOFFMANN also said that they had received a report from Iraq that SONAR AGHA[574] had sent a congratulation to the Prime Minister, Nuri Sa'id. I saw with them photographs of Kurdish personalities among whom was Sheihk <…, corrupted>; I know that Müller been in Iraq in 1937[575] Major MÜLLER told me that they intended to land on the Iraqi-Iran frontier in the hills in the territory[576] of the PIRAN TRIBE[577] which I believe lives in Iraqi territory.

Q. Do you know where MÜLLER intended to make his headquarters after landing? Did you not hear any names mentioned?

A. I gathered from MÜLLER that they would land in the PIRAN; I do not know the country, as I never have been there. I heard the officer who came from Berlin mention Koi Sanjak, Bitwin, Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Penjwin, Kaniqin and other places. I cannot remember having <…, corrupted> mentioned, but after landing I know that we were to have remained for two months there and I was to have been sent where they wanted; Major Müller told me this. I never heard him mention the names of any tribal leaders in this district.

Q. You mentioned the Bitwin; does this not suggest to you they intended to establish their headquarters whereabouts for these <…, corrupted> months?

A. I understand from them that they first would make a landing to the mountains near PIRAN. They would then hide themselves and their stores and the would get into touch with the people they knew and "commence their work"; I was to have been sent on special mission in the district. They wanted to make the place their headquarters for the months after which, Major Müller said, each would go to the place appointed to him.

Q. From whom where they expecting help?

A. Major Müller told me that they were expecting help from the tribal chiefs in northern Iraq after he had made friends with them. In Berlin I heard the name of Sewar Agha[578] mentioned.

Q. Where there other names of Aghas, Begat, Sheikhs mentioned?

A. They had a list of Aghawat and Begat[579] of Northern Iraq; I did not learn the names on the list.

[574] Probably Suar Agha. See above FN 536.

[575] Actually, this had been in 1935/36.

[576] Conjecture.

[577] In fact, the Piran tribe lives in the Kurdish regions of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq; here, the reference is to their territory in Iran, not Iraq.

[578] See above FN 536.

[579] Aghawat is the plural of Agha, Begat is the plural of Beg. Both titles, like Sheikh, are used to designate tribal leaders.

Q. Have you heard names other than Sheikh Mahmud Susa or Hurais[580] <…, corrupted> Agha of Koi, Sowar Agha[581] Piran, Siddiq, or others in such a way so you could gather what was meant?

A. As I have said I heard Sheikh Mahmud and Sowar Agha mentioned; I did not hear Hurais Agha's name mentioned at any time. He might have been on the list of names, but I do not know this.

Q. Do you know Hurais Agha?[582]

A. I know he is native of Koi and used to visit my father and uncle Atta'ullah Agha[583]. I do not know whether there is any relationship between them.

<…>

Q. Ramzi here was shown two photographs of Karl Bruno SCHMIDT who was employed ass a dental mechanic by the I.P.C.[584] until 1939 and was asked "Who are these men"?

A. Both photographs are of the man I have called Klein SCHMIDT and who was in the building in Berlin I have just mentioned.

Q. Was happened in the O.K.W. building?

<…>

On the wall of the office there was a large map of Iraq, Turkey and Iran. they also had many smaller maps and I could unterstand that they were studying military locations etc. on them. Reports regarding Iraq, Iran and Turkey used to come to this office and they checked them. These reports in some cases referred to tribal leaders as I remember hearing the name of SONAR AGHA as having congratulated Nuri Pasha in a telegram. HOFFMANN explained that report to me. Me and Major MÜLLER asked as if i knew Sonar Agha and I replied that I did not. They also brought a letter written in Persian and asked me to read it; I could not do so as I do not know Persian. Hoffmann explained another report received regarding Turkey; it was to the effect that Turkey was becoming pro-Allied and that the building of a railway line from Iraq to Turkey was a proof of this; also that a pipe line from Iraq to Turkey was further proof.

[580] The editors believe that the person in question is Mullah Ḥawīz Agha Hasan Agha Ghafūrī from the Koysinjaq region (1896–1977), who was a member of the Iraqi National Assembly during the monarchical period and served for three parliamentary terms between 1935 and 1958.

[581] Again Suar Agha.

[582] Name deduced. The most famous Agha of Koi was Kaka Ziad, son of Hama Agha, "the Great." Whether he was involved in rebellious activities remains unclear for the time being.

[583] Atta'ullah Agha was indeed the uncle of Ramzi.

[584] = Iraqi Petroleum Company.

One day Major Müller told me that I was invited by a Professor "BAUER".[585] Konieczny took me to his house. It was afternoon. We found him alone. <…> He knows Turkish and Arabic and talked with me and Koneiczny in Turkish. He addressed me as "RAMZI". Konieczny soon left me alone with this professor. He told me he would teach me Social Science and registered my name. He enquired about my home and I told him I came from Arbil. He said he knew Arbil and its people and spoke to me on its history. He mentioned that it was an ancient city and was the centre of the gods. The battle between Darius and Alexander the Great[586] took place in its neighbourhood. He asked me how Arbil was supplied with water and I told him that it was supplied by means of wells and the the farms were irrigated from natural ressources. He enquired about people of ARBIL and he asked about MULLA EFFENDI[587]: I told him that he had died recently.

He praised Mulla Effendi an how he was a respectable, religious man. He enquired about <..., corrupted> and I told him that he is now a Senator. He asked of HAJ RASHID AGHA[588] and I told him that he is dead and that he was my grandfather. He also asked about ALY PASHA DOBRA NATCHI[589] and I told him that he also is a Member of the Senate. These are all the people about whom he asked me. I had tea and biscuits with him and he asked me what I needed and I replied that I wished to enter the college of Social Science. He promised that he would inform Major Müller of the result. He then escorted me to my lodging and left me.

<…>

Q. What Iraqis did you meet?

A. I met none in Berlin; I heard from Koneiczny that YUNIS BAHRI[590] had been dismissed from the broadcasting service. I also heard that the ex-Mufti el Husseini was in Berlin where he delivered speeches in the Berlin Mosque every Friday. I heard of no one else.

A. Naturally, you have heard of the "KHOYBUN[591]" and of SHERIF PASHA its leader; did you see Sherrif Pasha in Berlin, or hear of him?

[585] This name was requested by British interrogators from other prisoners (documents not reproduced here). It referred to Caskel (probably a code name used by Abwehr).

[586] The battle of Gaugamela (1 October 331 BC) that ended with a crushing defeat of the Persians.

[587] A senior Islamic cleric from an influential family in Erbil. During the Gailani coup, he sheltered the royal family.

[588] The grandfather of Ramzi.

[589] An influential family clan from Mosul, from whose ranks many Ottoman dignitaries originated.

[590] Jounis Bahri (1903–1979) was an Arab nationalist from Mosul with pro-German sympathies. He was the presenter of an anti-British radio programme financed by the Germans and had close ties to the „Grand Mufti“ al-Husseini (see above FN 441).

[591] Khoybun (‘to be oneself’) was the name of a Kurdish nationalist party founded in Lebanon in 1927 that advocated independence for Kurdistan. It had branches in Syria, Lebanon, Europe and the United States. Its

A. I heard of the existence of the KHOYBUN and I understand <..., corrupted> Turkey, but I do not know where the committee is or how it is organised. I do not know whether SHERIFF is, or was, the leader of this society; I do not know whether he was in BERLIN.

Q. Have you heard of any member of the Badr Khan family, such as Doctor KAMURAN, JELADAT and others in Aleppo, Berlin or elsewhere?

A. No, I neither know them nor have I heard of them.[592]

<…>

Q. Did Professor HADANK or any other officer ask you to describe the conditions of tribes in Iraq or Iran. If so name them.

A. Not one questioned me on this except Major Müller who asked me whether I knew the PIRAN TRIBE AND NEIGHBOURHOOD, or SEWAR AGHA. I replied that I did not know them.

Q. Do you know of any other Kurd who is to come to Iraq in a plane as you did, or have you heard of anything of this nature?

A. Yes; I heard that the Germans were looking for another KURD in ISTANBUL intending to take him to Berlin to accompany Dr. OEHLER, Klein Schmidt, Grosse SCHMIDT, and KLEITER[593] who were in need of a guide. I also understood that all these were studying Kurdish under Professor Hadank.

Q. Did Professor Hadank use any books for his lecture?

A. Yes; he used „KURMANJI GRAMMAR“ in English & Kurdish by J. B. Soane[594], „ROWANDUZ HANDBOOK“ by one Hamilton and another by Captain HAY „Two years in Kurdistan“. He used to mention frequently the name of HAMA DASHIN, the famous Kurdish bandit whose name was mentioned frequently in a book called „<…, corrupted> ROWANDUZ“[595] by Hamilton. He spoke of

most prominent representatives were the brothers Jeladet and Kamuran Ali Bedirkhan and, in Iran, Nuri Pasha. The party dissolved in 1946. See p. 13, p. 21 – 24, p. 112 and p. 200.

[592] This is a typical example of the efficient interrogation methods used by the British, who already knew at this point that Ramzi had been involved with Khoybun.

[593] Kelaita.

[594] Ely Banister Soane, Grammar of the Kurmanji or Kurdish language, London 1913.

[595] Maybe the article The Construction of the Rowanduz Road“ von Hamilton (s. Bibliography).

Hama Deshin's notions and compared them with the habits and customs of the Kurds of Northern Iraq.[596]

Q. Did you ever hear MAKHMUR QAIMA[597]mentioned?

A. Yes; it was mentioned by the lecturer that the surface of the Land in Makhmur was suitable for aeroplane landings even though there are no aerodromes. Dr. OEHLER was thus marking it on the maps during the lecture in the hut (near Klagenfurt).

Q. While you were in Berlin did you gather that the Germans knew of the presence of POLISH TROOPS in Iraq and of their relations with the Iraqi people and the British?

A. While I was in the O.K.W. office I learned that a report had been received stating that Polish and AMERICAN troops had arrived in Iraq, but I heard nothing about their relations with the British or the Iraqis. And I did not hear of anything said against the British in Iraq; all the talk was against the Russians.

<…>

Q. What conversation passed between you and Hoffmann in that time span?[598]

A. During the talks we had he welcomed me and said that I would useful to them especially in the teaching of Kurdish and that he and Konieczny would accompany me to Berlin and assist me in any way I needed. He told me that he had been a teacher of engineering in Afghanistan and told me that he had many friends there. He also said that his parents had been with him in Afghanistan. He told me that really he was not on good terms with Major Müller and did not trust him. When he learned that Major Müller was to come with me to Iraq by plane he was disgusted but said that he could not refuse to come. He continually pressed me not to mention any conversation that had passed between us. It was was when he told me of this that I realised that I was to accompany them; I asked Hoffmann whether I could refuse to do so but he advised me against this as they had been waiting to get hold of someone who knew Kurdish.

<…>

Müller told me that he, Hoffmann, and Koneczny would be taking a trip to Iraq and that as we had passed some time together and had become friends, he requested me to accompany them. I asked him how it was proposed that we should travel and he replied by aeroplane from Berlin to the crimea and from the Crimea to Iraq where we would make a landing by parachute. When I heard this I told him that while at the A<merican> U<niversity> B<eirut> the University doctor had examined me and had found that I have a weak heart. He said that he would have me medically examined. This finished

[596] Archibald Milne Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan, London 1958 (first edition 1937) mentions in Chapter VI the famous bandit Hamada Chin, with whom he had unwittingly stayed as a guest. At that time, however, the man in question was already in his old age.

[597] A settlement 20 km south of Arbil.

[598] During the preparations for the Mammut mission in Germany.

our talk and we separated. That evening I asked Hoffmann whether I could refuse to join the expedition but he advised me not to disclose my feelings. Next morning I went for medical examination by a military doctor. The doctor did not tell me the result but Major Müller told me that I had been passed ‚fit'. <… They said they intended to give me the rank of a sergeant.

I told them that everyone in Arbil knew we and it would be useless for me to pretend that I was a soldier. He then told me that he had with him a Kurdish style outfit which I could have if I wished; at the time I was wearing ordinary civilian clothes – a suit. He brought it and it proved to be the one which was made under my direction in the house in the home town of Müller[599] by Frau Müller. I thereupon put it on.

<…>

Q. What was the intention of the Germans who descended by parachute with you?

A. I already have said that they wanted to make a rebellion in Iraq with help[600] the Kurdish people which would, they hoped, involve the Kurds of Turkey and Iran as well. The<y> also intended to communicate about the operations and military movements by W/T with Germany. The rebellion was to have been carried out with the help of the Kurdish tribal leaders as also I have previously stated, and for this reason they brought with them many presents. Major Müller told me that he had two bags of Golden English pounds, Turkish, Persian and American money in notes; also rifles. If it should have happened that they had succeeded in their mission they intended to bring more arme by planes to be landed by parachutes for distribution amoung the rebels.

Q. You stated that Major Müller & his party had a Kurdish flag; describe this flag.

A. I have not seen the flag.[601] Major Müller told me that he had made one in gold and silver; it was Red, White and Green with the sun in the centre. The sun was of golden stripes (indicates the rays). He told me that it was a large flag; I have not seen it.

Q. Did they make any medallions of this flag for wearing in the coat?

A. I do not know anything of this.

<…>

[599] Conjecture.

[600] Conjecture.

[601] Ramzi is not telling the truth here. He had indeed seen the flag and Müller even mentioned details about it. For further details, see Pherset Rosbeiani, Das Unternehmen „Mammut", p. 180f.

Q. Do you know the leaders whom Müller wanted to contact?

A. I have seen photographs of some Kurds with Major Müller.[602] Among these I recognised Sheikh Mahmud; this photograph had been personally presented to Müller when the latter had visited him in Baghdad. I also saw with him some photographs of Kakho Majid Hamadachin[603], the bandit who was pardoned by the Government. I have heard recently that he was killed. I did not recognise any of the other photographs.

<…>

TNA KV 2/1735

<…>

Q. You mentioned that Major MÜLLER had some photographs of Persian and Iraqi personalities. How many of these had he and how many beyond Sheikh Mahmud did you recognise?

A. He had some 50 or 60 such photographs among whom I recognised Müller taken in Kurdish clothes in Sulaimania riding a horse and with five other standing around <side note: „Müller has not mentioned“>. All these wore Kurdish clothes but I did not / but recognise any of them. There were also 4 or 5 photographs of men in suits and sidara[604] but these also I failed to identify. Müller did not tell me; he used to ask me as to their identity.

[602] The photos are published in Müllers book „Durchs verschlossene Kurdistan“.

[603] Name in part deduced. See above FN 596 concerning Hamada Chin.

[604] A sidara is an iraqi hat.

Whereabouts and fate of the agents

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

[to:] A.J. Kellar, Esq.[605], Box 500, Parliament Street, B.O., LONDON S.W. 1

General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, 26th July, 1943

Subject: „Mammut“ Party

1. I have been in Baghdad helping C.I.C.I. to interrogate a party of four Abwehr Abt II, Berlin parachutistis and enclose now two copies of a very short summary which I have prepared, chiefly for the purpose of obtaining rather than imparting information <…>.
2. The present situation is that KONIECZNY, HOFFMANN and RAMZI have broken and are telling us almost all they know. The first two, as German officers, spent a considerable amount of time in the M.E. departement offices of the Abwehr in the O.K.W. Headquarters in the Tirpitz Ufer[606] and although they did not have access to current files, they were able to pick up many odd scraps of very interesting information. They will shortly be sent to Cairo for further and cooler interrogation, after the Iraqi police have taken formal statements from them.[607]
3. RAMZI’s future is more obscure. At the moment he is being interrogated by the Iraqi police and will then be handed over to C.I.C.I.[608] for British local interrogation, after which he may be sent to Cairo.
4. MÜLLER is already here – the Iraqis having finally released him temporarily to S.I.M.E.[609] through C.I.C.I. after pressure from the Minister of State.[610] During his detention in Baghdad he gained complete ascendancy over his Iraqi guards and it was therefore quite impracticable to interrogate him while he was able to maintain in such a truculent state of mind. He is not afraid to die and we may have difficulty in breaking him, but if we suceed he should be extremely interesting because he must know a great deal about the Abwehr and the Lehrregiment Brandenburg and their present activities and intentions in the Middle East as well as in Iraq and Persia.
   <…> Yours sincerely, (M.N. Forrest)

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[605] Alexander J. Kellar was the head of the Middle East Desk within the British counterintelligence service in London (MI 5, see FN 611). Adrian O'Sullivan, Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran), The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45, Houndmills New York 2015, p. 30f.

[606] = Abwehr II/Ost or SOS. See the respective remarks in the Introduction.

[607] The members of the Mammut company were initially taken to Baghdad. Although Iraq was de facto under British control, it was formally a sovereign state.

[608] = Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq.

[609] For SIME, see FN 611. For the chronology of events, see the beginning of Müller's interrogation, above, p. 136ff.

[610] = Minister Resident in the Middle East, later Minister of State (1944). Key political figure in the British administration in the Middle East, also acting as mediator for the military. At times also a member of Winston Churchill's War Cabinet (until the end of 1943). During the period in question, the post was held by the Australian Richard Casey.

TNA, KV 2 / 1734

S.I.M.E.[611]

General Headquarters

Middle East Forces

SIME/500/14/5

6th August, 1943

UNTERNEHMUNG MAMMUT

Dear Kellar,

<…>

MÜLLER has started to talk, and I was told[612] this morning by Maj <…, corrupted> that he has at last admitted that he was a member of AST VIENNA from <…, corrupted> to May 1942 and that during this period he travelled to TURKEY, I think under[613] another name. I am therefore now trying to get THOMSON[614] to identify here[615] his photograph.

Yours, sincerely,

M.N. Forrest, Major

[to:] A.J. KELLAR, Esq.,

Box 500, Parliament Street, B.O., LONDON S.W. 1

[611] = Security Intelligence in the Middle East. SIME was the British central agency for counterintelligence and intelligence gathering in Cairo. It was where the British counterintelligence service (MI 5, roughly comparable to Abwehr III at OKW) and the intelligence gathering service (MI 6, roughly comparable to Abwehr I) worked together. SIME was directly responsible for the Middle East Command area, i.e. from the West African coast to Syria, but also worked closely with the corresponding agencies of the Persian and Iraq Command, and even dominated them. Ultimately, all British intelligence activities from the Atlantic coast to Persia, the Black Sea and the Gulf of Aden were coordinated in Cairo. The agency was disbanded in 1958. Roger Arditti, Security Intelligence in the Middle East (SIME): Joint Security Intelligence Operations in the Middle East, c. 1939 – 58. In: Intelligence and National Security, 31.2016, Issue 3, pp. 369 -396.

[612] Conjecture.

[613] Conjecture.

[614] No further information on this person.

[615] Conjecture.

TNA KV 2/1735

Defence Security Office

C.I.C.I. Iraq

(Baghdad)

18th August, 1943

Special Security Report No. <…, corrupted>

ACTION (Continued).

At the end of July, Müller was taken to Mideast[616] to undergo a fuller interrogation than was possible in Baghdad, and in a few days time Hoffmann and Konieczny, who have undergone further interrogation here, are to be taken to Middle East as well. Ramzi Nafi Rashid, as an Iraqi citizen, is being held a little longer by the Iraqi Autorities who have subjected him to a very thorough examination and will interrogate him further as the material for such interrogation is made available from Middle East. It is hoped that he too will be taken to Middle East at a later date.

The seperate interrogations are proceeding satisfactorily, but since the records of them are arriving in almost daily instalments, the following report must be regarded as being of an Interim nature. It is possbile that some of the items included here may as a result of further information be subject to amendment.

INFORMATION REVEALED BY MÜLLER

(a) According to Müller, the Germans, having been driven out of the Caucasus, are planning as regards this command mission[617] to immobilize as many British troops as possible and generally to hinder the smooth working of the United Nations'[618] War Effort by acts of sabotage, by fomenting trouble among the tribes and by organising resistance against any Government friendly to the British; the two main objects of his own expedition being sabotage and the instigation of a revolt among the Kurds.
(b) The plan was ambitiously designed but was based on a very inadequate appreciation of the nature and extent of the problems and difficulties involved. In Koneiczny's opinion Müller was a ‚line shooter' who was less concerned with the actual suitability of his plan than with the

[616] = SIME in Kairo. = SIME in Cairo.

[617] Conjecture.

[618] The term 'United Nations' here does not refer to the international community as it came into being in 1945, but to the Allies and their allies in the Second World War.

putting stories[619] of it and of himself to senior officers. In all its preliminary training, the expedition was heavily handicapped by a lack of information as to the country and its personalities. There are not many Germans that have expert knowledge of Iraq and the mission was forced to rely for its information on tribal life and customs on a few text books such as Hamilton's „Road through Kurdistan", Soane's „Two Years in Kurdistan" and the British Military Reports on Kurdistan for 1936 and notes[620] of lectures by a Professor Hadank who had been commissioned before the war by the Prussian Ministry of Education to edit and publish the mass of philological material chiefly Kurdish that had been collected before the war of 1914-1918 by another German scholar[621]. Hadank visited Iraq before the war and was know to a number of British officials here, one of whom has described him as ‚thin, dramatic, sour behind gold spectacles, with a drearily academic manner'. The effect he made on his German pupils[622] was little more inspiring than that which he had made on the British in Baghdad.

(c) The mission started that is to say without any real knowledge of the territory in which it was to work. It pictured the Kurds as discomforted minority that was ready to welcome any enemy of the British who arrived with gifts and arms. And it relied a great deal on receiving assistance from Sheikh Mahmud after whom the expedition had been christened ‚Mammut', and whose character and record[623] had been completely misunderstood. Even if it had had luck with him[624], which it certainly did not, the mission could scarcely have succeeded far.

(d) At the start Müller had intended to land in Persia, south of Lake Urmia, probably in the Saqqiz area. Mainly, however, as a result of Ramzi's enrolement in the party, he was persuaded to settle in the hills of Iraq, just west of the border, finally selecting as his objective a spot where there is no village, 40 kilometres north-north west of the sharp bend in the little Zab river at Rania.

(e) Müller enumerated the aims of his mission under six sub-headings:
(i) Destruction of means of communication (bridges, railways, telephones, telegraphs) by sabotage.
(ii) To incite a Kurdish revolt in Iraq and Persia. He was strictly forbidden to start a revolt in Turkey.
(iii) Approach the central sector of the Trans-Persian railway and blow up railway lines – an aim that was included mainly as a piece of ‚window dressing' to help ‚sell' the idea.
(iv) Destruction of military arms, munitions, food supply depots by fire or explosives.
(v) Minor sabotage such as cutting of brake lines on railway trains, and causing hot havoc and to do[625] damage to railway carriages by putting sand in the axle boxes.
(vi) Transmission to Germany of military intelligence by W/T.

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[619] Conjecture.

[620] Conjecture.

[621] Oskar Mann.

[622] This refers to the members of the Mammut group.

[623] Conjecture.

[624] Conjecture.

[625] Conjecture.

(f) (i) Müller hoped that the revolt among the Kurds would spread sufficiently for him to establish an emergency laying ground in which case a captured French transport aircraft was to be put at his disposal in which war material and supplies could be brought to him from Simferopol in the Crimea.
(ii) When asked how he proposed to carry out acts of sabotage without explosives and sabotage material, since he had brought none with him, he stated that he hoped to have such material sent to him later by aircraft. He also hoped to capture some on the spot.

(g) For reasons of propaganda it was intended to send a little later a female gynaecologist to join the mission, it being believed that a reduction of infant mortality particularly at child birth, would have a good effect upon the Kurds. This was Ramzi's idea. The gynaecologist in question was to be the head of a Woman's Propaganda Group in Kurdistan.

(h) The second half of Müller's expedition under Doktor Oehler was to follow as soon as Müller wirelessed that he was ready for it. If no word reached Berlin within six months the Group was to be dissolved. Oehler stated however that he proposed to come whatever happened, and Müller considers it possible that Oehler might have already started for Müller's original destination, with Kelaita and the two Schmids, and a Kurd called Alusi,[626] who in June was ill. It seems hardly likely however that Oehler would be in a position to make such a decision on his own responsibility and it must be presumed that the Germans know by now that Müller and his three companions have been captured.

<…>

Little of the information that Müller originally gave us concerning himself was true. He is neither a regular soldier nor a Major. After serving as a conscript from February '36 to November '38, he worked as a shop assistant and travelling salesman until he was called up in Juni 40. He was not commissioned until March 41. Most of his commissioned service has been spent in civilian clothes in various parts of Europe whith various aliases and covers, and it was not until the day he left on this expedition that he took the initiative with regard to his promotion and put up a Major's epaulettes.
(ii) His career in intelligence has been extremely interesing and now that he has broken down under interrogation he should provide some very valuable information.

<…>

H.K. Dawson Shepherd

Squadron Leader,

Defence Security Officer

[626] This refers to Aloisi (see above, p. 116).

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

APPENDIX 'A'

SPECIAL SECURITY REPORT NO. <…, corrupted>

German Parachutist Expedition against Iraq (Interim Report)

As the distribution list of the security Summary and the Special Reports are identical, this fourth interim report is bein sent out as an Appendix to security Summary No. 58.

1. Action (con'd)
   (a) Hoffmann, Konieczny and Ramzi Nafi Rashid have now been taken to Middle East for fuller interrogation than was possible in Baghdad. No account had yet reached us of the course that their interrogation has followed.
   (b) The interrogation of Müller has continued satisfactorily and later reports have not contradicted the information conveyed in Special Security Report No. 3.
   (c) Müller has been very communicative during interrogation. He has supplied a great deal of most valuable technical information concerning the workings of the German espionage and sabotage organisation. He has also supplied us with much information concerning other expeditons that have been planned and in some cases actually undertaken.
2. Additional information received from Müller
   (a) Müller has stated that the intelligence received by the Germans concerning Iraq and Persia is most unreliable but the satisfactory information concerning the shipping situation in Basra is received by W/T. Every effort is being made to locate the wireless set used to transmit this information.
   (b) Müller supplied a number of separate pieces of intelligence that he had received concerning Iraq and Persia. It was all of a very elementary nature and much of it was incorrect.
3. Khoybun Society
   (a) Müller has stated that Ramzi Nafi Rashid was a member of the Khoybun Society, knew many of its leaders and was anxious to meet on arrival in Iraq a fellow member in Sulaimania. According to Müller, Ramzi had been approached with a view to founding a new society parallel to the Khoybun with similar aims but with more reliable personnel.
   (b) It is felt here, however, that it would be surprising if the Khoybun was involved in this case. The Khoybun to the best of our knowledge has been defunct in Iraq for many years. Furthermore Ramzi is a Turcmar[627] not a Kurd, and therefore unlikely to have Kurdo-Armenian aspirations.

12th September, 1943

[627] Ramzi was not of Turkish origin, although he spoke Turkish fluently, like most of the inhabitants of Erbil.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

SIME, General Headquarters, Middle East <…>, 13th October, 1943, SIME/005/241/1

Dear Kellar,

Many thanks for your letter of the 23rd September with regard to the MAMMUT interrogation. I will answer each of your paragraphs as follows: <…>

All four members of the Party are at the moment at Maadi[628]. I do not think I can get much more out of Ramzi and intend therefore to return him to C.I.C.I. as soon as young HOURANI (an ex-pupil of mine from Mill Hill[629]) from P.I.C.M.E.[630] hast interviewed him on the tribal side.[631] We have nearly finished with KONIECZNY and Ramzi and would be grateful therefore if you could forward, fairly urgently, and further suggestions for their interrogation.

The rather academic interrogation of Müller about sabotage methods, and the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst has been seriously prejudiced by the sudden withdrawal of Tilley to Civil Affairs.[632] Before leaving C.S.D.I.C. he dictated solidly for two days and trieb to explain his notes for two nights and his successor is now preparing from this material a general summarized report on Müller which will run to some 50 or 60 pages and which will contain a corrected version of the material as already forwarded to you along with a considerable amount of fresh material.[633]

The Minister of State promised the Regent of Iraq, through the British Ambassador, that he would return Müller for trial in due course. I think we could persuade the Minister of State to put forward a very strong demand for the retention of Müller for intelligence reasons, if it is really thought worth while. Would you please keep this point in mind and discuss it with the interested people and let me know M.I. 5 and S.I.S.[634] views after you and they have had the opportunity of seeing the consolidated report.[635] It seems to me that Müller, with his rather wide Abwehr experience, would be much more useful to you and to us if he were kept alive either in England or in Egypt, than if he were buried in the desert near Baghdad. Surely the Iraqis lust for blood should be satisfied with the bodies of the wretched Konieczny, Hoffmann and Ramzi. <…>

Yours sincerely, M.N. FORREST, Major. For Colonel G.S.[636] MNF/ZMS

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[628] Suburb of Cairo. This was where the interrogation centre for prisoners of war was located.

[629] Hill School (London) remains one of the leading boarding schools in the United Kingdom to this day.

[630] = Political Intelligence Centre Middle East.

[631] See the following documents for more information.

[632] Tilley took part in the interrogations.

[633] This report was not included in the files of the British National Archives. It is conceivable that some of the material is still being kept under lock and key by the authorities.

[634] = Secret Intelligence Service (= MI 6).

[635] This is likely to be the report dated September 10, 1943.

[636] Unclear.

SIME

General Headquarters

Middle East Forces

14th October, 1943

SIME/005/241/1/I,2

Dear Kellar,

UNTERNEHMUNG MAMMUT

I enclose:

(1) <…>

(2) 2 copies of a short report by C.A. Hourani[637] of P.I.C.M.E.[638] on an interview which I allowed him to have with RAMZI whom he taught at the American University of BEIRUT. C.I.C.I. have now asked me to hold on to RAMZI until such time as I can return the whole party because they are afraid that if I return him without the others the Iraqis will raise a clamour for more blood. It is essential, therefore, that we should at the very earliest opportunity release the whole lot to BAGHDAD and thus procure room in Cairo for the various other prisoners who are flocking inform all round.

Yours sincerely,

M.N. FORREST, Major

For Colonel G.S.

[to:] A.J. KELLAR, Esq.,

Box 500, Parliament Street B.O.,

LONDON; S.W. 1

MNF/PWF

[637] Cecil A. Hourani is the younger brother of the renowned historian and orientalist Albert Habib Hourani (1915–1993). The Houranis are an important Christian family originating from Lebanon who also served and maybe still serve as a link between the British and the Middle East. An interview with Cecil A. Hourani in three parts on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-CCFH28c74.

[638] = Political Intelligence Centre Middle East.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

Report on interrogation of Ramzi Rashid made on October 12th

1. General impression

This was the same as I had of him as a student – that a very naive, unsubtle man, yet capable of grasping things if given time; in other words, he is not so much stupid as very slow in his mental process.

What was now to me is his apparent lack of a will. He is almost a fatalist; events caught him up and carried him along, not so much against his will as with the passive consent of his will. I say „almost a fatalist“ because he is not a complete one. He can see quite well his own error and responsbility for it. It was the first step for which he was responsible – after that the others followed inevitably. This first step was the consent he gave to Roberts [a proposal that he should broadcast in Kurdish from Berlin]. Here was his great error, here, if you like, is his real crime, though it never got past the stage of an intention.

When I asked him why he agreed to broadcast, and whether he did not realise that that alone was an act of disloyalty to his country which might have the most serious consequences for himself if Germany should lose the war, he told me that he never thought seriously of the consequences; that he would be in the same position as many other foreign students in Berlin; and that he desired above all to continue his studies. But I cannot help feeling that there was for Ramzi a certain attraction in the idea of broadcasting from Germany; it was something active, a participation in the war, which so many young men here passionately desire. I know from my experience as a teacher in Beirut what a great attraction Germany has for many students; it is to them an unknown land, full or romance – and you must remember that they are tired of the English, and want something new.

Those, I conjecture, were Ramzi‘ feelings. He was not a politician who wanted to help in defeating England; he was not even a violent Kurdish nationalist. He was a dreamy, slowminded, feeble-willed student with unfulfilled longings for something he knew-not-what, but novel.

Thus even when we say that he inteded an act of disloyalty, we must qualify the statement by saying that he did not fully realise the consequences; which, I suppose, is one of the signs of an immature mind – to will an act without envisaging its consequences.

After the first act, then the rest followed inevitably, it seemed to Ramzi. Whether they need have followed as they did is a question I cannot answer. For much as I tried, I could not get Ramzi to explain exactly he adopted his attitude to Muller, that if they ordered Ramzi he would obey, since he was at his mercy. He says he war frightened, that seeing the uniforms of Müller and the rest he assumed he was under military discipline; and once Müller pointed out to him in the streets of Berlin police whose job is to get rid of unwanted foreigners. But the question I cannot answer is whether, had Ramzi shown more willpower, Müller would have persisted with him. In other words, Ramzi was perhaps not so much foreced as taken advantage of. Müller must have realised what a feeble will he had, and given Ramzi the order which he almost seemed to invite by his attitude. Perhaps Ramzi really would have

been allowed to study and broadcast had he insisted enough? But he does not seem to have insisted at all.

This weekness of will, however, seems to be more consitutional than criminal in Ramzi.

2. Particular Points.

I got nothing new out of Ramzi, but the following may be of interest.

a. He insisted that Robert[639] had offered assistance to Ramzi to continue his studies. Robert told him that no student could go to Germany unless they did some war work, but that on those conditions he could go.
b. He denies all knowledge of the people whom Müller was to meet in Iraq. But he says that he believes Müller has a list with him, and thinks it was in one of the boxes.
c. Müller also had a Persian letter.
d. He says that Kaskel[640] did not ask about UTHMAN and TOGRAMACHI[641] as friends, but as prominent personalities. This seems unplausible. How does Ramzi know?, and anyway, they are not particularly prominent.
e. I asked him why, if the Germans had met no-one in Iraq, Müller wanted to send back K<onieczny> to Germany. He said that it was to take the news that they had landed in the wrong place, and to bring ammunition. This also seems unplausible. And even if they did land in the wrong place, they landed very conveniently near to Ramzi's house.[642]

(SGD.) C<ecil>.A. HOURANI

Oct. 13th 1943

[639] See the interrogation of Ramzi above.

[640] = Caskel.

[641] The information provided by Ramzi to Cecil Hourani is accurate. The Doğramacı family is a wealthy and well-known family in Erbil. The other person mentioned in the text, UTHMAN, is Judge ʿUthman, a member of the Mullah Effendi family branch. This ʿUthman was the father of the first governor of Erbil, Ahmed ʿUthman (1879–1946).

[642] This is a very unprecise assessment by Hourani.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

P.F. 65930/B.l.B/AJK

27th October, 1943

Major M.N. Forrest,

SIME

c/o GHQ, Cairo.

Dear Forrest,

Many thanks for you SIME/005/241/1 of 13.10.43 and SIME/005/241/1/I.2 of 14.10.43 indicating the stage which you have at present reached in the MAMMUT interrogations.

We are all most anxious at this end to keep MÜLLER alive as long as possible for he had provided us with a mine of new and valuable information which even now has not been wholly digested. <…> There may well be other questions we shall consider for[643] further reflection to put to MÜLLER, so I hope you will be able[644] to retain him ultimately as a ready reference. I have taken the freedom of raising the question of MÜLLER's future vis-à-vis the Intelligence Officer[645] Maunsell[646] and he has asked me to say that he will discuss the matter with[647] you on his return.

<…>

I also enclose the following three documents which y<…> possibly find interesting:

1. C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) – Report S.I.R.l 3, dated 18.11.42. which gives some useful information about Stahnsdorf, the main Abwehr W/T centre outside Berlin, and locates <…> Krumme Lanke, about which we had not previously heard. Any more information on this Signals station would therefore be interesting.
2. C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) report S.I.R. 7, dated 19.3.43. – which will add further to your records on the Brandenburg Division.

[643] Conjecture.

[644] Conjecture.

[645] Conjecture.

[646] Raymond Maunsell was Defence Security Officer at SIME and an important link between SIME and MI 5 in London. He was a tank officer and had served in the Transjordan Frontier Force in 1930–31. Adrian O'Sullivan, Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran), The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45, Houndmills New York 2015, pp. 3–6 et seq. Roger Arditti, Security Intelligence in the Middle East (SIME): Joint Security Intelligence Operations in the Middle East, c. 1939–58. In: Intelligence and National Security, 31.2016, Issue 3, pp. 369–396.

[647] Conjecture.

3. Extract from the Consolidated Report on the 8 saboteurs captured in America in June 1942, which describes with interesting detail the Division's sabotage school at Regenwurmlager near Meseritz.
4. The fact remains that our information on Abt. II has not <…> yet had time to tackle its Berlin personalities. The result is that it it difficult to provide you with any complete and up-to-date account of this department of the Abwehr, but I hope the different papers I have sent out to you will help to give you some of the background material you require. I am hoping to be given some additional and much needed assistance for our Mid-East work, and this will enable me to have some original research done on requests you send us from time to time for information.

<…>

Yours sincerely,
A.J. Kellar.

S.I.M.E., General Headquarters, Middle East Forces

SIME/005/241/1/I.2

31.10.43

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

Dear Kellar,

Here are two copies of the first detailed interrogation report on MÜLLER, which I must admit I have not yet had time to read.

We have now finished with HOFFMANN, KONIECZNY and RAMZI, and I am anxious to clear them out from our over-populated cells back to IRAQ.

It is essential that we should com to a decision about MÜLLER very soon. I should be grateful, therefore, for your views most urgently now.

Yours sincerely,

Martin (N.M.) FORREST

A.J. Kellar, Esq.,

Pos No. 500 Parliament Street, LONDON, S.W. 1.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

P.F. 65930/B.l.B./AJK.

12.11.43

Dear Cairnorosa,

Herewith a copy of the 1st detailed interrogation report on MÜLLER which has just reached us. Perhaps we could discuss some time whether there is anything more we can usefully send out to Mid-East in the light of this further report.

The personnel of the MAMMUT undertaking will soon have to be returned to the Iraqis for trial and punishment. We are hoping, however, to persuade the Iraqis to keep MÜLLER alive, either in Baghdad or in Cairo, since we feel that he will continue for some time to be useful to us as a ready reference. I gather from our recent telephone conversation that you agree with this view.

Yours sincerely,

A.J. Kellar.

J. Cairnorosa, Esq., Section. W.E., AJK/MB.

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

SECRET

SIME/005/S1 <?> /1/CIO

SIME

General Headquarters, Middle East Forces

12. January 44

MAMMUT

[to:] A.J. KELLAR, Esq., Box 500, Parliament St., B.O., LONDON SW 1, MNF/MS]

Dear Kellar,

<…>

I appreciate immensly all the conscientious beavering which you have undertaken in this case, and which has, in fact, made it possible to batter the truth out of MÜLLER. I am very sorry about all the confused CSDIC reference numbers which have cropped up, but these are now obsolete with our new organisation.

Yours sincerely, M.N. FORREST, Major.

For Colonel, G.S.

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

S.I.M.E.

General Headquarters

Middle East Forces

January 21st 1944

SECRET

SIME/005

Subject: Mammut

Dear Kellar,

The following is a copy of the relevant paragraphs from a letter which I have received from Dawson-Shepherd regarding the Iraqi attitude towards MÜLLER.

„The situation with regard to Müller is that Nuri has stated verbally to H.E. the British Ambassador that the British Security authorities may retain Müller for such time as he may be of use to them. The Ambassador interprets this as for the duration.

He has warned me however that if Nuri[648] falls from power we might well be faced with a demand for the return of Müller. That eventuality, he added, could however be dealt with when and if it arisen, and I maintain that you wuld be well advised to get Müller over to England at the earliest opportunity so that if Nuri does fall from power and the request for Müller is made, the difficulty of getting him back from England, due to shipping space etc.etc. might weigh in our favour and enable us to retain him until the conclusion of hostilities."

Rothschild, according to DS/215/44 of 14th January does not seem any more to want Müller in England and in accordance therefore, with your general wishes, I propose to keep the man available here for any questions which crop up locally or which you may dare to send us from time to time. There would of course be no particular difficulty in sending Müller to England nor that the Mediterranean is open, provided that he is returned in due course.

Yours sincerely,

M.N. FORREST, Major,

For Colonel, G.S.

[to:] A.J. KELLAR, Esq., Box 500, Parliament St., B.O., LONDON, SW 1, MNF/DMM

[648] Nuri as-Said 1888–1958, Iraqi Prime Minister and one of the most important persons of British rule in Iraq. He was assassinated during the coup in 1958, along with the royal family.

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

CinC Persia/Iraq

To: The War Office

Recd. 1500 25 Mar 44

IMMEDIATE

I/04229 cipher 25 Mar.

TOP SECRET

For DMI from DDMI

First. Three German parachutists landed 17 June 43 North Iraq were captured 29 June 43 wearing Kurdish dress. Main object expedition to create disturbances including incitement among Kurdish tribes to active rebellion. Secondary object espionage and sabotage our special Sitreps one to five refer.

Second. Iraq Government advised by us not to treat as Prisoners of War but as spies <…>.

Third. Promise of return after interrogation Iraq Gov<ernmen>t handed Germans to us and interrogation carried out over period of seven months July 43 to Feb 44.

Fourth. Germans induced under interrogation give very full extremely valuable information before handed back to Iraq Government on 21 Feb 44.

Fifth. Mental state of parachutists Hoffmann and Müller now believed unbalanced. Hoffman in mental hospital. Müller instigator and leader of party recently on hunger strike on religious grounds. Possbility of Iraq Government treating as PW and discussions at present unofficial basis but request your advice on attitude we adopt.

Sixth. Can you inform me how British parachutists in similar circumstances would be treated?

Seventh. Would you recommend Germans be regarded as PW with possibility obtaining reciprocal treatment from enemy.

C.6 (Telegrams)

To: MI 2 (for action)

Copies to:

DMI, DDMI (I) (S) (P/W), MI 1 (Co-ord), MI 2 2a. 5. 14. 17. 19., DPW, DDPW, PW 2b, Foreign Office (Mr. Dundas)

TNA, KV 2 / 1737

Extract for File No. PF 65930, Name: MÜLLER

Dated: 12.7.44 (rec'd)

Original from DSO[649] CICI, Iraq.

Extracted on: 3.8.44, By JEM, Section RB

FROM SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 64 PERIOD 1st June – 1st July 1944

MAMMUT EXPEDITION

(a) As was prophesied in Security Summary No. 63, para. 3, the Iraqi Government had asked the British authorities to take over the three German parachutists, as they themselves have no facilities for dealing with Prisoners of War and the Germans have committed no offence under the Iraqi Penal Code. Thus closes, as far as this office is concerned, an operation which, so we have been informed, has provided British Intelligence with more fresh information concerning enemy methods and organisation than any other espionage case, with on major exception[650], since the war began. MÜLLER himself, in spite of his low rank, was a prominent member of the Abwehr and he gave us apparently all the information of which he was possessed.
(b) Efforts are being made by the British authorties to hasten the trial of RAMZI NAFI RASHID, but the present alleged congestion in the law courts provides an obstacle.
(c) The gross cost to the Iraqi Government of housing the parachutists as denenus was ID 10 a day and not as stated in Security Summary No. 63, ID 40 a day.

[649] Defence Security Officer, Liaison officer of MI5 (counterintelligence) in colonial territories or the Commonwealth.

[650] No further information could be obtained from the files.

Extract

PF 65950

Name MÜLLER

Original from: CICI A Persia Tribal & Political Intelligence Summary no. 201, Dated / Ref Dat.: 9.1.45

Extracted: 18.2.45 by EHF. Section RB <?>

Items of Interest

RAMZI NAFI' AGHA, the Erbili student who was dropped along with German Parachutists near Mosul in June 1943, has been sentenced to life imprisonment (20 years). For reasons of security this information has been withheld from the General Public.

Extract

P.F. 65950

Name MÜLLER

Original in File No. MIDDLE EAST SECURITY SUMMARY No. 21., Dated 18.1.45

Extracted on 7.2.45, by GR, section RB

Extract form SECURITY SUMMARY MIDDLE EAST, No. 216

Ramzi Nafi Rashid, the Kurdish member of the Mammut parachute expediton which landed near Mosul in June 1943, has been sentenced by the Iraqi Courts to 20 years imprisonment.

TNA, KV 2 / 1736

Secret Telegram for Despatch in Cipher

To: S.I.M.E.

10.11.43

Signed D. C. WHITE

Reference to your letter No. SIME/005/241/1/1 of 31.10.43

<…>

PREPARATION

Geography, economics, communications <...>

The following material was available for instruction purposes:

(a) Dr. CASKEL's exposé on KURDISTAN
(b) Müller's own experiences on his journey to KURDISTAN early in 1926[651].
(c) GERMAN „military-geographical" treatis, an illustrated work in two volumes on IRAQ and IRAN. Published in 1941.
(d) GERMAN translation of a BRITISH Military Report on IRAQ, issued by the War Office in 1936.[652] (KONIECZNY and HOFFMANN give 1937/38 as the date of its publication). This report deals especially with traffic and communications in IRAQ.
(e) ENGLISH work by an author named HAMILTON: „Two Years in KURDISTAN" (or some similar title). HAMILTON is known to AGT as an engineer who worked on the construction of the RUWANDIZ Road and its bridges. Amonst other ilustrations, this book contained the photograph of a bridge in the RUWANDIZ Road, and also, according to KONIECZNY, an air photograph of ERBIL.

On: Geography, economics, communications Instruction was given by:

MÜLLER. Who lectured on his own experiences; on the GERMAN Military-geographical Report on IRAQ and IRAN; and on the BRITISH Military Report on IRAQ.

At ABW, BERLIN. 16 – 27 Mar.43:

And at BODENTAL. During both stays.

Dr. HADANK. Who lectured on HAMILTON'S book „Two years in KURDISTAN", during both stays.

[651] This refers to Müller's journey, which took place in 1935/36.

[652] For this report (produced not by the War Office, but by the Air Ministry) see above.

On: Ethnology, dialects, and tribal customs. <…> Instructions were given by:

Dr. HADANK. Author of a textbook on West KURDISH grammar,[653] which he used together with SOANE's treatis on the SULEIMANYAN dialect.[654]

MATTHAIKIRCHPLATZ 11/13, BERLIN, 16 – 27 March 43.

Ethnology dialects and tribal custom

Dr. CASKEL. Who lectured on the names of the various tribes and their respective chiefs.

At ABW, BERLIN. Mid May 1943.

[653] = „Kurdisch-Persische Forschungen" (Mann / Hadank) or a special extract from this series.

[654] This is likely to have been Ely Banister Soane, Grammar of the Kurmanji or Kurdish language, London 1913. Other publications by Soane apart from his well-known book "Through Kurdistan in Disguise": Report on the Sulaimania district of Kurdistan, 1910, downloadable at: http://www.kurdishacademy.org/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Sulaimania_district_of_Kurdistan.pdf (revised in 2008) and Notes on the Southern Tribes of Kurdistan, Baghdad 1918.

Pictures

(The following pictures are largely taken from the archive of the Ramzi family)

Ramzi's grandfather Haji Rasheed Agha Waysi Agha (1852-1939)

Attaulla Agha (1880-1963), the oldest son of Haji Rasheed Agha

Ramzi’s father, Nafie Agha (1887-1955)

Nafie Agha on horseback in Tarjan village

Musa Agha (1904-1960) the youngest son of Haji Rasheed Agha with Ramzi' brother Suad Nafie Agha (1929-1991)



Ramzi in his early youth

Diwaxana (guesthouse) of Rasheed Agha on the southeast rim of Erbil Citadel

Ramzi, standing first on the left with Kameran Badrxan sitting in the middle, next to him Akrem Jameel Bag, and Noraddin Zaza standing in the middle

Qasri Atawla Agha, inside view. The family mansion was built in 1918 by Aziz Qrat,

a Turkish mason from Arzarum



Hajj Rashid Agha at the opening ceremony of the Erbil Employees Club in 1932

Haji Rasheed Agha, sitting first on the right, reception meeting of King Ghazi of Iraq in Erbil

Ramzi in the front of the picture with his cousins Mohamad and Mutasam Fatah Chalabi

Ramzi on the left with Rafiq Tofiq and Mustafa Agha Uzeiri

Ramzi with Kirkuk high school soccer team, 20.04.1937

Ramzi with a friend (maybe Georg Konieczny), location is in Austria or Germany

Mosul in the early 1940s, during the period when members of Operation Mammut landed and attempted to cross this bridge, and they may have passed by this coffee shop.

Qasri Atawla Agha. The room with two windows on the right is where Ramzi and his companions stayed when arrived in Erbi)

Noraddin Agha (1882-1963) son of Haji Rasheed Agha and Ramzi's uncle, he persuaded Ramzi to surrender after his German companions where arrested and all males of Ramzi's family were arrested including his father, brothers, and cousins.

Suad Nafei Agha (1929-03/05/1991), Ramzis younger brother. Despite of his young age, he was sentenced to life and reduced to two years under probation in Baghdad for his role in helping Ramzi and his companions

Ramzi's grave is located in the cemetery of the Sheikhi Choli Mosque in Erbil



Saman Suad Agha, nephew of Ramzi, with Gottfried Johannes Müller during Müller's visit to Erbil in southern Kurdistan in 1992

Biokai Gawra Village (2026), which was used as a hiding place

by participants in Operation Mammut.

The village of Benslawa, where the participants in Operation Mammut first hid, was a hideout and resembled a small cave, but today it doesn't look like that.

A canal on the outskirts of the village of Binslawa, where Ramzi hid before surrendering himself to the Iraqi police along with his uncle Nawaldin Agha, after the three Germans had been arrested a day earlier.

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